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ABSTRACT
The issues in this dissertation reside at the intersections of, and relationships between,
topics concerning the meaning of generic generalizations, natural language modality,
the nature and role of moral principles, and the place of supererogation in the over-
all structure of the normative domain. In ’Generics and Weak Necessity’, I argue
that generics—exception-granting generalizations such as ’Birds fly’ and ’Tigers are
striped’—involve a covert weak necessity modal at logical form. I argue that this im-
proves our understanding of the variability and diversity of generics. This chapter
also argues that we can account for variability concerning normative generics within
a modal approach to generics. In ’The Genericity of Moral Principles’, I provide evi-
dence for the view that moral principles are generic generalizations, and, on the basis
of this claim, argue that moral principles do not provide adequate support for reason-
ing about the moral statuses of particular cases. In ’Supererogation and the Structure
of the Normative Domain’, I investigate the diversity of the central normative modal
notions and argue that we should distinguish between two senses of supererogation
based different ways deontic modals are sensitive to background information.
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Introduction
1
1.1 THE APPRECIATION OF MODAL DIVERSITY
When we say that a principle or concept involves some modal element, there is a wide
variety of notions we might have in mind. However, the diversity of modal notions
is not carefully acknowledged enough. One interesting example of this phenomenon
comes from the literature on the norm of assertion. Several authors, who presumably
take themselves to be discussing the very same norm, will use different normative
modals when stating the norm of assertion.
Here is Timothy Williamson’s statement of the knowledge norm of assertion:
(1) Onemust: assert p only if one knows p.1
Here is Jennifer Lackey stating the same norm:
(2) One should assert p only if one knows p.2
In a radical twist, John Turri uses a permissive modal:
(3) Onemay assert p only if one knows p.3
Finally, here is Jessica Brown, ommitting any mention of a modal when stating the
knowledge norm:
1Williamson (1996, 494). Also see Williamson (2000).
2Lackey (2007, 594).
3Turri (2013, 559). It is explicitly acknowledged that Turri takes himself to be talking about the knowl-
edge norm and cites Williamson, but in a footnote notes that while Williamson uses must, he prefers may
for the formulation of the norm.
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(4) Assert p only if one knows p.4
Perhaps one reaction to have here is that these authors are not being precise enough.
Although they have the same notion in mind—namely that there the knowledge norm
of assertion is a constitutive norm—they have not settled onwhich of these formulations
correctly represents the intended notion.
The need for further attention to detail when it comes to acknowledging the diversity
of modal terms is especially important in moral philosophy as well. As Snedegar (2016,
159) writes:
“Ought” is, or at least was, often treated as the central term in moral phi-
losophy. Moral principles and rules were stated using “ought,” moral obli-
gations were ascribed using “ought,” and deontic logicians use a big “O,”
for “ought,” as their deontic necessity operator. In fact, deontic logic—
which deals with deontic necessity and possibility—is sometimes described
as “the logic of ought.”
But more recently philosophers and linguists have emphasized that this is
a mistake. “Ought” is too weak for these purposes. Rules, requirements,
and deontic necessity more generally, are much more naturally expressed
using words like “must” and “have to.”
There is a huge difference between weak necessity modals such as ought and strong
necessity modals such as must, especially because must entails ought, but not the other
4See Brown (2008, 89-90). At the same time, the aim here is to cite Williamson (2000). However, it
should be noted that, later in the paper, Brown (2008, 98) uses must in the formulation of the knowledge
norm.
3
way around. The upshot is that many philosophers are presumably using a notion that
is weaker than intended.
This kind of confusionwithmodals generally feels a bit too common. One of the overar-
ching themes in this dissertation is the acknowledgment and appreciation of the great
diversity associated with these modal notions in natural language. My focus in inves-
tigating this diversity will be primarily on the implications for theorizing in problems
in the philosophy of language and in moral philosophy.
The core themes in this dissertation are GENERICS, MODALITY, and MORALITY:
 Themeaning of generics—exception-granting quasi-generalizations such as ‘Birds
fly’ and ‘Tigers are striped’—and how to account for them in terms of natural lan-
guage modality.
 The nature of moral principles and whether moral reasoning should be based
upon them.
 The diversity of normative notions and how to characterize the concept of su-
pererogation.
The following are the core theses defended in this dissertation:
 That a modal approach to generics should be based on weak necessity modals
and that this helps account for the variability associated with generics.
 That moral principles are generic generalizations and that this supports a partic-
ularist model of moral reasoning on which moral principles do not have a distin-
4
guished role in supporting inferences about particular cases.
 That we need a more diverse conception of supererogation—based on acknowl-
edging differences between deontic modals which are sensitive to actual circum-
stances and those which are not—in order to account for how it can be sometimes
wrong to sometimes go beyond the demands of morality.
The aim of this dissertation is to develop and defend these main theses while engaging
in various supplementary arguments related to issues in the philosophy of language
and moral philosophy along the way.
This introductory chapter provides background material on the topic of modality in
natural language (Section 1.2). Following this, I provide previews of each of the main
chapters in this dissertation (Section 1.3).
1.2 MODALITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGE
1.2.1 THE DIVERSITY OF NATURAL LANGUAGE MODALS
Natural language involves a phenomenon known as displacement. Language does not
always concern the here and now—we also express, for instance, what could be the case
or what should be the case. We can also use language in order to express thoughts about
different times or other counterfactual scenarios:
(5) Over here it is sunny but over there it is raining.
5
(6) Ernie should be coming home soon.
(7) If Big Bird was not present at the meeting, then Oscar the Grouch will take his
place.
Our focus here will be on the sort of displacement which concerns possibility and ne-
cessity. Modal claims and judgments are widespread. These are claims and judgments
about, for instance, what could, should, or must have been. They come in many forms:
(8) a. You cannot bring coffee to the library.
b. You should not break a promise.
c. You cannot drive faster than 500 miles per hour.
d. You must pay your taxes.
Claims about what is possible or necessary are communicated through a diverse range
of constructions. Some of the paradigm means by which we communicate what is
possible or necessary involves the use of modal auxiliaries and semimodal verbs such
asmay, might, can, should, ought, must, ought to, has to, or with the use of certain adverbs
such as possibly, probably, or likely.
These different modal terms can also be interpreted in a number of different ways. For
instance, we can distinguish between various senses of what it means to be necessary
or possible. We might mean that something is necessary in a legal sense, or perhaps in
a logical sense. Some event might be possible nomologically speaking, but might be
impossible biologically speaking.
6
The following sub-section provides an overview of the leading semantic theory of nat-
ural language modality which aims to accommodate this diversity.
1.2.2 KRATZER’S SEMANTICS FOR MODALS
The aim in this section will be to present an overview of the unified semantics for
modality in natural language due to Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012). There are three
dimensions of variability that will concern us which promise to account for the overall
variety of modal meanings:
 Quantificational strength
 Modal base
 Ordering source
One kind of variability has to do with quantificational strength: some modals involve
existential quantification whereas other modals may involve further varying strengths
of universal quantification. Another form of variability concerns what we might call
modal flavor: modals restrict the domain of quantification in different ways according
to background information given by context. And, finally, there is variability of source:
once the domain of quantification is restricted, there is further variation in how the
restriction is made in the sense that the set of worlds we quantify over are ordered
with respect to certain circumstances or ideals. I will now discuss these dimensions of
variability in more detail.
7
The first dimension of variability concerns quantification. Possibility modals appear
weaker than necessity modals. One way to make sense of this idea is that there is
an important parallel between the difference between these modal notions and the
difference between existential and universal quantification. The idea, then, is that we
can understand necessity modals in terms of universal quantification and possibility
modals in terms of existential quantification.5 Indeed, following Horn (1972), observe
that may and must, just like some and every, can be analyzed as duals:
(9) a. Ernie must be home ùñ Ernie may be home
b. Ernie must be home ùñ It’s not the case that it may be the case that Ernie
isn’t home
c. Ernie may be home ùñ It’s not the case that it must be the case that Ernie
isn’t home
d. Every muppet is on Sesame Street ùñ Some muppet is on Sesame Street
e. Every muppet is on Sesame Street ùñ It’s not the case that some muppet
isn’t on Sesame Street
f. Some muppet is on Sesame Street ùñ It’s not the case that every muppet
isn’t on Sesame Street
The second dimension of variability concerns the fact that modal terms get different
readings depending on what flavor we are to use when reading the modal. Here are
some examples of the variety of readings we can assign to modal expressions:
5However, matters are not exactly this straightforward. There is some sub-variability in modals which
involve universal quantification: some modals express weak necessity (e.g. should/ought) and others
express strong necessity (e.g. must/have to). This ends up making for certain complications in the Kratzer
account, especially the question of how it is we are to distinguish between weak and strong necessity
modals. This is the topic of the next sub-section.
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(10) a. Epistemic: Cookie Monster must/might/may have stolen the cookies from
the cookie jar. [given Elmo’s beliefs]
b. Teleological: Cookie Monster must eat less cookies. [given that he wants to
be more healthy]
c. Dispositional/Root: Big Bird can sing the alphabet. [given his abilities]
d. Deontic: Ernie must be home by 6pm. [given Bert’s orders]
Epistemicmodals pertain towhat is known or believed by an agent; teleological modals
pertain to goals and plans; dispositional or root modals pertain to abilities and propen-
sities; deontic modals pertain to sets of laws, rules, requirements, and obligations. The
set of worlds we quantify over is known as the modal base, and this will be determined
in a number of different ways according to context. If we take it that an epistemic
modal quantifies over a set of worlds, we must have a restriction in place according to
the kind of modal flavor in question. Then an epistemic modal quantifies over a set of
worlds that is compatible with what is known or believed by an agent. A dispositional
modal will quantify over a set of worlds that is compatible with the various abilities or
propensities of an agent or object. And so on for a number of different modal flavors.
The third form of variability is variability of source. Once we have a quantifier in place,
and a domain of quantification, we need something to fix a ranking of the worlds in
the modal base. It will be the best worlds according to this ranking that will ultimately
form the modal’s domain of quantification. In the case of deontic modals, as will be
relevant for Chapter 4, for instance, this means that we can further distinguish between
further kinds of deontic meaning. For instance:
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(11) a. Sesame Street residents may not use Oscar the Grouch’s trash can. [moral
norm for residents]
b. Every student ought to take a logic class. [recommendation of philosophy
professors]
c. Library users must pay their fines. [library regulations]
In these examples, the modal will quantify over a set of worlds accessible in the deontic
way, so to speak, but the worlds that form the relevant domain of quantification varies
according to the source of the modal. Sources inform the background information that
further differentiates the various occurrences of deontic modals. Sources allow us to
prioritize the worlds whichever conform to whatever norm or standard is in question.
The sense in which Sesame Street residents are not permitted to use Oscar the Grouch’s
trash can is moral. The underlying modal nature, however, could have been different
had we varied the source. For instance, the impermissibility of the use of Oscar the
Grouch’s trash can could also be due to whatever regulationsmay be in force in Sesame
Street. There are a plethora of possible sources, and this variability holds for all uses of
modals.
Modal statements have three components: a conversational background, a modal particle,
and the prejacent proposition j which the modal takes scope over. The basic logical
form of a modal statement can be given as:
(12) CB pModal jq
The conversational background, CB, is what every sentence is uttered against: modals
are interpreted with respect to conversational backgrounds. The basic picture is that
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conversational backgrounds comprise of the contextual information needed in order
to provide an interpretation of modals in natural language. These deliver the best of
the worlds that modals quantify over.
Conversational backgrounds supply information from context which is usually left in-
explicit; however, with some reconstruction we can use phrases such as in view of to
examine the influence of context on the meaning of modal terms. These free relative in
view of clauses determine a substantial portion of the meaning of modal sentences in
natural language.
To observe this, let us consider the following sentences with an eye on the meaning of
must in each of them:
(13) a. Oscar the Grouch must have been in the trash can for at least 4 hours straight.
b. Cookie Monster must share his cookies.
c. Ernie must be home by 6pm.
d. Elmo must learn to use pronouns properly when he speaks.
We can supplement these sentences with in view of phrases, allowing us to unpack
much of the meaning of the occurrences of must in (13):
(14) a. In view of his dispositions, Oscar the Grouch must have been in the trash can
for at least 4 hours straight.
b. In view of Sesame Street community norms, CookieMonster must share his cook-
ies.
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c. In view of Bert’s demands, Ernie must be home by 6pm.
d. In view of the norms of the English language, Elmo must learn to use pronouns
properly when he speaks.
These in view of phrases paraphrase much of what it is the sentences in (13) are about.
The occurrences of must in (14) then end up being neutral occurrences of must. Such
phrases do not tend to be linguistically realized. The relevant information typically
comes from context. We need to do some reconstruction tomake explicit their influence
in determining the meaning of natural language modals. Given that we are engaging
in some reconstruction, in view of, at times, can sound quite unnatural. Sometimes it
might be helpful to consider some cousins of in view of such as according to, given that,
in light of, and so on.
Conversational backgrounds are ultimately relative to two parameters: a modal base
and an ordering source. Let f be a modal base and let g be an ordering source. The role
of the modal base is to tell us which worlds are accessible; the ordering source induces
an ordering on the accessible worlds. These are both functions from worlds to sets of
sets of worlds (sets of propositions). In this way, we can see that the basic picture is
that modals quantify over the bestwords.
There are two sorts of modal bases: the epistemic modal base and the circumstantial modal
base. Modal bases restrict the worlds a modal quantifiers over. Epistemic modal bases
yield the accessible worlds where what is known by an agent at the world of evalua-
tion holds. The circumstantial modal bases return the accessible worlds where certain
circumstances of the world of evaluation hold.
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The modal bases then combine accordingly with the ordering source. The epistemic
modal base pertains to information and the circumstantial modal base pertains to
things like ideals and obligations. And it is from the circumstantial modal base that
we get an understanding of the dispositional or root modality.
Provided these various elements, we can give the official Kratzer semantics for must
and may as follows:
(15) rrMust jss f ,v  tw | X f pwq  rrjss f ,vu
(16) rrMay jss f ,v  tw | pX f pwqq Y rrjss f ,v  Hu
Hence, modal statements of the form Must(j) are true just in case the propositions of
the conversational background are true in all worlds; andmodal statements of the form
May(j) are true just in case the propositions of the conversational background are true
in some worlds. Note that we have decorated the lexical entry as being relative to f ,
whose job is to assign a set of propositions to every world. We can understand this as
being the accessibility relation in modal logic: to say that for some world v P X f pwq
is simply to say that Rwv, or that world w has access to world v. So, in particular, we
can derive the accessibility relation by taking the intersection of the set of propositions
that f assigns to a world w.
This account can be supplemented by adding the ordering source parameter. The or-
dering source, g, is a function which ranks worlds according to how well they satisfy
the ideals prescribed by g.
We can define an ordering relation ¤gpwq as follows: w1 ¤gpwq w2 iff:
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(17) tp P gpwq | w2 P pu  tp P gpwq | w1 P pu
This means that given a proposition from gpwq, if it makes w2 true, it makes w1 true as
well. So w1 is at least as ideal as w2. Furthermore, the relation ¤gpwq is a preorder.6
Provided the ordering source parameter, we can accordingly update the semantics for
the necessity modal and possibility modal and make explicit the notion of optimality:
(18) rrMust jss f ,g,v  tw | BESTp f pwq, gpwqq  rrjss f ,g,vu
(19) rrMay jss f ,g,v  tw | BESTp f pwq, gpwqq X rrjss f ,g,v  Hu7
1.2.3 WEAK AND STRONG NECESSITY
As noted in the previously quoted passage by Snedegar (2016), one prevailing idea is
that the central modal notion in the philosophy of normativity is the notion of ought.
However, as noted before, there is a general problem with the idea that the central
modal notion at stake is the notion of ought: it is too weak for the usual purposes it is
meant to serve. The strongermodalmust is more suited for the statement of moral rules
and obligations, and it is this modal which corresponds to the notion of requirement.
Distinguishing between weak necessity modals (such as should or ought) and strong
necessity modals (such as must or have to) is a matter of great general importance, not
6That is, reflexive and transitive. Although Kratzer (1991) actually defines ¤gpwq as a partial order (so
reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive). However, see Portner (2009) for discussion regarding dropping
antisymmetry.
7The formalization in terms of the BEST function follows Portner (2009) and the semantics here as-
sumes the limit assumption. The BEST function selects the most ideal worlds from its input, and obeys the
ordering ¤gpwq. The limit assumption says that there are always accessible ideal worlds.
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only from the perspective of understanding the core moral notions, but for semantic
theorizing more generally.8
One salient kind of difference concerning the behavior of weak and strong necessity
modals can be observed in certain asymmetries in felicity. Following some observa-
tions from Ninan (2005), consider the case of Cookie Monster, who is discussing his
issues with sharing cookies with others:
(20) I should share my cookies but I am not going to.
Then consider Elmo, who could report on Cookie Monster’s behavior:
(21) Cookie Monster should share his cookies but he’s not going to.
Elmo could try to command Cookie Monster to share his cookies, but then admit that
such an order would be futile:
(22) You should share your cookies, but you’re not going to.
The previous sentences all sound fine. But there is an asymmetry when using must. In
particular, consider a case where Elmo is discussing Cookie Monster’s behavior:
(23) Cookie Monster must share his cookies, but he’s not going to.
Elmo could similarly try to could order Cookie Monster:
8For recent discussion and overview of various recent approaches to this problem, see Becker (2016).
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(24) You must share his cookies, but you’re not going to.
Finally, there is also an oddity in Cookie Monster discussing his own behavior as fol-
lows:
(25) I must share my cookies, but I am not going to.
The sentences involving must sound odd. The explanation of this presumably has to
do with the asymmetry between the weak necessity modals and the strong necessity
modals. The asymmetry somehow appears to be a difference in force. There appears to
be a prima facie distinction in levels of force amongst different kinds of norms. Strong
necessity modals appear more forceful and weak necessity modals appear less so.
We can make sense of this idea by noticing that the use of different modal vocabulary
can perhaps imply different kinds of restrictions on what we ought to do. Statements
involving deontic must tell us that there are no other options available except the preja-
cent; statements involving deontic should or ought tell us that the prejacent is a preferred
option compared to the alternatives.
An additional feature of deontic must, as argued by Ninan (2005), is that it has the
force of an imperative. This is not a feature shared with deontic weak necessity modals.
In particular, one feature of deontic must is that it can be used to issue requirements.
Consider the following examples in (26) and note that there is very little difference
between them:
(26) a. You must dance.
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b. Dance!
The apparent lack of (at least) pragmatic difference lies in the fact that both utterances
amount to being orders to an addressee. Sentences containing weak necessity modals
do not appear to have the feature that they can be used to issue orders or requirements.
None of the following, for instance, would appear to have the force of an imperative:
(27) a. You should dance.
b. You ought to dance.
If anything, the sentences in (27) appear to sound close to either one of the following:
(28) a. I recommend that you dance.
b. I suggest that you dance.
The distinction in strength between weak and strong necessity modals will be a sig-
nificant topic in Chapter 4 where I discuss the overall structure and diversity of the
central normative modal notions. I will build upon this background material once we
properly enter the relevant terrain.
1.3 PREVIEW
This thesis is divided into three main chapters, and is followed by a concluding chapter
(Chapter 5) which discusses some further philosophical issues for research resulting
from the various arguments discussed throughout.
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The main chapters in this dissertation pursue a number of arguments and perspectives
related to the themes and questions discussed above. These chapters are at the inter-
sections between the topics of GENERICS, MODALITY, and MORALITY.
I will now provide a preview of each chapter in turn:
 Chapter 2: Generics and Weak Necessity
 Chapter 3: The Genericity of Moral Principles
 Chapter 4: Supererogation and the Structure of the Normative Domain
1.3.1 GENERICS AND MODALITY
The topic of generics—especially their meaning and their implications for our under-
standing of the structure of morality—is one of the core topics of this thesis.
Here are some examples of generics:
(29) a. Ravens are black.
b. Birds fly.
c. Tigers are striped.
Each of the sentences in (29) are true even in the face of counterinstances and seem to
have a kind of quasi-universal flavor. These sentences communicate generalities but
do not have any overt lexical item which we can trace the generalization to.9
9Although generics come in a variety of other forms, such as the indefinite singular (e.g. ’A tiger is
striped.’), my examples will mostly involve the bare plural.
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In Chapter 2, ’Generics and Weak Necessity’, I examine the links between weak neces-
sity modals and generics. I discuss the modal approach to generics and argue that if
generics involve a covert modal at the level of logical form, that this is a weak necessity
modal.10
In this chapter, I provide evidence for the claim that generics involve weak necessity
modals and sketch a theory. In particular, I will show that there are some important dis-
tributional parallels between generics and sentences with overt weak necessity modals:
both sorts of sentences share behavior in nonmonotonic reasoning environments and
also lack genuine epistemic readings. Acknowledging these parallels and the connec-
tion here is in the service of both our understanding of genericity and of weak necessity.
I propose an understanding of generics as involving a covert weak necessitymodal and
argue that this is a promising path to pursue in relation to different issues related to
the interpretation of generics.
Finally, this chapter features an appendix which focuses on normative generics (e.g.
’Boys don’t cry’ and ’Friends don’t let friends drive drunk’) where I argue that the phe-
nomenon that it is coherent to assent to a generic like ’Boys don’t cry’ in one situation
(perhaps involving a criticism of behavior) while also being able to assent to ’Boys
cry’ in another situation (perhaps where actual prevalence of crying is in question) is
to be explained as a matter of context-sensitivity, and that a modal approach has the
potential to accommodate this.
10This chapter is based on Thakral (2018).
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1.3.2 GENERICS AND MORALITY
One of the core topics in this thesis concerns moral principles. These are generaliza-
tions about morality and about how one should act. We rely on commonplace gener-
alizations such as the following in order to attempt to do what is right as opposed to
what is wrong:
(30) a. Stealing is wrong.
b. You should never lie.
c. It is wrong to act only for your own benefit.
My own investigation into the nature of moral principles focuses on their role in moral
reasoning. In Chapter 3, ’The Genericity of Moral Principles’, I argue that we should
understand moral principles as generic generalizations and that this supports a model
of moral reasoning in line with moral particularism. In particular, this chapter argues
that the view that moral principles are generic generalizations supports a model of
moral reasoning on which principles cannot serve a substantial role in supporting our
knowledge of what is morally right or wrong in particular cases.
In providing these arguments, this chapter offers a conception of moral principles that
is friendly to moral particularists and offers a new argument for a form of moral par-
ticularism. Additionally, it is argued that the generic conception of moral principles,
in its capacity as a normative model of reasoning, has significant advantages over the
default conception of moral principles which has been advanced in recent years.
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1.3.3 MODALITY AND MORALITY
In Chapter 4, ’Supererogation and the Structure of the Normative Domain’, I investi-
gate whether and how the notion of supererogation fits into the standard framework
for interpreting deontic modals. I propose that we can distinguish between two senses
of supererogation based on a distinction between deontic modals which are evaluated
with respect to a set of facts and deontic modals which are not.
Going beyond the call of duty in a suboptimal way can, at least in some cases, seem
better than not acting at all. Yet it can sometimes be wrong to act suboptimally. Hence,
it can be sometimes wrong to act beyond the demands of morality. The standard ac-
count of the structure of the normative domain does not seem to be able to account for
this phenomenon.
The aim in this chapter is to demonstrate howwe can appeal to the standard interpreta-
tion of the normative modal notions of permission, recommendation, and requirement
in order to interpret and explain the phenomenon of suboptimal supererogation. The
approach will not be to alter these notions but to instead investigate them in more de-
tail and, as a result, propose that there is a need to distinguish between two notions of
supererogation, one binary and one scalar.
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Generics and Weak Necessity
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Generics express generalizations which lack explicit quantification, and do not ap-
pear to be straightforwardly analyzed in terms of any particular quantifier expression.
Generic sentences are characterized by an incredible diversity—a diversity that is still
to be reckoned with and uncovered further. Perhaps the most acknowledged form of
diversity involving generics lies in their truth-conditional variability. The following
examples help demonstrate this:
(31) a. Ravens are black.
b. Ducks lay eggs.
c. Mosquitoes carry malaria.
It is now a very familiar point that generics can express a range of generalizations:
while the majority of ravens are black, the majority of ducks do not lay eggs since only
female ducks of reproductive age lay eggs. It is true that mosquitoes carry malaria, but
this is not true of the majority of mosquitoes: only around one percent of mosquitoes
carry the disease.
The focus of the investigation in this chapter is to argue for an approachwhich promises
to accommodate this diversity of generics, especially by considering whether generics
are related to other phenomena which have similar diversity.
I defend a modal approach to generics: I argue for the view that generics involve a
covert weak necessity operator. My main tasks will be to present the arguments which
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point to this view, and, in addition, I will also discuss how this approach promises to
deal with the diversity associated with generics.
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 2.2 provides the relevant background on
the modal approach to generics and we will examine the covert structure of generics
by looking at the interactions between generics and in view of phrases.
Following this, I discuss the main distributional parallels between generics and sen-
tences containing overt weak necessity modals. Section 2.3 discusses the shared fea-
tures of both sorts of sentences in the environment of defeasible reasoning; Section 2.4
discusses the claim that both sorts of sentences do not take genuine epistemic readings.
Section 2.5 sketches and discusses the proposal that the covert generic modality is a
weak necessity modal.
Section 2.6 concludes. Following this, the chapter also features an appendix in Sec-
tion 2.8 which discusses normative generics (e.g. ‘Boys don’t cry’ and ’Friends don’t
let friends drive drunk’) in relation to the modal approach discussed in this chapter. In
this appendix, I argue that the variability between descriptive and normative generics
is a matter of context-sensitivity familiar from the sort of context-sensitivity associated
with natural language modals.
2.2 THE MODAL APPROACH TO GENERICS
There are good motivations going back to, for instance, Dahl (1975) and Heim (1982)
that generics involve a covert modal operator. This chapter challenges the standard
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version of themodal analysis of generics and argues that if wewant to analyze generics
in modal terms, we should instead hold that the covert generic modality is a weak
necessity modal.
One dominant perspective in theorizing about generics is that they involve something
covert at the level of logical form. In order to set up the necessary background, we will
discuss one suggestion to begin with, which is that the covert element is something
along the lines of an adverbial quantifier.11
A standard test for whether or not a sentence is a generic involves adverbial quantifier
insertion. This test, at least prima facie, gives reason to believe that generics involve
something covert. Krifka et al. (1995) propose the following: check whether the addi-
tion of such adverbs results only in the slightest change of meaning. If so, we can take
the sentence without the adverbial quantifier to be a generic.
For an illustration of this test, consider the following:
(32) Birds fly.
And combine with an adverb of quantification:
(33) a. Birds usually fly.
b. Birds normally fly.
c. Birds typically fly.
11For overviews of different approaches to the semantics of generics, see Krifka et al. (1995), Leslie and
Lerner (2016), Nickel (2017), and Sterken (2017). For a recent defense and motivation behind the Gen
operator, see Sterken (2016).
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The additions of usually, normally, and typically seemmerely to cause a slight change in
meaning compared to (32).12 Any sort of difference between the examples in (32) and
(33) appears to be due to the former examples being somehow weaker—at least in the
sense that the examples in (33) explicitly advertise their exception-grantingness.13
A related avenue to pursue might be to consider some other insertions which combine
(32) with various modal auxiliaries and semimodal verbs. It is worth seeing what we
might gather from this and whether any such insertions capture the generic nature of
(32).
We can start by considering the strong necessity insertions:
(37) Birds must fly.
12Note, however, that not just any adverbial quantifier insertion will work to capture the genericity
of (32). Consider:
(34) a. Birds rarely fly.
b. Birds occasionally fly.
c. Birds invariably fly.
The adverbial quantifier test—at least on one way of understanding its import—tells us that if there is
something hidden at the level of logical form, it is something which behaves like an adverbial quantifier
of a certain kind.
13Note that the exception-granting property here may be witnessed by the following examples:
(35) a. Birds usually fly, but some/many don’t.
b. Birds normally fly, but some/many don’t.
c. Birds typically fly, but some/many don’t.
Somehow, the sentences in (35) appear more natural than:
(36) Birds fly, but some/many don’t.
Three points. First, I take it that there is a difference between (35) and (36). This should be expected, for
these adverbial quantifiers mentioned explicitly indicate the exception-granting character of the sentences
in (33). Second, the many-readings in (35) sound slightly better when we think of them along the lines
of ‘It’s normal for birds to fly, but many actually don’t’. Third, it is worth noting that capacity readings
are salient here; see Schubert and Pelletier (1989) as well as Nickel (2016, ch. 4) and Sterken (2015a) for
further discussion. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for Inquiry for asking me to clarify these points.
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(38) Birds have to fly.
These appear a bit odd. The oddness of both (37) and (38) is that they seem to be too
strong: these paraphrases somehow fail to take into account the thought that ‘Birds fly’
admits of exceptions. Perhaps the oddness here is due to the oddness of the following:
(39) Birds must fly, but some/many don’t.
(40) Birds have to fly, but some/many don’t.
These sound odd because they appear to be, in some sense, instances of contradictory
conjunctions.14 At least one lesson to learn from attempting to formulate a contradic-
tory conjunction is whether the modals in (37) and (38) sound appropriate for captur-
ing the putative exception-granting property of ‘Birds fly’.
For another insertion, consider the permissibility modals might and may:
(41) Birds might fly.
(42) Birds may fly.
Both (41) and (42) clearly fail to capture the strength of ‘Birds fly’. They simply appear
far too weak. For another weak modal, also consider:
(43) Birds can fly.
14For further discussion of contradictory conjunction effects with generics, see Sterken (2013, 2015a).
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Although its doubtful that (43) captures the force of generics, there are certainly cir-
cumstances where this can sound appropriate. If we are making a list of the things that
birds can do, a candidate item on that list would be (43). It may be that (43) isolates a
particular reading of ‘Birds fly’, one that perhaps does not happen to be the ordinary,
salient one.
Let us now consider:
(44) Birds happen to fly.
(45) Birds are supposed to fly.
It appears as though both (44) and (45) respect the apparent exception-granting charac-
ter of generics, although (45) does this better. An issue with (44) is that adding happen
to does not allow for the reading that flying is something that characterizes birds. A fa-
miliar feature of many true generics is that they attribute properties to noun phrases
that are not merely accidental. One thing to consider is that the following does not lead
to a kind of contradictory conjunction and sounds fine:
(46) Birds are supposed to fly, but some/many don’t.
None of the previous insertions (with the exception of (45)) are so great, but inserting
a weak necessity modal looks very promising:
(47) Birds should fly.
(48) Birds ought to fly.
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There appears to be a good sense inwhich both (47) and (48) capture the force associated
with ‘Birds fly’. That is, we do not get that some particular bird flies given (47) or (48),
and this is an entirely desirable consequence. Indeed, we don’t get any oddness with
the following conjunctions either:
(49) Birds should fly, but some/many don’t.
(50) Birds ought to fly, but some/many don’t.
It is important to note that exploring these examples is not meant to serve the aim of
capturing the right modal auxiliary insertion that captures something like a ‘correct’
paraphrase of all generics in the bare plural. It has been noted before that no attested
language has any overt manifestation of whatever is taken to be the covert generic
operator.15 The aim here at the outset is only to perform an initial examination of
whether any of these modal insertions can help us capture whatever kind of ‘force’ or
‘flavor’ we are apt to associate with generics.16 The main claim is that inserting weak
necessity modals seems, at a first glance, promising.
This leads us to the background for the modal approach to generics. The target pro-
posal of interest in this chapter is the idea that generics involve a covert modal opera-
tor. This proposal is explained in Krifka et al. (1995) according to Kratzer’s semantics
15See Krifka et al. (1995) for discussion of this point.
16Let us even suppose that there is a decent paraphrase available outside the examples we have already
discussed. Here is one to consider:
(51) Birds nonaccidentally fly.
When we considered (44), we saw that it was an inadequate paraphrase because we want the connection
between birds and fly to be a sort of nonaccidental connection. However, (51) is extremely unhelpful and
nonaccidentally happens to be a sort of philosopher’s jargon. Given that this term is quite unnatural, it is
hard to classify it alongside other more natural quantificational expressions in natural language.
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for necessity modals. To begin with, consider the standard tripartite rendering of the
logical form of generics:
(52) Genrx1 . . . xn; y1 . . . ynspRestrictor,Matrixq
Here Gen stands for an unpronounced quantifier responsible for the genericness of
generic sentences. A prominent approach to Gen is to treat it as a modal operator in
the setting of possible worlds semantics.17 In particular, the idea would work some-
thing like in the following way. Start with the idea that generics resemble conditional
sentences. On the restrictor theory of conditionals due to Kratzer (1986), the role of
if-clauses are to restrict the domains of different operators associated with condition-
als.18 Additionally, this domain restriction is present whether there is a overt operator
present. If there is no overt operator, a covert operator is to be posited.19
Then, for similarmotivations, if generics resemble conditional sentences, thenwe ought
to posit a covert modal operator which lives at the logical form of generics.
Following Krifka et al. (1995), we can give an interpretation of (52) as follows:
(53) Genrx1 . . . xn; y1 . . . ynspRestrictor,Matrixq is true in w relative to a modal base
f pwq and ordering source ¤gpwq iff:
17Also see Dahl (1975), Heim (1982), Kratzer (1981) as well as Krifka et al. (1995) and Sterken (2017) for
further discussion.
18Kratzer (1986, 656) writes:
The history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake. There is no two-place
if...then connective in the logical forms for natural languages. If -clauses are devices for
restricting the domains of various operators. Whenever there is no explicit operator, we
have to posit one.
19See also Lewis (1975), Heim (1982), Kratzer (1981, 2012).
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for every x1 . . . xn and every w1 in f pwq such that Restrictor rx1 . . . xns is true in w1,
there is a world w2 in f pwq such that w2 ¤gpwq w1, and for every world w3 ¤gpwq
w2, Dy1 . . . yn Matrixrx1 . . . xn; y1 . . . yns is true in w320
Suppose we have a generic such as ’Bunnies are fluffy’. According to (53), we can, as
it were, unpack this interpretation along the following lines:
(54) Everything which is a bunny in the worlds of the modal base is such that, in all
the most normal worlds according to the ordering source, it will be fluffy.
In this way, we can see that a feature of this proposal is that (53) gives essentially along
the same lines as the semantics of must.21 Hence, an important virtue of this approach
to generics is that it captures the kind of restricted universal quantification over normal
cases that seems to be needed in order to capture their generality while allowing for ex-
ceptions. In (54), we can see that universal quantification over normal bunnies does not
mean that every bunny needs to be fluffy; worlds which include non-fluffy bunnies are
considered less normal than worlds with fluffy bunnies. Furthermore, one of the most
important benefits of this approach is that variability in the contextually determined
parameters, namely the modal base and ordering source, can function to capture dif-
ferent flavors of genericity. Additionally, the positing of a covert modal comes from an
independently motivated theory of covert modality in conditional sentences.
This chapter builds on the modal approach to generics by arguing that there is an
important connection between generics and weak necessity that we should appreci-
ate. The core aims are to provide some evidence for the view that generics involve
20Where w2 ¤gpwq w1 means that w2 is closer to the ideal as determined by the ordering source than w1.
21Barring differences in the binding of variables.
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covert weak necessity modals. The core evidence for this view is based on some in-
teresting and noteworthy distributional parallels between generics and sentences con-
taining overt weak necessity modals. In addition, this chapter also provides a sketch
of a theory of generics based on the weak necessity proposal.
To illustrate the view, I will largely follow the account of weak necessity modals due to
von Fintel and Iatridou (2008). This approach allows for an additional context-sensitive
parameter which will be useful in the interpretation of generics. On this approach, a
weak necessity modal (e.g. should/ought) claim is true provided the proposition under
the scope of the modal is true in the best of the best worlds. That is, weak necessity
modals involve a further domain restriction measure. It is proposed that generics can
be domain restricted twice over in the same way, with the secondary domain restric-
tion involving a contextually determined notion related to normality, ideality, or some
related notion.
2.3 MODALS AND in view of PHRASES
This chapter investigates the covert structure of generics. My aim is to provide evi-
dence that generics involve covert weak necessity modals. Our initial lens from which
we examine this covert structure will be to observe the interactions between free rela-
tive in view of phrases and generic sentences without overt modals. This will take place
from the perspective of the unified semantics for modals in natural language given in
Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012). Hence, ultimately, the task is to look at the influence
of context on the meaning of generics.
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2.3.1 GENERICS UNDER in view of
The idea that I would like to establish in this section is that in view of phrases, when
combined with generics, tell us what we need in order to determine a conversational
background for generics. This means that in view of phrases, in the case of generics,
must be supplying information to a covertmodal.
If in view of phrases are supplying information to a covert generic modal, then different
in view of phrases will affect the genericity, in some important sense, of a given generic
prejacent. We can observe such affects as follows:
(55) a. Birds, in view of their DNA, fly.
b. Birds, in view of scientific testimony, fly.
c. Birds, in view of their dispositions, fly.
d. Birds, in view of what I’ve seen, fly.
The examples in (55) show that ‘Birds fly’ can, on different occasions, receive variable
interpretations. One way to account for the variability is that it is very much like the
variability associated with different readings of modal sentences. This means that we
need to think carefully about the features of the conversational background involved,
in particular, the modal base and the ordering source.
Sterken (2015b) has recently discussed the contextual variability of generics. She claims
that such variability is widespread and distinctive. I am proposing that at least one
helpful way to examine this variability is in terms of in view of and related locutions.
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For instance, let us discuss one of the cases Sterken highlights, which is originally dis-
cussed in Nickel (2008):22
(56) Dobermans have floppy ears.
Dobermans are born with floppy ears, and so we can easily imagine that in a sort of
evolutionary biology context that (56) sounds totally fine. However, (56) comes out as
false in certain dog-breeding contexts. Consider Nickel’s example text:
(57) While Labradors andGolden Retrievers have floppy ears, Dobermans don’t. Dober-
mans have pointy ears.
These Nickel-effects can be easily recast using in view of phrases:
(58) Dobermans, in view of evolutionary facts, have floppy ears.
(59) Doberman, in view of the practices of dog-breeders, have pointy ears.
If we control the interpretation of (56), it is very easy to witness the variability here.
We could even construct a sentence which suitably combines (58) and (59):
(60) Dobermans, given evolutionary facts, have floppy ears, however, given dog-
breeding practices, they have pointy ears.
22Also see Nickel (2016).
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In fact, perhaps the effect here could seem more ordinary and widespread: we even
can imagine something similar for ‘Birds fly’. Suppose there are bird-breeders who
like to inject birds with a mystery non-flying juice. We could then have the following:
(61) Birds, in view of the injection practices, do not fly.
(62) Birds, in view of evolutionary facts, fly.
We could even imagine a person growing up in Antarctica who has only seen pen-
guins. The context in such a case would have it come out as false that birds fly. And so
on. Stepping away from the particular details of such cases, I should emphasize that
the main point at hand is that the variability of generics can be easily witnessed in a
systematic, principled way by supplementing with in view of phrases.
It appears as though the explanation of what is happening in such cases is that these
in view of phrases make explicit the background information which informs and af-
fects the interpretation of a covert generic modal. There are cases, however, where we
have in view of phrases combined with non-modal, non-generic sentences. Consider
such a sentence in (63) and then combined with a phrase to specify some background
contextual information in (64):
(63) John danced with Sue.
(64) Given what I’ve heard, John danced with Sue.
On the basis of examples like (64) one might reasonably be skeptical that the combina-
tion of in view of phrases and generics tells us anything about the existence or nature
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of a covert generic modal, for presumably there is no such modal in these seemingly
more ordinary sentences like (63).23 If in view of phrases provide information to a
covert modal in generics, what are they doing in cases like (64)?
The proposed answer is that, in cases such as (64), we have made explicit some back-
ground evidential information.24 English is not evidentially marked; however, the idea
is that some reconstruction can tell us the source of information that a speaker pos-
sesses. Here is some reason to think that phrases like given what I’ve heard in (64) pro-
vide evidential information (presumably to a tacit epistemic modal). Following Mur-
ray (2010), evidentials contribute not-at-issue content to restrict the common ground. A
feature of not-at-issue content is that it is not directly challengeable. The at-issue con-
tent, for instance the assertion that ‘John danced with Sue’, is challengeable. Consider
the following two responses to (64):
(65) No, they didn’t dance.
(66) # No, you didn’t.
So, if a phrase like given what I’ve heard is providing us with not-at-issue content, then
we should understand it as placing a restriction on the common ground which plays
the role of providing evidential information.
Now consider in view of phraseswhich select non-doxastic conversational backgrounds
to combine with non-modal, non-generic sentences. These do not seem to combine
well. Here are just a few attempts at combining with (63):
23I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Inquiry for pressing me on various points related to in
view of phrases.
24I owe this point to discussion with Josh Dever.
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(67) a. In view of the laws, John danced with Sue.
b. In view of their DNA, John danced with Sue.
c. In view of their dispositions, John danced with Sue.
That such conversational backgrounds do not combine well with non-modal, non-
generic sentences should be expected since there is obviously no overt modal available
to affect, nor is there good reason to think with such sentences that there is a covert
modal to affect (other than a tacit epistemic modal which receives evidential informa-
tion).25
Additionally, it is worth noting that not just any in view of phrase will affect any avail-
able modal, whether covert or overt. Consider the following combinations of in view of
phrases and generics:26
(68) a. In view of the weather, birds fly north.
b. In view of grandma’s pets, birds live in grandma’s house.
Aside from the point that these examples sound a bit strange, even perhaps ungram-
matical: if the in view of phrases in (68) combine well with the generics they are at-
tached to, then there is a worry that we can overgenerate readings for many bare plu-
ral sentences. But there is good reason to think that these in view of phrases do not
combine well at all. Let us try adding an overt modal to the sentences in (68):
25There is more to be said about the interactions between the evidential in view of phrases and generics,
I come back to this issue in Section 2.5. There I argue, inter alia, that doxastic in view of phrases do not
affect the generic covert modal at all.
26The examples considered here belong to an anonymous reviewer for Inquiry, and I thank them for
bringing this point to my attention.
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(69) a. In view of the weather, birds must fly north.
b. In view of grandma’s pets, birds must live in grandma’s house.
When we add must, it is not obvious that these in view of phrases are really helping
to unpack the meanings of the overt modals in (69). But if these latter examples with
overt modals sound better, then this confirms discomfort with the examples in (68),
since these in view of phrases seem to be looking for an overt modal, maybe one with
an epistemic flavor. In particular, this gives us reason that such in view of phrases
would not be affecting the interpretation of a generic covert modal.
There are plenty of complexities here. However, I believe these observations are suffi-
cient to allow us to proceed with the hypothesis that there are at least certain, relevant
kinds of in view of phrases which restrict the domain of generics. This should help
us achieve some further insights concerning genericity, in particular, concerning the
nature and interpretation of the covert generic modal.
The rest of the chapter will focus on making the case that the covert generic modal
is a weak necessity modal. In the next two sections, I provide some evidence to hold
this view by showing some parallels between generics and sentences with overt weak
necessity modals.
2.4 GENERIC DEFEASIBLE REASONING
In this section, I argue that generics display very much the same behavior as sentences
with overt weak necessity modals in nonmonotonic reasoning environments. In both
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cases, we see that reasonable defeasible consequences follow. And although reasoning
via general principles with overt weak necessity modals or with generics may not al-
ways be reasonable, they seem to at least share this feature in common. This parallel
gives us reason to believe that generics involve a covert weak necessity modal.
2.4.1 PARALLEL PATTERNS OF REASONING
The theorists who investigate the link between generics and defeasible reasoning are
motivated by the need to account for the defeasible validity of inference patterns such
as:
(70) Defeasible Modus Ponens
 If Tweety is a bird, (normally/generally/etc.) Tweety flies.
 Tweety is a bird.
 So, Tweety flies.
(71) Generic Modus Ponens
 Birds fly.
 Tweety is a bird.
 So, Tweety flies.
The conclusion that Tweety flies in both (70) and (71) follows not deductively, but given
some adequate nonmonotonic consequence relation between a set of premises G and a
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set of conclusions j.27
My interest here is to examine what is happening when we draw defeasible conse-
quences from generics. In particular, we will take a look at what are the adequate ways
to characterize the conclusions of defeasible reasoning in order to, in a sense, gauge the
force of these consequences. So, suppose we have the premises of (71), that is, that
‘Birds fly’ and ‘Tweety is a bird’. What we will do is look for a paraphrase that, in some
sense, respects the potential for retraction that is characteristic of defeasible reasoning.
Let us start with the following:
(72) Tweety must fly.
(73) Tweety has to fly.
Both of these strong necessity conclusions would be inappropriate, for they are clearly
too strong. Now consider:
(74) Tweety might fly.
(75) Tweety can fly.
27Briefly, a logic is nonmonotonic if the following monotonicity property fails of its consequence rela-
tion: if j is a consequence of G, then j is a consequence of GY y. If the monotonicity property fails, then
a conclusion can be prevented by adding further premises. The aim in these frameworks is to reach defea-
sible conclusions. An important feature of nonmonotonic logics is that they allow for retraction: given the
information that ‘Tweety is a bird’, and that ‘birds fly’, we infer that ‘Tweety flies’. But if we find out that
Tweety has a broken wing, then we would retract our conclusion that ‘Tweety flies’, and instead infer that
‘Tweety doesn’t fly’. This is a major contrast to the situation in classical deductive formalisms where, once
a conclusion is established, it remains established, since adding additional premises keeps validity intact.
So it is in this sense that nonmonotonic logics allow for retraction and monotonic logics do not. Indeed,
this is taken to be reason that nonmonotonic logics are held to be useful in characterizing common sense
reasoning as well as the role generics play in such reasoning patterns.
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It appears as though (74) is too weak of a conclusion to draw, though I imagine that
there are contexts where (75) can sound appropriate—perhaps this would depend on
how we are reading the premise that ‘Birds fly’.
Let us now consider the weak necessity conclusions:
(76) Tweety should fly.
(77) Tweety ought to fly.
I submit that both (76) and (77) sound appropriate as conclusions of defeasible reason-
ing. In particular, paraphrasing things this way respects the potential for retraction:
(78) Tweety should fly, but doesn’t.
(79) Tweety ought to fly, but doesn’t.
It then appears as though generics license defeasible consequences with, as it were,
the force of weak necessity. Sentences with overt weak necessity modals license con-
sequences in the same way. Let us consider a defeasible pattern of reasoning using a
sentence with such an overt modal in the major premise.
(80)  Residents of Sesame Street ought to share their cookies.
 Cookie Monster is a resident of Sesame Street.
 So, Cookie Monster ought to share his cookies.
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It would be odd to conclude that ‘Cookie Monster shares his cookies’; things sound
much better when we add ought. It is true that Cookie Monster ought to share his
cookies, though we all know that he’s not actually going to (or at least do so very reluc-
tantly). It would not sound appropriate to say that hemight share his cookies; likewise,
it would not sound appropriate to say that he must share his cookies. It is in this sense
that sentences with overt weak necessity modals share something in common with
generics: the defeasible consequences we derive sound appropriate when we add an
overt weak necessity modal. Additionally, if we were to take the generic version of the
premise of (80), that is, ‘Residents of Sesame Street share their cookies’, the appropriate
way of embedding the defeasible conclusion would be the same.
The foregoing reveals that generics and sentences with overt weak necessity modals
share an important link to each other in nonmonotonic reasoning environments. What
we should take away from the parallel behavior is that generics must involve some-
thing like a covert weak necessity modal, for this would be an explanation of the par-
allels. And this also means that if we want to understand the relationship between
generics and defeasible reasoning, we should also look to study reasoning patterns
involving ought and should.
2.4.2 A REMARK ON THE REASONING DATA
Before moving forward, it is worth nothing that there are generics from which it does
not appear that we can draw any reasonable consequences. This makes for a general
worry for those who investigate the links between generics and defeasible reasoning,
as it undermines the strength of such links.
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A challenge of this form is put forth by Leslie (2007). The challenge is based on infer-
ences such as the following:
(81)  Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus.
 Buzzy is a mosquito.
 So, Buzzy carries the West Nile Virus.
Leslie holds that this is not a very attractive inference and that the existence of such
cases means that schemas like (70) and (71) do not hold for all generics. However, I
think this challenge is perhaps a bit too quick, and that it is worth taking another look
at her case.
Let us begin by finding an in view of phrase that helps us make sense of the generic
premise in (81). Perhaps the following are some bad attempts:
(82) a. Mosquitoes, in view of scientific testimony, carry West Nile Virus.
b. Mosquitoes, in view of their dispositions, carry West Nile Virus.
c. Mosquitoes, in view of their DNA, carry West Nile Virus.
I am inclined to hold that under these in view of phrases, we get false interpretations
of ‘Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus’. Suitable non-doxastic readings do not appear
easily available. Perhaps the following in view of phrases with an apparent ‘epistemic’
flavor help provide some ‘reasonable’ readings:
(83) a. Mosquitoes, in view of what I’ve been told, carry West Nile Virus.
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b. Mosquitoes, in view of what I’ve seen, carry West Nile Virus.
These doxastic in view of phrases help us draw out some suitable contexts for the ma-
jor premise of (81).28 A consequence is that the conclusion that ‘Buzzy carries West
Nile Virus’ seems reasonable—given a sort of doxastic in view of phrase in the generic
premise—when read in the following ways:
(84) a. Buzzy, in view of what I’ve been told, carries West Nile Virus.
b. Buzzy, in view of what I’ve seen, carries West Nile Virus.
In particular, we should read the sentences in (84) as restricted according to some evi-
dential information. So the idea is that these conclusions are warranted on the basis of
the source of evidence given in the major premise, thereby making these conclusions
defeasibly acceptable.
The main upshot of looking at Leslie’s example in a different way is that perhaps there
is a way to salvage such cases where it does not appear as though reasonable conclu-
sions can be drawn from generics. The suspicion is that, at least in some cases, those
who judge (81) as bad do so because they may be interpreting the premises and the
conclusion with respect to different sorts of conversational backgrounds.
Yet there is the overriding intuition that inferences such as (81) are bad. Indeed, gener-
ally, there is some kind of difference between the reasonableness of inferences like (71)
28However, stay tuned for some remarks in the following two sections on the status of generics eval-
uated with doxastic in view of phrases. I will argue that such in view of phrases do not affect the covert
generic modal. This makes for another distributional parallel with sentences containing overt weak ne-
cessity modals—there is good reason to believe that such sentences do not admit of genuine epistemic
readings. Anyway, there is an intuition that ‘Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus’ is a true generic, so it
presumably must have some suitable non-doxastic interpretation or other.
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and (81), whether or not there is a way to salvage (81). It is worth noting that, strictly
speaking, these defeasible inferences involving generics such as (71) and (81) are bad.
There is a sense in which such inferences appear fine because they are reasonable un-
less we have defeating information. However, there is a sort of oddity. Consider the
case of ‘Birds fly’. It is plausible to think that this generic is somehow about ideal
or normal birds. But Tweety is an actual bird. The oddity is that when we conclude
that Tweety flies we do so on the proviso that the normal or ideal birds of interest are
relevantly similar to the actual birds. Without such an auxiliary assumption even the
inference involving ‘Birds fly’ is going to be unreasonable. The reason why there is a
kind of inferential badness in the case of the mosquito inference is because we are un-
able to make a similar auxiliary assumption. On the reading that makes ‘Mosquitoes
carry West Nile Virus’ true, we would have it that this sentence talks about mosquitoes
in a certain ideal or normal way. But Buzzy is an actual mosquito. We know that most
actual mosquitoes do not carry West Nile Virus. So we do not operate under the as-
sumption that the actual mosquitoes are relevantly similar to the ideal or normal ones
that we are talking about.29
Anyway, even if such inferences are not salvageable, that is, even if we cannot find
contexts in which we can draw reasonable inferences from a given number of generics,
I hold that there is no genuine, general worry here. This is because sentences with
overt weak necessity modals share the same feature. Many of them do not allow us to
draw reasonable consequences from them. Suppose there is a scenario where hardly
any resident of Sesame Street shares their cookies. Then it would appear unreasonable,
in many cases, to conclude something like ‘Cookie Monster ought to share his cookies’.
Likewise for other major premises that feature overt weak necessity modals.
29I thank Matthew McKeever for helpful discussion on this point.
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To recap, the main point of interest is the parallel behavior of generics and sentences
with overt weak necessity modals. We observe this through the relationship between
generics and the defeasible conclusions we draw from them. While it appears as
though many generics do not warrant reasonable conclusions, the same holds for sen-
tences with overt weak necessity modals. Given this, I claim that there is indeed in-
terest in investigating the nonmonotonicity of inferences from generics. In the next
section, we move on to discussing another parallel between generics and sentences
with overt weak necessity modals, namely that both sorts of sentences do not receive
genuine doxastic interpretations.
2.5 DOXASTIC BACKGROUNDS AND GENERICITY
In Section 2.3, it was noted, in the case of non-modal, non-generic sentences, that dox-
astic in view of phrases affect the interpretation of a tacit epistemic modal. In particular,
such conversational backgrounds concern the evidential state of a speaker. It was also
noted that non-doxastic in view of phrases do not combine well with non-modal, non-
generic sentences.
The present section begins by observing that there are generics that do not receive any
reasonable non-doxastic interpretations. What we learn from this observation is that
only non-doxastic conversational backgrounds affect the interpretation of a generic. I
will argue, here, for the claim that generics do not receive genuine epistemic interpre-
tations and that this is a feature that is shared with sentences that have overt weak
necessity modals. This gives further reason to believe that the generic covert modality
is a weak necessity modal.
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2.5.1 PREJUDICIAL GENERICS AND DOXASTIC BACKGROUNDS
There are many generics that seem as though to only have true readings given doxastic
in view of phrases. For instance, consider the following prejudicial generics:
(85) a. Blondes are dumb.
b. Black people are violent.
c. Muslims are terrorists.
There is no non-doxastic reading that could make any of the sentences in (85) true. For
instance, consider:
(86) a. In view of their DNA, blondes are dumb.
b. In view of scientific testimony, blondes are dumb.
c. In view of their dispositions, blondes are dumb.
(87) a. In view of their DNA, black people are violent.
b. In view of scientific testimony, black people are violent.
c. In view of their dispositions, black people are violent.
(88) a. In view of their DNA, Muslims are terrorists.
b. In view of scientific testimony, Muslims are terrorists.
c. In view of their dispositions, Muslims are terrorists.
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These readings of the various sentences in (85) are plainly false. The following doxastic
readings of (85) can only come out as true just in case an agent has the appropriate
states of mind:
(89) a. In view of what I’ve seen, blondes are dumb.
b. In view of what I’ve heard, Black people are violent.
c. In view of what Smith tells me, Muslims are terrorists.
However, this does not mean that any of the sentences in (85) are true generics.30 The
doxastic in view of phrases present in (89) do not affect the covert generic modal at all;
instead, they provide information to a tacit epistemicmodal. This is because doxastic in
view of phrases, when combined with generics, contribute non-at-issue content, which
does not end up affecting the genericity of the underlying proposition.
There are a number of generics that only have ‘reasonable’ readings under in view
of phrases. I will not claim that this is a general feature of prejudicial or ‘trouble-
some’ generics. The claim of interest concerns the variance between doxastic and non-
doxastic conversational backgrounds and their interactions with generics. My aim in
this section is to argue that sentences with overt weak necessity modals share the fea-
ture that doxastic conversational backgrounds do not affect their interpretation; that is,
there are no genuine epistemic interpretations of such sentences.
30Think of the sentences in (85) as being very much as bad as the following:
(90) Philosophers have wings.
(90) is plainly false and can only receive true readings under doxastic in view of phrases. And the likely
reason (90) is judged to be false is because, uncontroversially, there is no non-doxastic in view of phrase
that can make it true. The asymmetry between the sentences in (85) and (90) is that there are people out
there who judge sentences in (85) as having reasonable interpretations.
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2.5.2 THE LACK OF DOXASTIC INTERPRETATIONS FOR GENERICS
If generics can have genuine epistemic readings, we should reasonably expect there to
at least be some case where the only available reading of a generic is an epistemic one.
That is, we need a case where the only available interpretation of a generic is under a
doxastic in view of phrase. Let us consider a generic with such a doxastic conversational
background:
(91) In view of what I believe, mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus.
This claim is true so long as an agent has the appropriate belief states. However, that
the doxastic generic claim is true is entirely uninteresting. When we divide generic
claims into true and false sentences we do not hold that this division at all depends
upon belief states. If we did care about doxastic readings, then what it means to be a
true generic is entirely trivial. We do not want (91) to come out as a true generic in any
interesting sense. Another reason doxastic conversational backgrounds are irrelevant
when theorizing about genericity is that such statements are akin to belief sentences:
(92) I believe that mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus.
The irrelevance is that belief sentences are not generic sentences: genericity does not
survive through embedding under doxastic operators. We would not hold that the
embedded proposition (whatever its underlying nature may be) is true just because
the belief sentence is true. Then even having a case where the only available reading
seems epistemic does not matter if we want to investigate whether generics can have
genuine epistemic readings.
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Second, for further evidence, let us see if there can be genuine cases of faultless dis-
agreement involving doxastic readings of generics. But as we have already observed,
if a generic is true, it is true provided a non-doxastic in view of phrase. Then whatever
is going on with disagreement involving generics under doxastic in view of phrases
is irrelevant and uninteresting. We can imagine two parties disagreeing over whether
philosophers have red wings or blue wings, but we do not take it that the disagreement
has anything to do with the covert modality of generics; it instead can be diagnosed
in terms of thinking of belief operators. Additionally let us consider a case of disagree-
ment involving a true non-doxastic generic claim and a contrary doxastic generic claim.
Suppose someone disagrees with ‘Birds fly’ and holds ‘In view of what I believe, birds
do not fly’. We take it that the former party is correct and the latter party is wrong.
Therefore, there is no interesting case of disagreement here that will tell us anything
about whether generics can involve genuine epistemic modality.
Given the evidence that generics do not receive genuine doxastic interpretations, we
want a view of the covert generic modality that allows us to block such interpretations.
The weak necessity view is promising because there are independent arguments that
sentences with overt weak necessity modals do not receive genuine epistemic interpre-
tations.
Yalcin (2016) has argued based on some interesting observations that should and ought
do not admit of genuine epistemic readings, and makes a strong case for this. He
writes:
Consider a case which many would, at least initially, take as drawing out
the putative epistemic reading of the English modals ought and should. Sup-
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pose Jones is in a crowded office building when a severe earthquake hits.
The building topples. By sheer accident, nothing falls upon Jones; the build-
ing just happens to crumble in such away so as not to touch the place where
he is standing. He emerges from the rubble as the only survivor.31
Suppose that, after the incident, Jones says either:
(93) I should be dead right now.
(94) I ought to be dead right now.
In such situations we do not have standard deontic readings of (93) and (94). These ut-
terances do not involve considering, say, certain deontic or bouletic preferences. Given
this, one would reasonably expect that we should go for epistemic readings of (93)
and (94).32 However, the problem is that we cannot use a modal with an uncontrover-
sial epistemic reading instead. For instance, observe that the following do not sound
appropriate here:
(98) # I am probably dead right now.
(99) # I might be dead right now.
31Yalcin (2016, 231).
32As Yalcin (2016) notes, the observation that weak necessity modals lack epistemic interpretations is
anticipated by Copley (2004, 2006). This is based on data such as the following:
(95) # The beer must be cold by now, but it isn’t.
(96) # The beer may be cold by now, but it isn’t.
(97) The beer should be cold by now, but it isn’t.
Given the apparent contrast present here, we get some initial motivations for thinking that the should
in (97) is not epistemic.
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(100) # I may be dead right now.
Yalcin notes that it is reasonable to expect that if a sentence entails a defective sentence
it is presumably itself defective. However, Jones’s utterances are not defective, so we
should not take it that, in particular, (93) and (94) entail (99) and (100). Hence, this is
additional support for the claim that there is no genuine epistemic reading of either
(93) or (94).
The main upshot is that both generics and sentences with overt weak necessity modals
share the feature that they do not take genuine epistemic readings. There are indepen-
dent, yet related, reasons for why both types of sentences do not take such readings.
This parallel gives support to the view that the covert generic modal is a weak necessity
modal.
2.6 WEAK NECESSITY SEMANTICS FOR GENERICS
We have seen that we can track the variability of generics at least in part by noting how
in view of phrases can govern their interpretation. This gives us evidence to hold that
generics involve covert modals because the best explanation of the behavior of at least
some sorts of in view of phrases is that they are affecting the interpretation of a tacit
modal. If generics involve covert modals then there is a significant question about the
nature of these covert modals, and whether this would contribute to explaining the
core of the variability we get with generics.
In Section 2.4 and Section 2.5, we saw that there are some important parallels and
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observations which provide evidence for the view that generics involve covert weak
necessity modals. This section pursues the case for the weak necessity view further by
discussing the relationship between the variability of weak necessity modals and the
variability of generics and whether there are any important relationships between the
dimensions of variability of both weak necessity modals and generics.
Accordingly, my task in this section is to give a sketch of an approach to generics based
on the proposal that generics involve a covert weak necessity operator. I discuss how
this approach helps us model the variability of generics with respect to some cases of
interest. The overall argument I want to put forward in discussing these cases is that
treating generics as involving covert weak necessity modals gives us a new option for
modelling the variability and diverse features of generics.
The aim will not be to give a fully worked out formal semantics for generics, but rather
to give a sketch of an approach. The core of the conceptual payoff of pursuing the
weak necessity approach to generics lies in revealing that the contextual variability as-
sociated with weak necessity modals is of a similar nature as the contextual variability
associated with generics.
2.6.1 DUAL ORDERING SOURCES
A weak necessity approach to generics would have to take on board some account
of the difference between weak and strong necessity modals. There are potentially a
number of options to explore, but for the sake of the discussion here, it is useful to
restrict our focus to the influential account given by von Fintel and Iatridou (2008). If
generics can bemodelled in terms of weak necessitymodals, then it is useful to see how
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things would work when considering a widely discussed approach but importantly
because it builds directly upon the Kratzer framework for natural language modality.
The main idea behind the proposal of von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) is that weak ne-
cessity modals arise from the promotion of a secondary ordering source of a strong
necessity modal. In particular, the idea is that strong necessity modals tell us that the
prejacent is true in all of the preferred worlds; weak necessity modals tell us that the
prejacent is true in all of the best of the preferredworlds. Hence, weak necessitymodals
carve out a finer portion of the modal base due to a secondary ordering source. This
feature, in addition to the various other parallels between generics and sentences with
overt weak necessity modals, will turn out to be important for an account of generics.
The guiding idea will be that the generic covert modal is sensitive to two ordering
sources: a primary ordering source and a secondary ordering source. The former or-
dering source will be given by the proposition picked out by an in view of phrase; the
latter ordering source is determined by another measure.
Thus far, we have observed the various ways in which generics get their domains re-
stricted by in view of phrases. These free relative clauses that we supply come with a
proposition that helps us specify a modal base and allows us to impose an ordering on
the set of worlds in question. For instance, we are able to specify different conversa-
tional backgrounds for a given generic:
(101) a. In view of their DNA, birds fly.
b. In view of scientific testimony, birds fly.
c. In view of their dispositions, birds fly.
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The information, however, given in the free relative clauses in (101) will not be enough
for our purposes. These clauses give us what is required to restrict the domain of a
strong necessity modal. The intuitive way of determining the truth conditions based
on what is given in (101) will be to take the contextually determined best worlds and
see whether in all of those words the prejacent is true. A further restriction will give us
weak necessity, which will give us what we need to capture genericity.
The subsidiary ordering source, from a cross-linguistic perspective, according to von
Fintel and Iatridou (2008), can be brought about by counterfactual marking.33 They
claim that in a wide variety of languages, counterfactual morphology, in combination
with a strong necessity modal, returns a construction that is semantically equivalent
to the English ought. Generics do not manifest themselves with overt modal lexical
items, so the strategy here will be to introduce some counterfactual marking to help us
capture the secondary restriction.
A precedent for introducing counterfactual marking as a way to interpret sentences
containingweak necessitymodals comes fromYalcin (2016). At least in the cases where
a weak necessity modal takes a non-genuine epistemic reading, the suggestion is that
it receives a reading that has something to do with the way things normally unfold.34
Recall either utterance of Jones after the earthquake:
(102) I should be dead right now.
(103) I ought to be dead right now.
33See also Silk (fc).
34Although Yalcin’s suggestion was, in particular, about non-genuine epistemic readings, I think that
things generalize.
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The idea is that the interpretation of these sentences is somehow restricted according
to normality, in some sense or other. Furthermore, an initial gloss of the relationship
between weak necessity modals and normality is given as follows:
(104) a should/ought to F  It is normal for a to F
However, the problem with this gloss is that it would be odd for Jones to say:
(105) # It is normal for me to be dead right now.
But (105) does sound better when adding some standard counterfactual morphology:
(106) It would be normal for me to be dead right now.
So, following Yalcin (2016), a better gloss of the relationship between weak necessity
modals and normality is as follows:
(107) a should/ought to F  It would be normal for a to F
We can then use (107) to make manifest an overt construal of the affect of a secondary
ordering source:
(108) a. In view of their DNA, it would be normal for birds to fly.
b. In view of scientific testimony, it would be normal for birds to fly.
56
c. In view of their dispositions, it would be normal for birds to fly.
The counterfactual morphology present in (108) represents a further restriction which
then allows the modal to quantify over the very best of the worlds picked out by the
various in view of phrases. We then check whether in this more restricted set of worlds
whether the prejacent holds. Additionally, and crucially, the subsidiary restriction may
rule out the actual world, thus allowing for the coherence of sentences of the form
‘Should p but not p’ and helps make sense of the fact that generics grant exceptions.
It is also important to note that the subsidiary restriction need not be a normality re-
striction. We can have any sort of restriction which is capable of a counterfactual dis-
placement which may remove the actual world from the information states relevant to
assessing the truth-conditions. Let us begin by taking a look at the following generics:
(109) a. Oysters make round pearls.
b. Scots wear kilts.
c. Stealing is wrong.
d. If you make a promise, you should keep it.
Now, we consider the generics in (109) supplemented by the counterfactual morphol-
ogy which makes the subsidiary ordering source overt:
(110) a. It would be ideal for Oysters make round pearls.
b. It would be ideal for Scots wear kilts.
c. It would be wrong to steal.
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d. If you make a promise, it would be good/right for you to keep it.
The sorts of restrictions on the modal base given in (110) are preferred over normality
restrictions. Consider (109)a. It appears as though many oysters produce pearls that
are not perfectly round. At least in some sense, a normal pearl is one that is not per-
fectly round. A way to pick out the pearls of interest is to pick out certain ideal ones
like we have in (110)a. The idea, then, is that we are likely talking about ideal pearls
when we use (109)a. Similar remarks apply for (109)b. It isn’t quite normal for Scots
to wear kilts, though restricted in various ways to certain cultural ideals we get the
worlds where the prejacent holds. Now consider the moral principle in (109). Taking
for granted the idea that moral principles are like generics, the more suitable way of
capturing their genericity is by selecting the worlds with the right normative facts. It
is true that, normally, stealing is wrong, however the moral content of the generic is
more aptly captured by (110)c. Similar remarks apply for the conditional construction
in (110)d. This way of putting things does a much better job at capturing the moral
content than an overt appeal to normality. We would have: ‘If you make a promise,
then it would be normal for you to keep it’, which would not quite do the job.
One can think of these other ways of capturing the additional restriction as each having
something to do with normality. That is, the additional restrictions can be thought of
capturing different types of normality, as normality appears highly context-sensitive.
It is convenient, though, in my mind, not entirely essential to think of the further dis-
tinctions we require to capture weak necessity in this way.
Here is another way to think about the additional measure provided by weak necessity
modals. A suggestion from von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) is to think about it in a
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metalinguistic fashion. Consider:
(111) If we were in a context in which the secondary ordering source were promoted,
then it would be a strong necessity that...
It is useful to compare this to a move by Nickel (2016) who suggests adding a counter-
factual element into the semantics of generics, along with a reference to normality. One
way of doing this, Nickel suggests, is to take a generic like ‘Lions have four legs’ and
interpret it as follows:
(112) If there was a lion that was normal with respect to the number of legs for lions,
then all lions that are normal with respect to the number of legs for lions would
have 4 legs.
The idea we are after in capturing weak necessity is that the weak necessity results from
embedding a strong necessity claim in a counterfactual environment. The counterfac-
tual embedding is what can move the world of evaluation away from the actual world.
The in view of phrase places the restriction over the strong necessity claim. And the
counterfactual restriction places a further restriction on top of this.
2.6.2 DOUBLY RESTRICTED GENERICS
The proposal is that generics work in essentially the same way as sentences containing
overt weak necessity modals. Their initial restrictions come from in view of phrases.
We have seen that such phrases play the role of determining different readings for a
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given generic. This is because, at least with non-doxastic conversational backgrounds,
we are able to specify contexts that affect the interpretation of a given generic. And,
as we have seen, genericity, just like with sentences containing overt weak necessity
modals, comes with an additional proviso: we not only select the best worlds given
the conversational background, we select the best of these best worlds. This is the
main idea behind the proposal. The best of the best worlds are the worlds determined
by some sort of normative measure based on normality or ideality.
I now discuss how the theory sketched here would approach variousmore problematic
cases of generics. In particular, wewill consider cases of generics which appear true yet
the prejacent holds only for a minority; we will also consider cases of generics which
appear false yet the prejacent holds for a majority of instances.
First, the majority cases. A paradigm example of the kind of generic I have in mind
is ‘Books are paperbacks’. The standard suggestion is that such generics are false; the
weak necessity view helps us see why this is so even though the majority of books are
paperbacks. If we attempt to make the ordering sources overt, then we could have
something like:
(113) In view of bookbinding practices, it would be normal for books to be paperbacks.
The basic idea is that we consider the set of worlds where a certain kind of bookbind-
ing practice is held fixed (presumably one where many of the books are produced in
paperback form). And then we consider a set of these worlds based on whatever ideals
or norms we are apt to associate with books. But in this set of worlds it is not the case
that it is considered normal for a book to be paperback. So, according to the weak ne-
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cessity view, when we feed in information pertaining to norms and ideals, we would
predict that ‘Books are paperbacks’ is false. The weak necessity restriction allows this
sentence to be false no matter how prevalent the relevant bookbinding practices are.
Second, the minority cases. Examples of cases I have in mind are sentences such as
‘Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus’. One feature of this generic is that it does not easily
appear to take a genuine non-doxastic reading. This is partly why this sentence is
associated with a weak inferential profile. But there is the more obvious weakness that
very fewmosquitoes actually have the virus. What the weak necessity view has to offer
is that it could capture such weakness. In particular, it captures the idea that it is false
that many actual mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus, yet, at the same time, it is true that,
in some sense, they ought to be carriers of the disease. Perhaps a plausible reading for
the generic claim could be that it is somehow reasonable to expect that mosquitoes are
carriers of the virus. Indeed, the idea is that they are the very species that is a carrier
of the virus. The weak necessity view is positioned to capture this kind of intuition
because of the nature of displacement associated with weak necessity modals. We pick
out a suitable in view of reading and then consider a weak necessity restriction which
asks us to consider norms and ideals. Weak necessity modal claims do not depend on
actual circumstances; they instead very much depend on the ideals and norms we are
apt to associate with these sentences—and this gives us leverage in the case of weak
generics.
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2.7 CONCLUSION
I have defended the claim that the generic covert modality is a weak necessity modal.
The distributional parallels between generics and sentences containing overt weak ne-
cessity modals point us to this view. In light of these parallels, I have presented a way
of thinking about the generic covert modal as a weak necessity modal and discussed
how this would approach various cases of generics. The hope is that we have made
some progress in both our understanding of generics and of weak necessity modals.
There is much more to be said on understanding genericity in terms of weak necessity,
and there is much more to understand about weak necessity.
This chapter features an appendix which investigates the variability of generics further,
in relation to the modal proposal for generics defended here. In Section 2.8, I turn
my attention to normative generics in particular. I argue that variability involving
normative generics is a matter of context-sensitivity, and that the context-sensitivity in
question can be explained by a modal approach to generics.
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2.8 APPENDIX: NORMATIVE GENERICS
Normative generics—generalizations such as ‘Boys don’t cry’ or ‘Friends don’t let
friends drive drunk’—seem to express norms or ideals. Oftentimes, however, their de-
scriptive counterparts come out false: almost every boy cries andmany friends let their
friends drive drunk. Additionally, it is coherent to accept ‘Boys don’t cry’ in some con-
texts while also accepting ‘Boys cry’ in other contexts. Such normative generalizations
raise particularly pressing empirical and philosophical questions for many accounts of
generics, many of which are focused on giving truth-conditions for descriptive gener-
ics (e.g. ‘Tigers are striped’ or ‘Ducks lay eggs’).
In this appendix, I propose that a modal approach to generics is able to handle the
diversity involving normative and descriptive generics: I argue that this variance is a
matter of context-sensitivity, and that the kind of variance in question is familiar from
natural language modality. Since the modal approach promises to accommodate for
data involving normative generics, this provides an additional argument in favor of
treating generic generalizations as involving a covert modal element.
2.8.1 INTRODUCTION
The following are examples of normative generics:
(114) a. Boys don’t cry.
b. Friends don’t let friends drive drunk.
c. Politicians put the interests of citizens first.
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Paradigm examples of normative generics can oftentimes betray their descriptive coun-
terparts in truth-value.35 While the examples in (114) can be read as broadly reflective
of current norms and ideals, their descriptive counterparts do not necessarily express
true generalizations. All of the examples of normative generics highlighted in (114)
share in common the feature that their descriptive counterparts are false. It is gener-
ally true, for instance, that boys cry, that friends regularly let their friends drive drunk,
and that it is likely that politicians do not always put the interests of citizens first.
These generics express norms or ideals as opposed to some descriptive characterization
of kinds. As Leslie (2015, 112) notes:
It has long been noted that some generics such as “boys don’t cry” or “a
woman puts family before her career” do not seem to express any kind
of inductive generalization about the empirical world, but instead have a
certain kind of normative force.
Additionally, normative generics have deeper social dimensions. As Leslie (2015, 134)
explains:
These are generics that seem naturally tailored to advise or admonish. They
have a characteristic ‘hortatory’ force. For example, ‘boys don’t cry’ is false
as a description of the facts (since boys certainly do cry), yet assertions in-
volving it can nonetheless serve to express an admonition, or an encourage-
ment to hold back the expression of feeling. Similarly, ‘a woman values her
35Recent work has brought attention to such generics which possess a normative flavor. See Haslanger
(2014), Leslie (2015), Ritchie (2019), Saul (2017) Wodak et al. (2015).
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family over her career’ does not convey so much an empirical demographic
observation as an exhortation, even perhaps, a rebuke. ‘Friends don’t let
friends drive drunk’ was not introduced into public consciousness as a ba-
nal descriptive observation; utterances of it rather serve as injunctions pre-
cisely because friends (descriptively speaking) all too often let their friends
drive drunk, and activists wished to change this pattern.
This variability brings many challenges for theorizing about generics.36 Not only does
giving them closer attention help our understanding of genericity, it also helps us un-
derstand a significant dimension of human social cognition. One of the pressing re-
search questions in the literature on generics concerns accounting for the difference be-
tween descriptive generics and normative generics, andwhether an account of generics
can capture this dimension of diversity amongst generics. One of the central questions
I will focus on concerns the explanation of how it is coherent to accept a generic gen-
eralization such as ‘Boys don’t cry’ when understood in a normative sense while also
accepting ‘Boys cry’ as an adequate empirical statement.
On my view, the way to best understand the overall diversity of generics is to model
them in terms of natural language modality. This is the view that generics involve a
covert modal operator at logical form. I have discussed motivations for this through-
out this chapter, especially why a modal approach to Gen should be based on weak
necessity modals. In this appendix, the core argument for the modal perspective on
generics is that this approach has the potential to deal with normative generics because
36There are also further research questions concerning the grammatical form of these diverse generics.
For example, there is evidence that generics expressing characteristic or principled generalizations can be
come in either bare plural or singular forms, whereas statistical generics only manifest in the bare plural
form. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I am leaving aside complexities having to do with the
diversity of generics in their surface grammar and their relation to logical form.
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natural language modals themselves possess the flexibility to occur either normatively
and non-normatively. This gives reason to believe that the best way to understand the
context-sensitivity of generics is to understand it in terms of the context-sensitivity of
modals. The focus on normative generics will help to illustrate the modal approach
further, as well as provide an argument for it.
Modal terms such as should, ought, and must are context-sensitive in that they share
a core meaning but different uses express different ‘flavors’ of modality in different
situations. These modals occur with great diversity including epistemic, teleological,
bouletic, probabilistic, and normative interpretations, amongst others. These diverse
interpretations of natural language modals are determined by context: we start from a
common modal semantics and supplement special parameters with background infor-
mation from context which restricts the underlying modal quantification. In this way,
the resolution of the context-sensitivity of modal expressions is a metasemantic matter.
Sterken (2015b, 3) has recently defended a metasemantic approach to generics; her
approach can be summarized as follows:
When context-sensitivity is made the centerpiece of a theory of generic sen-
tences, our theorising has to be reoriented. This includes moving what has
been taken to be semantic work into the metasemantics. In other words,
rather than attempting to provide a theory of what the semantic value of
Gen is, I suggest we attempt to provide a metasemantic theory—that is, a
theory which addresses the question: in virtue of what does Gen have the
semantic value it has in a given context? It is the metasemantics, not the
semantics, that determines the content of Gen relative to context (just as it is
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the metasemantics, for the most part, which determines the content of that).
This keeps the semantics simple.
I agree that the core research problem here involves a metasemantic theory. While
Sterken’s approach is based on an interpretation of Gen which is based on indexical
quantification modeled on the metasemantics of demonstratives, I will argue that a
metasemantics for generics should be based on the idea that Gen is modal. I will argue
that this view has at least as many advantages as the indexical quantification view, and
that it has at least one more advantage, namely that, unlike the indexical quantification
approach, my approach accounts for the variability between descriptive and normative
generics.
The remainder of this appendix develops this line of argument. I begin by discussing
normative generics and argue that there is a strong case in favor of interpreting them in
terms of context-sensitivity (Section 2.8.2). After this, I explain how a modal approach
to generics can deal with normative generics (Section 2.8.3). Finally, I end with some
concluding remarks (Section 2.8.4).
2.8.2 CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY
I argue that the variance between descriptive and normative generics should be treated
as a matter of context-sensitivity and that the fact that it is coherent to assent to ‘Boys
don’t cry’ in the normative sense while also assenting to ‘Boys cry’ in the descriptive
sense is evidence of a form of context-sensitivity attributable to the generic character
of these utterances. A coach on the football field might pressure a young boy after he
has been injured while playing by telling him, ‘Get back out there—boys don’t cry!’
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But in a different context, when accurate statistical information is in question, the very
same coach may also reasonably assent to ‘Boys cry’, since this is widely and generally
true of actual boys. This is one of the main phenomena which needs some explanation,
especially the question of how a general approach to generics would be able to account
for the relevant data.
The case for treating this variance as involving a form of context-sensitivity builds
upon previous arguments for the context-sensitivity of generics. Sterken (2015b) has
recently made a persuasive case for a distinctive form of context-sensitivity associated
with generics, one that is not only across generic sentences, but across utterances of a
single generic.37 The nature of the context-sensitivity is distinctive in that it is not due
to some other familiar type of context-sensitivity, such as the context-sensitivity which
arises from domain restriction, or gradable predicates, or some other phenomenon;
instead the context-sensitivity is argued to be traceable to Gen.38
There are a number of cases considered by Sterken.39 I will consider two of these
cases where, at least on some interpretations, something along the lines of a rules or
regulations reading is available; in such cases, the generic expresses some kind of pre-
scription.40
For a first case, consider:
37Sterken (2015b) also points to a case by Nickel (2008) involving ‘Dobermans have floppy ears’, which
provides a paradigm example for the context-sensitivity of generics. Dobermans are born with floppy
ears, so in the context of evolutionary biology, this generic is true; however, in dog-breeding contexts, this
generic is false. See earlier in this chapter for further discussion of this case.
38Sterken (2015b, 10).
39Although none of Sterken’s examples involve the paradigmatically normative generics that we have
been discussing here.
40See Carlson (1995).
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(115) Cabs are yellow.
Sterken asks us to consider two contexts.41 The first situation one is where there is a
regulation that any licensed cabmust only be painted yellow or pink. In actual practice,
every cab is painted yellow. In such a situation, if one is asking about how to identify
cabs in the relevant jurisdiction, then (115) is a suitable response and is intuitively
true in such a context. However, for another situation, suppose that (115) is used in
a scenario where one is describing what the cab coloring rules are in the jurisdiction,
then (115) is intuitively false.
For a second case, consider:
(116) Frenchmen eat horsemeat.
For this example, Sterken reports that under the paradigmatic reading where distinc-
tive, or at least characteristic, properties of French people are salient, (116) seems true.
However, (116) is false in a different context where suppose ‘a group of nutritionists is
querying the unhealthy eating populations of the French’.42
Hence, because it is possible for the generics in both (115) and (116) to vary their
truth-values across different contexts of utterance, we have a standard case for context-
sensitivity.43
41Sterken (2015b, 7).
42Sterken (2015b, 8) gives the following example text: ‘Frenchmen eat croissants and baguettes. They
don’t eat traditional food, like horsemeat or grains.’ In this context, I agree that (116) definitely looks
false.
43Sterken gives additional support for context-sensitivity here given the agreement test of Cappelen
and Hawthorne (2009); I will discuss this below in relation to normative generics.
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I agree that these examples help make the case that generics exhibit context-sensitivity;
in addition, I think that they are also helpful in approaching the more general problem
of how to account for the difference between descriptive and normative generics. I will
now present the argument that variability between normative and descriptive generics
constitutes a distinctive and paradigmatic form of context-sensitivity involving gener-
ics.
We have seen that generics such as ‘Boys don’t cry’ and ‘friends don’t let their friends
drive drunk’ can very between the descriptive and the normative in the sense that
it is possible and coherent to accept and use these generics as norms while also ac-
cepting that, descriptively speaking, these generics are false. My claim is that context-
sensitivity is the best explanation of the fact that it is not contradictory to assent to both
‘Boys don’t cry’ and ‘Boys cry’.
There are three remarks before proceeding.
First, while typical arguments for context-sensitivity exploit evidence that involves a
divergence in truth-value of the same utterance across different contexts, examples
such as ‘Boys don’t cry’ does not seem to give rise to truth-value divergence in the
usual sense because it is not obvious whether this sentence expresses a true or false
generic. Perhaps the norm that boys should not cry reflects the ideals of society in
some sense or other, but this is different from saying that it is true that boys should not
cry. At the very least, if ‘Boys don’t cry’ has a widely understood normative reading,
which might have imperatival uses, then as long as it differs from ‘Boys cry’ in the
statistical sense, this is what we need to keep track of.
Second, it is, I think, more important to consider the coherence of assenting to both
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that Boys don’t cry and that Boys cry. This datum serves the crucial role in my argument
that normative generics can give rise to a semantic form of context-sensitivity.
Third, it is important at this stage to state a sort of caveat or hedge. Perhaps I have
been speaking as though the primary divisions amongst generics are along descriptive
and normative lines. I do not have a particular commitment about these matters of cat-
egorization; this is largely a matter of expository convenience. The main point I want
to draw home is that if the diversity of natural language modality seems to correspond
with the diversity of generics, then our theorizing is likely on the right track.44
Moreover, I contend that it is possible to coherently assent to ‘Boys cry’ and ‘Boys
don’t cry’ and understanding this form of variance between descriptive and normative
generics as a matter of context-sensitivity is supported by one of the industry-standard
tests given by Cappelen andHawthorne (2009), namely the Agreement Test. According
to this test, if two speakers, in different contexts, cannot be reported as disagreeing
about whether a sentence is true, then we have evidence for context-sensitivity.45
44For example, another category to consider aside from the descriptive and the normative is what we
might call the normality reading which is something of a hybrid of the descriptive and the normative.
A descriptive notion of normality involves concepts such as statistical frequency. For instance, people
might some notion of how long the average person actually spends time exercising per week. Perhaps it
is so that the average person spends two hours per week exercising. Then, in the descriptive sense, it is
normal to exercise for two hours per week. But there is also the prescriptive notion of normality. This has
to do with concepts such as ideals. People, perhaps following some general health guidelines, might have
some notion that the average person should ideally spend five hours per week exercising. Then, in the
prescriptive sense, it is normal to exercise for five hours per week. Bear and Knobe (2017) have recently
argued that peoples beliefs about normality possess this hybrid character, so when people are asked about
the normal hours spent exercising per week, they will tend to give an answer which is something of a mix
of the descriptive and prescriptive senses of normality.
45Here is a concise statement of the test:
Let u be a sincere utterance of a sentence S by a speaker A in a context c, and u’ be a sincere
utterance of not-S by a speaker B in a context c’. If from a third context c”, A and B cannot
be correctly reported by A and B disagree whether S, then S is semantically context-sensitive.
Meanwhile, if from a third context c”, A and B can be correctly reported by A and B disagree
whether S, then this is evidence that S is semantically invariant across c, c’ and c”. (Cappelen
and Hawthorne, 2009, 54)
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We can easily see that the Agreement Test gives us evidence of context sensitivity in-
volving normative generics. As mentioned before, two separate utterances of ‘Boys
don’t cry’ can give us plenty of cases where one can coherently assent to ‘Boys don’t
cry’ but dissent to ‘Boys cry’. The important point is that we would not have the in-
tuition that there is disagreement concerning ‘Boys don’t cry’ in such cases. When
the coach on the football field is encouraging or perhaps reprimanding his players by
telling them that boys don’t cry, we do not understand this as involving any sort of dis-
agreement with someone who asserts that boys cry in a context where actual natural
tendencies of male children are in question. Hence, the lack of disagreement gives us
reason to hold that context-sensitivity is an explanation of the phenomenon at hand.46
2.8.3 METASEMANTICS
This section argues that a modal approach can handle the context-sensitivity associated
with generics, and the focuswill be on normative generics. The core point I put forward
is that the variability associated with generics is akin to the variability associated with
modality in natural language. If this is on the right track, then we have reason to
believe that a metasemantic approach to generics should be modelled in terms of the
metasemantics of natural language modals.
While I agree with Sterken (2015b) that generics exhibit distinctive context-sensitivity
and that the promising direction to pursue is to provide a metasemantic theory of Gen,
my argument here is that a careful consideration of the dimension of variability related
46I am aware that the Agreement Test is not conclusive; a more complete argument for context-
sensitivity would require addressing alternative explanations, amongst other things. My aim, at present,
is to provide suggestive but defeasible evidence for context-sensitivity.
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to descriptive and normative interpretations of generics points to a modal approach to
Gen. An overview of the argument is as follows. There is good evidence and precedent
for treating generics in terms of modals. In natural language, modals are able to take
on a variety of interpretations and the dominant approach to the semantics of modality
due to Kratzer treats modals as context-sensitive. The resolution of context-sensitivity
of modals involves an account of how parameters such as the modal base and order-
ing source are saturated by background information. This is one of the central issues
underlying the metasemantics of natural language modality. Because a metasemantic
account is needed to account for the context-sensitivity of modals, we should expect a
similar strategy in accounting for the context-sensitivity of generics.
Sterken (2015b) appeals to the metasemantics for supplementives from King (2014),
which is an account based on speaker-hearer coordination: on this view, the seman-
tic value of a demonstrative, in a given context, is determined by speaker intention
together with the hearer’s knowledge of this intention. In this way, Sterken prefers
to base a metasemantic theory of Gen on a theory which is generally applicable as a
strategy for dealing with supplementives.47
Her metasemantic theory based on the coordination account is stated as follows:
The semantic value of a use of Gen in a context c is the generalisation g that
meets the following two conditions:
47As Sterken (2015b, 19-20) writes:
As I understand it, the metasemantic question for Gen is an instance of the more general
question: in virtue of what do supplementives get their semantic values in a given context?
In this way, specifying an answer for the metasemantic question for Gen will likely appeal,
in part, to the same sorts of resources as the corresponding metasemantic questions for
demonstratives, domain variables, implicit argument places and the like.
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1) the speaker intends g to be the value of Gen in c; and
2) a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the com-
mon ground of the conversation at the time of utterance would
know that the speaker intends g to be the value ofGen in c. (Sterken,
2015b, 21)
One of the core arguments in favor of this account of the metasemantics of generics
is that it explains the apparent semantic underdetermination of Gen. To take one of
Sterken’s examples, consider the following generic in (117) and notice that there are a
number of possible contexts which may go along with what a speaker says in uttering
(117):
(117) Mammals lay eggs.
(118) a. A biologist is discussing birds, and their relationship to other species, she
utters, Birds lay eggs. Mammals lay eggs too.
b. There is a homogeneous subset of animals such that all of them lay eggs.
c. Several mammals that reproduce in some way lay eggs.
d. Many mammals that have reproductive capacities lay eggs.
These examples demonstrate that there are many possible candidates which could fur-
ther fill in what a speaker says when uttering (117). As King (2014) argues, semantic
underdetermination is characteristic of supplementives; hence, this gives us reason to
model generics in a similar way. That is, we can explain the semantic underdetermina-
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tion of generics by giving an account of the resolution of context-sensitivity in the style
of how we account for the underdetermination of supplementives.
The standard examples of rules and regulations generics and the standard examples of
normative generics both appear to have something along the lines of a normative flavor.
At this point, we must ask whether there are important differences between rules and
regulations generics and normative generics. I will propose one way to think about the
difference: normative generics license inferences or signal endorsement whereas there
can be non-endorsing uses of rules and regulations generics.
Paradigm examples of generics which involve a salient rules and regulations reading
include:
(119) a. Bishops move diagonally.
b. Basketball players shoot free throws when fouled.
When the generics in (119) are used in the rules and regulations sense, they do not
seem to presuppose that the speaker holds that a bishop should move diagonally or
that a basketball player should shoot free throws after being fouled. Paradigmatic
instances of normative generics, however, do seem to carry the propensity to license
such inferences. Haslanger (2014, 367) writes:
in contexts where it is assumed that what’s natural or good (at least for
good things) is how things should be, that is, where such assumptions are
part of the common ground, then the utterance of a generic enables a short
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inference to the normative conclusion, giving the generic a kind of norma-
tive force.
Haslanger (2014) argues that this inferential propensity belongs to pragmatics. In the
case of normative generics (as well as other non-statistical generics) she proposes that:
if one asserts that Fs are G, then it is implicated (or presumed) that under
‘normal’ circumstances it is something about being an F that makes an F a
G, that Fs as such are disposed to be G.
I agree that the propensity to license inferences in this way is an important phenomenon
we need to account for, and that this should indeed influence our theorizing about
generics. There are a range of competing theoretical options to account for this propen-
sity and while I am sympathetic to a pragmatic explanation, I think that there is reason
to think that this phenomenon can, at least in part, be captured from the perspective of
a metasemantic account, in particular, in differences in how the contextual parameters
of natural language modals are saturated.
The central metasemantic parameters are the modal base and ordering source. These
are the values that need to be fixed for any given context of utterance. The differences
between rules and regulations generics and normative generics can, at least in part, be
witnessed by differences in how these parameters are filled.
While I am sympathetic to the metasemantic approach to Gen due to Sterken (2015b)
and agree that this approach is very fruitful in capturing a wide range of the data, I
argue that there is reason to believe that the indexical quantification variant of this
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approach does not possess the resources we need in order to capture the broader vari-
ability of generics involving normative uses.
The main point of contention against this approach is that it does not seem likely that
a mechanism such as indexical quantification—which is modelled on the metaseman-
tics for demonstratives—can handle the variability which arising from descriptive and
normative readings of the same generic. This is because indexical quantification does
not involve the sort of intensionality that we need in order to capture the meanings of
a wider range of generics. The theory based on Sterken (2015b) would likely deal with
such cases by variability in the lexical restrictor and allowing the adverbial quantifier
to span over different kinds of situations, actual or non-actual. Aside from the point
that many generics seem to involve some sort of intensionality, one doubt is that vari-
ations between quantifying over actual versus non-actual situations does not seem to
be a general feature of supplementives. This would be problematic if the account is
meant to treat generics in terms of the more general phenomenon of how we should
account for the metasemantics of supplementives.
For the purposes of this appendix, I want to provide a simple illustration of how vari-
ation in the context-sensitive parameters of modals helps us with accounting for nor-
mative generics. The generic ‘cabs are yellow’, in a rules and regulations context can
be characterized in modal terms by having a modal base whose set of worlds contains
those worlds where a cab is painted yellow or pink; the ordering source we would
need is one which restricts this set by narrowing down things down to what the reg-
ulations provide. If what is in question is perhaps the stereotype that cabs are yellow,
then the modal base would be restricted accordingly, and we would need an ordering
source based on normality in order to complete the overall conversational background.
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For ‘Boys don’t cry’, the paradigmatic normative interpretation can be derived by con-
sidering a modal base which includes the proposition that boys do not cry, where the
resulting worlds are ordered by what is considered ideal. Conversely, when what is
in question relates to what is developmentally normal for a boy, then the modal base
would include worlds where boys cry, and the overall flavor of the modal would then
require an ordering source based on what is biologically normal.
In this way, we can see that a modal approach to generics has the resources and flex-
ibility to account for the variability arising from normative generics. In particular, it
is the contextual flexibility which helps provide an explanation for the phenomenon
that it is coherent to assent to a normative generic while also assenting to its falsity in
different situations. Whatever is the best account for how these contextual parameters
get saturated in the case of ordinary natural language modals will be relevant here; at
present, the main claim is that an approach to the context-sensitivity of generics can
and should be modelled in terms of modality.
2.8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Here is a summary of my arguments. I have argued in this appendix that a modal ap-
proach to generics promises to capture the overall variability of generics by showing
how this approach can deal with the context-sensitivity of generics. The ability to pro-
vide a uniform setting to deal with the difference between descriptive and normative
generics is a highlighted motivation for this approach.
It is worth stating one general point in favor of my account and one general strike
against at least some competing account of generics is that my account allows for a
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uniform treatment of descriptive and normative generics. For example, Cohen (2001)
suggests that we need to depart from the usual logical form of descriptive generics in
order to give a treatment of normative generics. But on the modal approach, we can
keep one logical form with a unified semantics.
Previouswork on generics includes several proposals for dealingwith normative gener-
ics. I limit myself to a very brief discussion of the view defended by Leslie that norma-
tive generics involve lexical polysemy.
Leslie (2015) appeals to empirical work on dual character concepts by Knobe and
Prasada (2011) which is motivated independently of theorizing about generics. Dual
character concepts allow us to explain how it is possible to assent to ‘Boys don’t cry’
without dissenting to ‘Boys cry’ by claiming that ‘boy’ is polysemous in the sense that
in the former generic, ‘boy’ picks out an ideal, whereas in the latter generic, ‘boy’ picks
out actual boys. Hence, on this style of explanation, the distinction between descriptive
and normative generics itself should not be located in some feature particular to gener-
ics, such as differences in logical form, or appeal to a mechanism such as pragmatic
implicature.
A modal account of generics offers a competing explanation without resorting to pol-
ysemy. At least one off the bat worry with a polysemy strategy is that there are po-
tentially very many notions or concepts associated with social kinds such as ‘boy’ and
we would not want an over-proliferation of too many senses of ‘boy’ and it is hard to
see how this would follow from a conceptual duality. For example, what is ideal for
a boy could easily vary from culture-to-culture. But it is hard to see how lexical pol-
ysemy would then be able to deal with the full diversity of concepts associated with
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‘boy’. While a context-sensitivity strategy for generics has to deal with the worry of
overgeneration, there is an important sense in which we want to be able to predict and
accommodate the potential diversity of generics by keeping only the right elements
stable.
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The Genericity of Moral Principles
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most central and contentious issues regarding the nature of moral reasoning
concerns whether we can have knowledge of themoral features of particular actions on
the basis of moral principles. This issue is at the heart of the dispute between general-
ists and particularists in moral philosophy. Moral generalists argue that moral thought
and deliberation depends on moral principles. This position is associated with and
supports a view on which moral principles have a central role in moral reasoning:
Role Generalism: Moral principles serve a substantial role in moral rea-
soning by supporting our knowledge of what is morally right or wrong in
particular cases.
The central aim of this chapter is to argue against generalism by targeting Role Gen-
eralism. My opposition to this tradition in moral philosophy is based on the idea that
moral principles are not apt to serve a distinguished or special role in moral reason-
ing because there is good evidence that such principles are of the more elusive sort
expressed by generics in natural language. And because there is reason to believe that
generics do not properly sustain reasoning about particular cases, I will argue, on this
basis, that moral principles are not apt to support the role in moral reasoning that they
are generally afforded.
The following are some examples of generics:
(120) a. Ravens are black.
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b. Birds fly.
c. Tigers are striped.
Generics express generalizations with a kind of quasi-universal flavor: they commu-
nicate generalities without a full-on commitment and remain true even in the face of
counterinstances. These generalizations are conveyed without any lexical item respon-
sible for telling us about the nature of the generalization in question.
There is good evidence that we should understand moral principles as generic gener-
alizations because they share paradigmatic features of ordinary generics. I argue that
this should turn us against Role Generalism.
If moral principles involve the same form of generalization as ordinary generics, then
there are two main consequences:
 The correct understanding of moral principles is then one on which there is an
incredible amount of variability: moral principles remain true even without it
being the case that they are successful in giving the right verdicts in particular
situations.
 Moral principles do not come with any information about how many instances
are required to conform to the generalization in order to be true: information
about the prevalence of a particular property does not come from a generic gen-
eralization itself.
In this chapter, it is argued that these consequences generate a new argument against
Role Generalism. In doing so, this chapter provides an argument in favor of a partic-
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ularist conception of moral reasoning on which our judgments of whether a particular
case possesses a given moral property cannot be supported by our knowledge of gen-
eral moral principles. In particular, it is argued that the generic conception of moral
principles supports the following thesis concerning the role of moral principles in rea-
soning:
Role Particularism: Knowledge of what is morally right or wrong in par-
ticular cases does not depend upon moral principles.
The generic conception of moral principles reveals a further angle in the controversy
over generalism and particularism focused on the nature of moral reasoning. The re-
sulting conception of reasoning is thoroughly particularist: the generic view challenges
the salient competing models on which moral reasoning is either deductive or defeasi-
ble and instead provides motivation for a weaker theory of reasoning. The arguments
also raise substantive questions about the nature of reasoning with generics; these are
taken up along the way.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The issue of moral reasoning is discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2 from the perspective of moral generalism and moral particularism. This sec-
tion discusses how it is that different perspectives on the nature of moral principles
inform and give rise to different accounts of moral reasoning.
Section 3.3 argues that we should accept a conception of moral principles on which
they are generic generalizations because paradigmatic moral sentences share promi-
nent features in common with ordinary generics.
Section 3.4 lays the foundations for an account of moral reasoning which is based on
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the idea that moral principles are generic generalizations:
 In Section 3.4.1, it is argued that because generics do not come with any infor-
mation about the prevalence of the properties in question, they do no support
provide sufficient support in reasoning about arbitrary cases.
 In Section 3.4.2, it is argued that the non-relationship between generics and preva-
lence yields an argument for moral particularism because moral principles also
do not come with any information about prevalence, and hence cannot provide
the appropriate support to sustain a central role in reasoning.
Section 3.5 concludes. Some further issues regarding moral epistemology and the in-
teraction between overt deontic modals and covert generic modals are taken up in the
concluding chapter of the thesis (Chapter 5).
3.2 MORAL REASONING WITH PRINCIPLES
Moral principles, at least in ordinary cases of moral deliberation, are usually expressed
by sentences such as the following:
(121) a. One ought not to steal.
b. Lying is wrong.
c. If you make a promise, you should keep it.
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According to the generalist tradition in moral philosophy, the principles expressed by
such claims both characterize and govern our actions. Consider the opening section
of Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation where
he presents an introduction to his account of the source and structure of morality. He
argues that there are two features of the world, namely our inclination toward pleasure
and our aversion to pain, which not only govern human behavior but also generate a
standard of right and wrong.48
Bentham (1970, 11-12) continues on these points by specifying what exactly he takes to
be the role of the principle of utility:
By the principle of utility it is meant that principle which approves or dis-
approves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose
interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote
or oppose that happiness.
The principle of utility gives us an example of how a principled conception of morality
is meant to work. This principle is fully general. It applies to all situations, all acts,
and all persons. This sort of indifference and impartiality is characteristic of a variety
of traditionalist positions in ethics. On this account, the principle of utility provides
a descriptive characterization of our proclivities, but also makes the normative claim
that we are to be guided by the relevant proclivities. This is because the notions of
right and wrong are defined in terms of pleasure and pain: the promotion of pleasure
or happiness generates a standard of right and the opposition of such states generates
48Bentham (1970, 11).
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a standard of wrong.
Furthermore, accounts of the structure of morality not only differ according to which
principles are the foundational ones, but also in terms of whether there ought to be a
single foundational principle at all. An alternative conception of the foundations of
morality might, for instance, have it that there is instead a series of commandments
which may not turn out to be explained by some single rule or source. Such moral
frameworks take the ordinary moral principles we use such as ‘No one should steal’
or ‘No one should murder’ as more basic or central whereas a view which subscribes
to one core moral principle takes these as more intermediary and explained by the one
core principle.
A part and parcel of such an account of the structure of morality is a theory of moral
reasoning.49 This is because a principled conception of morality needs to deliver on
how it is we have knowledge of what is morally right and what is morally wrong on
the basis of moral principles. The generality of moral principles should make them
applicable in all circumstances (or at least a sufficiently wide range of circumstances)
and thereby deliver a normative account of how we should reason about matters of
morality.
The most orthodox theory of moral reasoning arising out of the generalist tradition is
the theory on which moral reasoning is a form of deductive reasoning. The core idea
behind this theory is that both the correct psychologically descriptive and normative
account of moral reasoning is one which conforms to the structure of deductive argu-
49There are, of course, a number of notions of ‘reasoning’, some which are particularly concerned with,
for example, unconscious thinking including biases and heuristics which influence moral judgment. For
further discussion, see Sunstein (2005), as well as references therein. The focus here, however, is on
the philosophically more paradigmatic notion of moral reasoning which is reflective, and which can be
carefully reconstructed.
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ments.
The deductive model of moral reasoning enjoys a form of historical prominence in
that it was arguably held throughout the history of philosophy up to recent times.50
Demos (1958), who was, relatively speaking, an early detractor of the idea that moral
reasoning is deductive, notes that:
The fact that moral principles are stated in the form of universal propo-
sitions has made it appear that they function as premises in a deductive
inference. (Demos, 1958, 153)
Additionally, Hare argues, in The Language of Morals, in favor of the deductive model.
He elaborates:
There are two factors which may be involved in the making of any decision
to do something...They correspond to the major and minor premisses of
the Aristotelian practical syllogism. The major premiss is a principle of
conduct; the minor premiss is a statement, more or less full, of what we
should in fact be doing if we did one or other of the alternatives open to us.
Thus if I decide not to say something, because it is false, I am acting on a
principle, ‘Never (or never under certain conditions) say what is false’, and
I must know that this, which I amwondering whether to say, is false. (Hare,
1952, 56)
50Demos (1958), for instance, proposes that Aristotle was perhaps the first to put forward the deductive
model of moral reasoning. Although this is somewhat interesting because, at the same time, Aristotle is
claimed to be the “forefather” of particularism (Ridge and McKeever, 2016).
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Later, in Freedom and Reason, Hare claims that:
the only inferenceswhich take place in [moral reasoning] are deductive...What
we are doing in moral reasoning is to look for moral judgements and moral
principles which, when we have considered their logical consequences and
the facts of the case, we can still accept. (Hare, 1963, 88)
Suppose we consider the model of moral reasoning resulting from Bentham’s principle
of utility. It would involve starting from this principle as a major premise and then
applying it to particular cases. We can consider a simplified version of the principle of
utility for an example:
(122)  If an action x promotes the greatest pleasure, then x is morally right.
 This action promotes the greatest pleasure.
 Therefore, this action is morally right.
As a part of the reasoning process, we might imagine that one needs to especially sup-
ply reasons for the truth of the minor premise, for instance by justifying whether, in
fact, the action in question does promote the greatest pleasure by considering a variety
of potential factors.
Alternatively, since the principle of utility serves as the basis for various more pedes-
trian moral principles, moral deductive reasoning for the utilitarian can be said to pro-
ceed from these subsidiary principles instead. For example:
(123)  Stealing is wrong.
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 This is an act of stealing.
 Therefore, this act is wrong.
Indeed, this is presumably the sort of more commonplace moral reasoning that or-
dinary people are said to engage in. These two different examples of the deductive
model of moral reasoning are indicative and not exhaustive. There will be some vari-
ation amongst different potential examples, but this will be mainly due to differences
amongst the formulations of general moral principles and not the inferential relation-
ship in question.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss how different conceptions of moral principles
give rise to different associated theories of moral reasoning. An examination of the
available options reveals a number of positions for generalists, although the situation
from the perspective of particularism seems less straightforward.
3.2.1 GENERALISM
The common commitment behind generalism in moral philosophy is that there are
principles which specify the moral reasons which serve the role of determining the
moral status of particular actions. Moral generalists tend to be committed to the truth
of moral principles as well as the significance of such principles in deliberation. This
position is aligned with the idea that moral principles can explain the moral status
of particular actions and that such principles hold a central role in moral reasoning.
However, as is well-known, the underlying nature of moral principles has been very
well-contested within the generalist tradition. For our purposes, it is important to
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make explicit how it is that different generalist conceptions of moral principles lead to
different commitments regarding moral reasoning.
The proposal that moral principles fit the form of the major premise of an Aristotelian
syllogism is one of the most traditional and simple accounts. We can understand the
principle that ‘Stealing is wrong’ as a universally quantified material conditional:
(124) For any action x, if x is an act of stealing, then x is wrong.
Call a view which treats moral principles in this manner Exceptionless Generalism.
This traditionalist conception of moral principles supports the idea that such principles
have a very direct and stable role in the determination of right andwrong. This stability
supports the idea that the moral status associated with some action is something that
follows from the general principles of morality.
The stability is due to the fact that Exceptionless Generalism gives rise to a deductive
model of reasoning as previously described. To say that a version of generalism gives
rise to a deductive model of reasoning is to say that the conception of moral princi-
ples at hand is one from which we can infer deductive consequences. These are the
strongest inferences we can make from exceptionless universal generalizations:
(125) Exceptionless Generalism: deductive inference
 For any action x, if x is an act of stealing, then x is wrong.
 This is an act of stealing.
 Therefore, this act is wrong.
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This is essentially the idea discussed in the passages quoted above from Hare. The
idea that Exceptionless Generalism is associated with a traditional deductive model
of reasoning is itself a descriptive and normative idea.
Although this account has been historically prominent and perhaps, at least implicitly,
widely-held, it is fair to say that an exceptionless understanding of generalism and its
associated theory of reasoning receives less support today. The main problem for this
view is that it does not account for the idea that there are reasonable and acceptable ex-
ceptions to moral principles. The above example would make too many acts come out
as wrong: there are, very easily, some plausible cases where there are acts of stealing
which are not wrong.
The need to accommodate tolerable exceptions to moral principles motivates further
refinements. We can imagine a weakening of Exceptionless Generalism on which the
relevant moral principle is interpreted as a conditional, but one which tolerates excep-
tions in some way. These views are under the heading of Proviso Generalism. One
version of Proviso Generalism comes with some open positions for specific exception
clauses. Then, for instance, we can think of this view as suggesting something like the
following:
(126) Stealing is wrong except when you need to feed your family, when you are being
coerced. . .
Alternatively, and more pertinently, we might have:
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(127) For all x: If x is an act of stealing (and it’s not the case you need to feed your
family and it’s not the case you are being coerced...), then x is wrong.
Call this viewNaive Proviso Generalism. Its associated conception of moral reasoning
is a special case of the deductive model which accommodates exceptions by appropri-
ately restricting the antecedent of the moral principle:
(128) Naive Proviso Generalism: Deductive inference with exceptions
 For any action x: If x is an act of stealing (and it’s not the case you need
to feed your family and it’s not the case you are being coerced...), then x is
wrong.
 This is an act of stealing. (And it’s not the case you need to feed your family
and it’s not the case you are being coerced...)
 Therefore, this act is wrong.
There are at least two immediate worries for such an account. First, the account of
moral principles itself faces problems because it does not seem likely that we can have
a finite list of all the exceptions. For this reason, it is unlikely that we can properly jus-
tify the minor premise. The second point is that if this view were correct, then it would
appear to reduce substantive principles to principles that appear non-substantive be-
cause it captures the essence of ’Stealing is wrong’ as ‘Stealing is wrong except when
it’s not wrong’.
In order to avoid such problems, it is advisable to consider a version of Proviso Gen-
eralism which captures the main spirit of Naive Proviso Generalism in that we take
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moral principles to involve some form of a proviso but retain the putative substan-
tiveness of moral principles. Views of this kind are versions of Substantive Proviso
Generalism. These proviso-involving accounts of moral principles end up abandoning
the deductive conception of reasoning.
One approach to Substantive Proviso Generalism is to enforce the substantiveness of
moral principles by appealing to the notion of a ceteris paribus law as used in the
special sciences. On this kind of proposal, we can take ordinary statements of the
general laws of the special sciences and interpret them with a special ceteris paribus
proviso. To illustrate, consider an example from Morreau (1999):
(129) An increase in the supply of an article will cause its price to fall.
Morreau notes that strictly speaking, the example, as put forward, is wrong: if there
is an increase in demand, then it need not be the case that prices of items fall as a
consequence of an increase of supply. In order to appropriately express the relation-
ship between prices and supply, we would have to hedge so as to exclude cases of an
increase in demand. That is, we ought to add a ceteris paribus clause:
(130) Ceteris paribus, an increase in the supply of an article will cause its price to fall.
This gives us Ceteris Paribus Proviso Generalism.51 However, there is good reason
to believe that such an account will face difficulties absent a substantial account of the
ceteris paribus clause as applied to the moral case. The associated conception of moral
reasoning would look like as follows:
51For a defense of interpreting moral principles in terms of ceteris paribus restrictions, see Pietroski
(1993). Also see Holton (2002) and Robinson (2008) for discussion.
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(131) Ceteris Paribus Proviso Generalism: Ceteris paribus inference
 Ceteris paribus, stealing is wrong.
 This is an act of stealing.
 Therefore, this act is wrong.
Suppose that one moral principle says that stealing is ceteris paribus wrong and that
another moral principle says that failing to feed one’s dependents is ceteris paribus
wrong. There is a serious question here as to how it is appealing to a ceteris paribus
clause will play any role in helping one decide what one ought to do. This is because
we are missing an account of how we know when the cetera are paria. If an account of
what one ought to do in such situations is given by something other than the meaning
of the ceteris paribus clause, then it would seem that moral principles themselves do
not serve the role a generalist would wish for them to serve.
Finally, one of the prominent approaches under the heading of Substantive Proviso
Generalism which aims to overcome these problems relies on the notion of a default.
The default approach to moral principles is defended by Horty(2007, 2012), and is
based on the version of nonmonotonic logic due to Reiter (1980). The core idea is that
a moral principle, such as ‘Stealing is wrong’, allows us to establish, by default, that
an act of stealing is wrong. On this view, moral principles ‘[identify] the defaults that
underlie our reasoning’.52 Horty continues:
On this view, the general principle that lying is wrong should be taken to
mean simply that there is a default according to which actions that involve
52Horty (2012, 154).
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lying are wrong—or that, to a first approximation, once we learn that an
action involves lying, we ought to judge that it is wrong, unless certain
complicating factors interfere. Horty (2012, 154)
A crucial feature of defaults is that they are defeasible; establishing that an act of steal-
ing is wrong can be overridden, provided that there is information present which can
take priority.53 The conception of moral principles as defaults gives usDefault Proviso
Generalism. This account is intended to overcome problems for Ceteris Paribus Pro-
viso Generalism and related accounts by giving a more complete account of defeasible
inference by giving an account of how defaults are overridden. For instance, suppose
it is accepted that the need to feed one’s dependents makes stealing morally justifi-
able. Then this information acts as an additional default which takes priority over the
default that an act of stealing is wrong.
In Section 3.4.2, I discuss some challenges for Default Proviso Generalism which are
based on the arguments for the treatment of moral principles as generic generaliza-
tions. The main issue discussed is whether the treatment of moral principles in terms
of defaults can not only serve as a descriptive model of moral reasoning, but also a
normative one. The remainder of this section discusses moral particularism in relation
to the question of moral reasoning.
3.2.2 PARTICULARISM
Moral particularism denies the centrality of principles in moral philosophy. The as-
pect of this view under consideration in this chapter is the denial of an epistemological
53For recent discussion and criticism, see Bonevac (2016).
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route from moral generalities to particular cases. In order to challenge this epistemo-
logical route, particularists need to work with an account of moral reasoning which
does not require moral principles. This is because one important aim for the particu-
larist research program is to give an account of how it is that moral principles appear
to feature in our everyday thinking and reasoning while, at the same time, denying
the substantiveness of moral principles. In line with this, Dancy (1993) has previously
stated that:
It seemswise for particularism to allow some role tomoral principles, some-
how conceived, rather than simply announce that everyone is completely
mistaken about them and their importance in ethical thought and educa-
tionSo particularism needs to provide some account, within the constraints
which it accepts, of what is a very common practice of somehow appeal-
ing to general truths and previous cases in the course of reaching a moral
judgment, and in the justification of one when reached. (Dancy, 1993, 67)
There is, however, a big question as to how exactly the particularist can achieve such
an aim. In order to offer some account or perspective of the role of moral principles in
our lives, especially our thinking and reasoning, the particularist needs to offer work
with a notion of moral generalization that is acceptable by the particularist’s lights.
But it is far from obvious what notion the moral particularist should be working with.
Different theorists, whether their sympathies are aligned with generalism or particu-
larism, will work with different conceptions of moral principles. What appears to be
common ground is that the less plausible notion of moral principle is one on which
specifies absolute, exceptionless reason in favor or against the rightness or wrongness
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of an action. Beyond this, matters get controversial quickly.
It is worth considering various aspects of the particularist’s attack on moral principles
to see whether there are any insights to be gained regarding what the particularist can
say about moral reasoning. Importantly, however the notion of reasoning is spelled
out, it must not be principle-dependent.
The prominent version of moral particularism, associated with Dancy, denies the fol-
lowing thesis:
Invariable Relevance: Moral principles specify properties that always count
in favor or against either the rightness or wrongness of the action in ques-
tion.54
The idea behind Invariable Relevance is that if, for example, there is a case of stealing,
that very fact, in every situation, counts against an action. At the same time, although
the fact that someone stole something counts against that action, it may not always
succeed in making the action wrong overall. This describes Dancy’s target conception
of moral principles, which he sees as yielding such ‘general’ reasons:55
Moral principles, however we conceive of them, seem all to be in the busi-
ness of specifying features as general reasons. The principle that it is wrong
to lie, for instance, presumably claims that mendacity is always a wrong-
making feature wherever it occurs (that is, it always makes the same neg-
54cf. Dancy (2004, 74). The idea behind this thesis is known as ‘Atomism in the theory of reasons.’
55This is meant to be understood roughly in terms of prima facie duties, in the sense of Ross (1930).
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ative contribution, though it often does not succeed in making the action
wrong overall. (Dancy, 2004, 76)
If moral principles specify reasons which provide such an invariable contribution, they
support a conception of moral reasoning on which there is, at the very least, perhaps
something like a default route from the epistemology of moral principles to the episte-
mology of particular cases. One of the core ways in which particularists deny the role
of principles in moral reasoning is to argue for the following thesis:
Variable Relevance: Features which count in favor or against the rightness
or wrongness of an action need not always count in favor or against either
the rightness or wrongness of an action.56
There is a plurality of features that can contribute in favor or against the rightness or
wrongness of an action, especially those not specified by moral principles. One of the
well-known arguments for particularism as articulated by Dancy (1993, 2004) is that
the truth of Variable Relevance leads to a wholesale rejection of moral principles.
Recently, however, it has been argued that the commitment of Variable Relevance is
consistent with generalism, and that disagreement about what account of moral prin-
ciple we should work with is at issue.57
Horty (2012) has argued in this vein, and also emphasizes that differences about the
meaning of moral principles are at stake here. Regrading his disagreement with the
version of particularism due to Dancy, he writes:
56cf. Dancy (2004, 73). The idea behind this thesis is known as ‘Holism in the theory of reasons.’
57For instance, see McKeever and Ridge (2006) and Väyrynen (2006).
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The disagreement has its roots, I believe, in our different views concern-
ing the meaning of general principles—it is a semantic disagreement. We
both acknowledge, by and large, the principles guiding practical reason-
ing cannot usefully be taken to express universally generalized material
conditionals: the practical principle that lying is wrong cannot mean that
every action that involves lying is wrong. Instead, as we have seen, what
Dancy suggests as the most attractive generalist option is that these princi-
ples should be taken to identify considerations that play an invariant role
as reasons. The principle that lying is wrong should thus be taken to mean
that lying always provides some reason for evaluating an action less favor-
ably, even in those cases in which our overall evaluation is favorable.58
Horty’s own position rejects the idea that a feature plays an invariant role as a reason
and is able to do so in a way which is consistent with generalism. Provided that the
commitment to Variable Relevance will not be uniquely particularist, the search, in
order to give an account of moral reasoning from the particularist perspective, should
be for a non-substantive view of principles. And in this case, what will count as non-
substantive will have to be a view on which there is no good epistemological route
from a moral generalization to a particular case.
Such an account, from the perspective of the particularist, is still forthcoming.59 The
particularist needs a conception of moral principles which is suitably non-substantive
58Horty (2012, 153-4).
59One complaint from Schroeder (2009) still feels relevant in certain respects. In a review of Dancy
(2004), he remarks: “though his book outlines several models for how principles might work, it is disap-
pointing to discover that nowhere in 215 pages of what is supposed to be the definitive statement of his
anti-principle views, does Dancy tell us in so many words exactly what a principle is actually supposed
to be” (2009, 568-569).
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and makes sense of everyday moral reasoning. The next section hopes to provide
something helpful to moral particularists. It offers a conception of moral generalities
that is particularist-friendly in that it is weaker than all the proposals that generalists
have worked with, and is thereby not strong enough to support the traditional aims of
generalists.60
3.3 GENERICITY IN THE MORAL DOMAIN
As has been noted before, the project of providing truth conditions for generics is chal-
lenging as our intuitions vary widely between different generics. Matters are not es-
pecially straightforward since whether or not a generic is true, for instance, need not
correspond with any statistical regularity.
To start with a very familiar example:
(132) Ducks lay eggs.
Despite the fact that only female ducks of reproductive age actually lay eggs, (132) is
true. Hence, it need not be the case that the majority of ducks lay eggs in order for the
generic to be true.
Moreover, we can even have weaker cases of generics:
(133) Ticks carry Lyme disease.
60See Stangl (2006) for a discussion of some attempts by particularists to characterize moral principles
in a non-substantive way as well as arguments for why these approaches face difficulties.
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Only around 1% of ticks carry the disease, yet the generic claim in (133) is true.
Finally, for some further complications, consider:
(134) Books are paperbacks.
Although the majority of books are paperbacks, the corresponding generic in (134) is
false.
Examples of these various kinds abound. The amount of variation in the data is wide,
and the inability of being able to account for generics in terms of a correlation to statis-
tical regularity is only one example of how complex matters can be.
The claim defended in this section is that moral generalizations are generalizations
in the sense that generics are generalizations: they exhibit the kind of variability and
quasi-generality that we associate with generics. In order to pursue this claim, it is
important to have some minimal yet central distinguishing characteristics or features
of genericity in the background. For our purposes, we will take the following two
characteristics to serve as hallmarks of genericity:
Resistance: Generics can remain true even if there are counterinstances.
Non-Numerity: Generics do not carry any information about how many
instances are required in order to be considered true.
The features of Resistance and Non-Numerity help distinguish generic generaliza-
tions from generalizations involving overt quantifiers, as the latter lack these two fea-
tures. Resistance andNon-Numerity are closely related—in the sense that Resistance
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says that generics can tolerate exceptions while Non-Numerity says that generics do
not tell us how far this toleration extends. There are two remarks on these features.
 First, regarding Resistance: generics tolerate exceptions, yet we cannot express
their truth conditions the way we can with generalizations involving overt quan-
tifiers. In the case of such quantified generalizations, we know that, for instance,
a universally quantified generalization would be false if there is a single coun-
terinstance; a most-quantified generalization would be false if most of the in-
stances are actually counterinstances; and, finally, we know that a some-quantified
generalization would be false if there is no instance acting as a witness to the gen-
eralization. With generics, however, there is no way of similarly specifying how
it is that a generic can be false.
 Second, regardingNon-Numerity: generics do not provide us with any informa-
tion about how many instances of a generalization are required in order for it to
be considered a true generalization (Carlson, 1977). Suppose one is asked ‘How
many tigers are striped?’ It is possible to reply by suggesting that all/most/some
tigers are striped, but it would appear problematic if one were to reply by sug-
gesting that tigers are striped.
This second point is important. It not only cleanly distinguishes generics from ordinary
quantified sentences, this point, more significantly, highlights one of the very remark-
able features of generics which make them so intractable. The idea that generics are
non-numerous reveals that they are independent of prevalence in the sense that the
truth of a generic is consistent with varying levels of prevalence of cases which con-
form to the property specified by a generic.
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The argument put forward in this section, then, is that there are firm grounds for think-
ing that moral principles are generic generalizations because they, too, possess the fea-
tures of Resistance and Non-Numerity. I will consider both features in turn.
First, moral principles exhibit the property of Resistance because it is well-accepted
that paradigmatic moral generalizations tolerate exceptions. At the same time, how-
ever, it is also understood that there are general difficulties in positing a proviso to
handle the exceptions because there is no straightforward way to specify the content
of such a proviso which can account for the various possible permissible exceptions. It
is important to note that this reveals that a moral generic such as ‘Stealing is wrong’ is
one that resists statistical explanation: stealing is still wrong even if it were to turn out
that overwhelmingly many cases of stealing turned out to be somehow exceptional or
perhaps blameless cases of stealing.
Second, moral principles pass the criterion for Non-Numerity: these principles do not
wear any information on their sleeves concerning howmany instances of a givenmoral
generalization hold true. Suppose one is asked ‘How many instances of stealing are
wrong?’ Depending on what the present state of affairs is like, it may be appropriate to
answer by suggesting that all/most/some acts of stealing are wrong; it would, however,
be infelicitous to reply by putting forward the generic claim that stealing is wrong.
In addition, it is also worth noting that canonical examples of moral principles appear
to pass some standard tests associated with generics. This should count as further,
albeit defeasible, evidence in favor of the idea that such generalizations are generic
generalizations. Moral principles do well with the standard adverbial quantifier inser-
tion test of Krifka et al. (1995). According to this test, we have good reason to hold that
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a given sentence is a generic if the insertion of an adverb of quantification renders only
the slightest change in meaning. For instance, inserting usually into the generic ‘Birds
fly’ gives us ‘Birds usually fly’ which only results in a slight change in meaning.61
To apply this test in the case of a moral principle, consider the following:
(135) Stealing is wrong.
Then combine with an adverb of quantification:
(136) a. Stealing is usuallywrong.
b. Stealing is normallywrong.
c. Stealing is typicallywrong.
d. Stealing is generallywrong.
These paraphrases sound appropriate, and also help bring out the prima facie exception-
granting character of the moral principle in (135). Overall, it seems reasonable to say
here that adding in these adverbs only result in a slight change in meaning. Then, by
the test, we have good reason to consider (135) and other such related principles to be
generics.62
61In this case, the insertion of an adverb of quantification only slightly changes meaning especially
when compared to the insertion of such a quantifier into a sentence which receives what is called an
‘existential interpretation’. Intuitively, such sentences are focused on talking about particular individuals
and not individuals in general. Such sentences change very little when the quantifier some is added to
them. An example of a sentence receiving an existential interpretation is ‘Birds are on the roof’. Adding
some hardly alters the meaning, however the insertion of an adverb of quantification drastically changes
the meaning. See Cohen (2004) for data and discussion.
62Admittedly, it would be hard for everyone to hear paradigmatic moral sentences as generics. If, for
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An important result of the feature of Non-Numerity is that this reveals that moral
principles are consistent with a potentially incredible amount of variation in prevalence
of cases which appropriately conform to the generalization. Provided that the truth of
a generic does not imply prevalence, this will have some important implications for
how to account for reasoning with generics. This issue, along with its implications, is
pursued in more detail in the next section.
3.4 FROM THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF GENERICS TO THE EPISTEMOL-
OGY OF MORALS
In this section, I present an argument for Role Particularism. I argue that our knowl-
edge concerning whether a particular act is right or wrong does not derive, in any
important sense, from our knowledge of moral generalities. The argument here is
based on the thesis that moral principles are generic generalizations; the core idea be-
hind the line of argument is that investigating the epistemology of generics provides a
framework for understanding the epistemology of morality.
The position developed in this section is that if we understand the epistemology of
moral reasoning in terms of the epistemology of generic reasoning, we end up with a
form of moral particularism. The very nature of moral reasoning, in particular, how
to interpret and represent such patterns of reasoning, is a central issue in the episte-
instance, one has some very firm, prior metaethical commitments, they might find it hard to hear moral
principles as having a generic reading. For example, suppose one has some strong Kantian commitments.
Then such a person would strongly disagree that moral principles are generics.
If the aim is to give the best account of the semantic nature of moral principles, we will not be able to
convince those with such strong prior commitments. This is because the present project is different: our
focus is on the ordinary appeal to moral practices, and the question of whether the moral principles we
use in ordinary cases of moral reasoning serve some substantial role in our moral lives.
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mology of morality and is especially important with respect to the issue of whether
moral generalities can support, in the appropriate ways, our judgments about moral
situations. The relevant notion of support in question here is an epistemic one, and, in
order to arrive at some understanding of moral reasoning which addresses such con-
cerns, it is important to first carefully examine the structure of reasoning with generics.
3.4.1 GENERIC REASONING
There is an important clarification and observation to start with. We need to distin-
guish between our knowledge of generic generalizations and whether our knowledge
of generic generalizations supports inferences about whether particular entities or in-
dividuals possess the property specified by a generic. Questions about these issues are
some of the core questions at the basis of the epistemology of generics. Our concern
here will be with the latter question of the inferential support provided by generics and
whether or not the truth of generics provide support for justifying our beliefs about
whether or not some individual under the scope of a generic generalization possesses
the property in question. In this section, I approach this issue by considering some of
the issues in the literature on the relationship between generics and defeasible reason-
ing.
Several researchers have connected their approaches to the semantics of generics with
the literature on defeasible validity because it has been claimed that generics support
defeasibly valid inferences. Asher and Morreau (1995) and Pelletier and Asher (1997),
for example, have regarded the ability to account for how it is that generics support
and license nonmonotonic inferences as an important desideratum. Such inferences
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may take the following or related forms:
(137) Generic Modus Ponens
 Frogs jump.
 Kermit is a frog.
 So, Kermit jumps.
The conclusion that Kermit jumps is said to be defeasibly supported by the generic
claim that frogs jump. Here, the premises support the claim that Kermit jumps yet
we might also find that the inference is defeated because we learn, for example, that
Kermit does not jump due to some genetic defect. The truth of the premises provides
some support or tentative reason to favor the conclusion.
This inference is regarded as defeasibly acceptable because, in general, inferences of
this sort appear reasonable, so it would seem likely that a semantic approach to gener-
ics should also be accompaniedwith investment in the ability to account for the defeasi-
ble acceptability of these inferences. Several semantic accounts of generics do just this:
these accounts may either represent the meaning of a generic in terms of defeasible
rules or as conditionals with the right kinds of inferential properties.
There is, however, an important problem for this idea. Leslie (2007) poses a challenge
against the notion that accounting for nonmonotonic inferences supported by generics
should be a desideratum when theorizing about generics.63 This is because there are
63For a discussion of relevant experiments about reasoning with low prevalence generics, see Prasada,
Khemlani, Leslie, and Glucksberg (2013).
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several generics from which it appears as though we are unable to derive any reason-
able consequences. Her two examples are as follows:
Example 1
 Mosquitos carry West Nile Virus.
 Buzzy is a mosquito.
 So, Buzzy carries the West Nile Virus.
Example 2
 Ducks lay eggs.
 Beaky is a duck.
 So, Beaky lays eggs.
The point which can be extracted from these examples is an argument based on the
variability of generics. The very fact that generics resist a statistical explanation re-
veals several kinds of examples where defeasible reasoning based on generics does not
appear reasonable. So, there is a problem for the idea that accounting for patterns of
defeasible validity should be central in giving an account of generics.64
There is a more general argument to be made here regarding the issue that there is a
high degree of variability in the acceptability of nonmonotonic inferences involving
64I have previously noted in Chapter 2 that there are different ways of looking at Leslie’s example, and
that we should make sure we examine them bymaking overt various elements of the background context.
See Section 2.4.2 for discussion.
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generics. That is, there is more to say even about the paradigmatic cases of generic rea-
soning. The inference to the claim that Kermit jumps seems almost uncontroversially
reasonable, however, I claim that even this judgment is not as robust as it appears:
closer examination reveals that we should find the inference questionable or at least
marginally acceptable.
Consider the following. It is known that frogs jump and that Kermit is a frog. No
other facts about Kermit are known. Although we know the generic information that
frogs jump, by Non-Numerity, it follows that we are not in a position to know any
facts pertaining to the prevalence of jumping frogs or anything about the prevalence of
jumping amongst various subsets of frogs. Such information about prevalence is not
given by, nor follows from, the meaning of the generic.
Suppose it is known that Kermit belongs to a group of frogs which have a high preva-
lence of jumpers. If this is the case, the inference that Kermit jumps would appear
well-supported. However, in the case where information regarding the prevalence of
a generic in a given situation is known, it would appear likely that we should attribute
any resulting sense of inferential goodness to the facts about prevalence themselves
and not the generic in question.
Furthermore, absent any information about prevalence, the inferences we draw from
generics would not then appear well-supported. Knowing the generic generalization
that frogs jump should notmake us feel entitled to infer anything about particular frogs
on the basis of the generic alone. And this point easily generalizes across the whole
range of generics, regardless of whether there is witness to sufficient prevalence.65
65It might be argued that the point made here relies only on a very particular understanding of generics
and that there is perhaps a plausible understanding of generics on which the meaning of a generic is
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The property ofNon-Numerity reveals an important lesson regarding the relationship
between generics and defeasible reasoning. Without sufficient prevalence as a given,
it is hard to get a handle on what the notion of defeasible validity involving generics
is meant to capture; it is also not clear whether the various proposed formal principles
would turn out to be helpful if our judgments can vary so easily across a range of
situations. One lesson we can extract from the foregoing is that knowledge of generic
generalizations do not themselves support our beliefs about particular cases under the
scope of such generalizations. The stronger version of this lesson says that generic
generalizations provide no support whatsoever in this sense; the weaker version says
that generic generalizations provide very little support.
Hence, at the very least, what we get is an important point of caution in the episte-
mology of generics: we should accept a position of caution when relying on generic
generalizations in reasoning because they are unable to confer the appropriate kind of
justificatory support required when reasoning about particular cases. Even very little
support provided by knowledge of a generic generalization is not enough to provide
robust justificatory support for our beliefs about particular cases. The two core reasons
for the lack of justificatory support are as follows:
 First, accepting the truth of a generic does not entail that there is a sufficient
prevalence, in the current circumstances, of whatever property is specified by the
generic. This point is best supported by the Leslie cases. These are cases where
somehow tied to facts about prevalence. In presenting my arguments, I am not presupposing any one
particular understanding of generics. But I would argue that an account of generics which involves and
depends upon prevalence is not on the right track: it would not be able to account for ‘weak’ generics and,
in general, would have trouble accounting for the range of variability that is said to be associated with
generics. It is important to note that the point about the relationship between generics and prevalence is
intended to hopefully be generally acceptable common ground, although there is some dissent.
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we know that, as a matter of actual fact, we are reasoning with generics which
are associated with low prevalence.
 Second, the point generalizes and goes beyond the phenomenon pointed out by
the Leslie cases. Suppose we consider a supposedly high prevalence generic such
as ‘Tigers are striped’. We know that it is true that, in the actual world, a vast
majority of tigers are striped. However, even if there is a felt presumption in favor
of cases of generic reasoning, this presumption is itself unstable and potentially
influenced oneway or the other by extraneous factors—perhaps our beliefs about
prevalence or some other information. In other words, it would be a mistake to
think that any apparent epistemic goodness of generic reasoning comes directly
from generics themselves. So, any felt presumption could not serve the relevant
justificatory role.
It is helpful and important to distinguish the descriptive and the normative here. Re-
cent work in psychology has shown that once subjects accept a generic, they are dis-
posed to treat the generic as inferentially powerful in the sense that they will believe
that an arbitrary member of a kind possesses the property in question regardless of
prevalence-related beliefs (Khemlani, Leslie, and Glucksberg, 2009). However, in char-
acterizing the nature of reasoning with generics it is important to note that an account
of reasoning we are interested in is deliberately not fully descriptive. The concern is
not only with capturing how it is that we, as a matter of actual practice, reason, but
also importantly with how we should reason. The epistemic question of whether there
is justificatory support for beliefs about particular cases on the basis of generics is itself
an inherently and thoroughly normative question: it is a question either about how we
are permitted to reason, or how we should reason, or something along these lines.
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3.4.2 GENERIC MORAL REASONING
The core lesson from considering the epistemology of generics carries over to the case
of moral principles. This is so not only because of the plausibility of the idea that
moral principles express generic generalizations, but also because a closer examination
of moral reasoning itself reveals similar features to generic reasoning. Understanding
moral reasoning in terms of generic reasoning reveals an alternative perspective, one
on which moral reasoning does not depend on moral principles. Accordingly, this
section presents the argument forRole Particularism: I will argue that whenwe reason
about distinct moral cases or situations, our judgments are not, in the right kind of way,
supported by moral generalities.
The argument for Role Particularism relies on two claims:
 That moral principles are generic generalizations.
 That generic generalizations do not provide the appropriate inferential support
in reasoning.
Together, these claims naturally lead to the conclusion that moral principles do not
provide the appropriate inferential support and point to a conception of moral reason-
ing on which our judgments about the moral features of particular acts do not depend
upon moral principles. Establishing an argument for this claim establishes an argu-
ment for Role Particularism.
The core of this point is based on the idea that the principle of Non-Numerity is true
of moral principles. This can be stated as follows:
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MoralNon-Numerity: Moral principles do not carry any information about
prevalence, that is, they do not carry any information about how many
cases need to appropriately conform to the principle.
The generic conception of moral principles delivers an account which respects Moral
Non-Numerity. If this is the case, moral principles cannot be depended upon in moral
reasoning. We will verify this claim in the following way. In order to confirm that we
have reached the desired conclusion that moral principles cannot be depended on in
moral reasoning, it suffices to argue that even the stronger, default notion of principles
cannot confer the appropriate epistemic support in reasoning. We can consider the
default perspective because it is consistent with the idea that moral principles are non-
numerous.
Recall that on Horty’s view, moral principles specify the ‘defaults that underlie our
reasoning’.66 Defaults can be overridden by other defaults, provided there is some fac-
tor in force that prioritizes other defaults. These defaults can be overridden according
to a number of different factors. The important thing to note is that the default per-
spective on moral principles is consistent with Non-Numerity. That there is a default
which says that we should conclude that an action is wrong if it involves stealing does
not provide us with any information about the prevalence of cases of stealing that ul-
timately turn out to be wrong. Hence, the proponent of the default account of moral
principles should acceptMoral Non-Numerity.
However, Moral Non-Numerity presents some problems for a generalist account of
the epistemology of moral properties on the basis of general principles. This places the
66Horty (2012, 154).
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pressure against the default theory: the proponent of the default theory of reasoning
has the burden of justifying why it is that moral principles are associated with the
default entitlement or presumption that arbitrary instances conform to the principle.
There are two overall points to make against the default theory on this matter.
First, suppose the proponent of the default theory argued that the entitlement or pre-
sumption to infer according to moral principles attempts to argue for the idea that
somehow our place in the moral landscape sufficiently meets certain background ex-
pectations of normality in the sense that it should be considered a safe bet, so to speak,
at least in our world, that an act of stealing counts as wrong.
My response is two-fold. The first point is that if the notion of default entitlement or
presumption had its basis in some metaphysical account of the world that ‘backs-up‘
the default entitlement or presumption on the default view, this would seem to have
to be a strange coincidence if anything. Dancy (2004) elaborates on the idea that such
an arrangement would end up being a sort of ‘cosmic accident’:
The principle that it is wrong to lie cannot be merely a generalization, a
claim that lies are mostly the worse for being lies, for if all moral principles
were of this sort, the argument that moral thought and judgment depend
on the possibility of moral principles would simply be the argument that
such thought is impossible unless there is a considerable preponderance of
normal cases over abnormal ones. I have never seen this argument made,
and I doubt, what is more, whether it would be persuasive if restricted to
ethics. (2004, 76)
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Furthermore, even if one were to grant a certain configuration of normal cases over
abnormal cases as a basis for default entitlement or presumption, this still would not
be enough to justify a generalist moral epistemology of our beliefs about the moral
features of particular cases. This would not show that moral principles which spec-
ify defaults are sufficient enough to justify beliefs about particular cases: it still does
not show that a conception of moral principles consistent with Moral Non-Numerity
would provide, on its own, the positive epistemic appraisal we are after because there
is no reason to think that such positive support follows from the metaphysical story.
The second point that can be registered against the default theory is that there is rea-
son to think that the default entitlement or presumption to infer according to moral
principles is more a result of a strong felt tendency to infer on the basis of moral gen-
eralizations. It might be said that a reason in favor of supporting the default model
of moral reasoning is that it does well at adequately characterizing the descriptive fea-
tures of our psychologies by making good on the idea that we are prone to make such
strong inferences on the basis of moral principles.
However, there is an empirical point that can be made in response. Recent work by
Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) gives support for the idea that we are prone
to a psychological effect whereby there is a tendency to generalize from the truth of
a generic to the truth of the corresponding universal statement.67 Lerner and Leslie
(2013) build on this and argue that it might appear that people accept rather strong
moral generalizations, however the source of this is actually an overgeneralization
based on the acceptance of moral generics. They observe that it is generally agreeable
that universally quantified moral generalizations are false, because of familiar prob-
67See Lazaridou-Chatzigoga et al. (2017) for discussion and criticism.
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lems having to do with moral dilemmas.68 However, at the same time, many subjects
report an intuitive attraction to such universally quantified generalizations. Lerner
and Leslie (2013) argue for the existence of what they call a ‘moral overgeneralization
effect’: there is a psychological tendency whereby people end up endorsing the univer-
sally quantified moral generalizations because they mistake them for the true generic
moral generalizations. It seems likely that the same point should apply in the case of
accepting default principles: a likely explanation of the tendency to reasonwith default
principles could be that it is due to a similar sort of overgeneralization effect.
While the default theorist might argue that a virtue of their account is that it is able
to capture the idea that we have a tendency to accept rather strong generalizations, I
would argue that an account of moral reasoning should be more concerned with the
question of how we should reason as opposed to modelling how we in fact reason.
Hence, the justification for default entitlement or presumption should not rest upon
purely descriptive foundations.
These arguments perform a double-duty: they serve to illustrate the main claim of this
section but also generate arguments against a competing version of generalism. We
considered whether the proponent of the default view of moral principles could give
metaphysical or descriptive arguments that provide the basis for why we should infer
by default on the basis of moral principles, however in both cases, we find thatMoral
Non-Numerity undermines both justifications. The broader point is that the principle
ofMoral Non-Numerity implies a claimwith a distinctively normative flavor: because
moral principles are independent of information about prevalence, they cannot gener-
ate sufficiently positive epistemic support in moral reasoning.
68Indeed, it is fair to say that thinking that universally quantified moral generalizations are false is
common ground between generalists and particularists.
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3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Moral particularists want to say something enlightening about the role of moral princi-
ples in various domains such as moral reasoning and moral education. It would seem
difficult to say anything about such topics while denying that moral principles have a
prominent standing in moral philosophy. It is also hard to say anything enlightening
about any of these other areas of moral inquiry if we affirm a wholesale denial of moral
principles.
However, with a weak, generic notion of moral principles, this opens further avenues
for particularists to consider. And because the generic perspective on moral princi-
ples has plausibility independently of commitments regarding views such as particu-
larism and generalism, it is a proposal that has wider interest, and there is very likely
much more further work to be done with respect to the role of generics in other di-
mensions of moral philosophy. Additionally, having a generic conception of moral
principles would assist other arguments and strategies for particularism, such as the
one defended by Thomas (2011), who argues for particularism on the basis of the non-
monotonicity of moral reasoning. Hence, for these reasons, I conclude that there is
something interesting and important to be gained by introducing the generic notion of
moral principles as a competing theoretical option.
The view itself that moral principles are best understood as generic generalizations
raises further questions regarding how exactly we should be interpret moral princi-
ples, especially their logical form and meaning. This perspective involves interaction
between modality and genericity, since the view implies that many moral statements
which feature overt modals should also involve underlying genericity. For instance,
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Saint-Croix and Thomason (2016) have recently discussed the idea that some ought
sentences are also generic. On their proposal, the underlying logical form of some
ought claims involves two modals: a generic modal and a deontic modal. The defea-
sibility of moral principles is captured by representing the generic modal as having
wider scope. The precise details of such an account is definitely an important matter
for further research.
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4
Supererogation & the Structure of the
Normative Domain
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
We would generally regard it as supererogatory if one were to donate 12% of their
income to charity. Hence, the following ought-claim seems intuitively true:
(138) You ought to give 12% of your income to charity.69
At the same time, it is also true that you should do better; therefore, the following
ought-claim also seems intuitively true:
(139) You ought to give 12% of your income to charity, but you really ought to do better.
If the notion of supererogation is tied to the concept of what we ought to do, and if
what we ought to do is whatever is best, then it would seem as though (138) should be
false because this is not the best you can do.
Perhaps a reasonable intuition is the following: so long as you are donating a non-zero
amount of your income to charity, your action counts as supererogatory. But, from this,
it would not follow that you ought to perform just any action that is supererogatory. At
least part of the issue seems to be that the concept of supererogation, as it is ordinarily
used, seems to come with a kind of scalar flavor: when you act beyond the call of duty,
you are doing something better than what is required. But then if you are not doing
what is best, then you ought not supererogate.
69If you happen to find yourself not sharing this intuition, perhaps it might help to assume, among
other things, that the donating is going toward a worthy cause through an effective organization, and
that 12% of your income is more or less a negligible amount for you.
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Supererogation is a prominent notion in our commonsense understanding of morality.
But it raises a number of conceptual difficulties, especially when it comes to subop-
timal supererogation. The focus of this chapter is on how to interpret the notion of
supererogation in the setting of an account for deontic modality in order to discern
the relationship between supererogation and the notion of ought. The next section
introduces a conceptual problem about suboptimal supererogation, and sets up the
remainder of the chapter from there.
4.2 THE ALL OR NOTHING PROBLEM
I will now introduce another problem about supererogation, one which highlights
some difficulties with accounting for supererogation within the standard account for
deontic modality. I want to start off by motivating the thought that there are at least
some cases where we ought to do good, even if we are not doing the best. But then
there are other cases where not doing are best is clearly morally wrong.
Suppose that one has the option to donate to charity and opts to donate to the cause of
animal welfare. Assume that one is also willing to appropriate a large sum of money,
say, a million dollars. If one selects a very efficient charity, then this money could
have a significant impact in the reduction of animal suffering. At the same time, it
is also true that the money could have instead gone toward a supply of protective
nets to shield human beings against malaria. A million dollars would be enough to
protect around half a million people who are at risk of contracting malaria. There is a
controversial question of which option yields themore optimal outcome. This question
is partly empirical because it depends on, amongst other things, the effectiveness of the
122
charities in question, but the question is also deeply philosophical because we need to
have an account of how to weigh the values of the lives of different animals.
These questions aside, however, suppose that a million dollars towards animal welfare,
in some set of circumstances, somehow does less good than a million dollars towards
malaria nets. Perhaps this is because it might be that there is no animal welfare charity
on the market which operates as efficiently as a malaria charity, or because a million
dollars does not benefit enough animals in order to outweigh the good produced by
protecting half a million individuals from malaria.
In such a situation, I hold that there is the reasonable judgment that one has done
nothing morally wrong in giving a substantial sum toward the benefit of non-human
animals. After all, the causes we are comparing are both worthy and very much in
need of attention in our world. Hence, even if one is acting suboptimally, it appears
that one could still be doing something good, and, importantly, not morally wrong.
While we have noted that there are some cases where it seems reasonably acceptable
to not do what is best when acting in a supererogatory way, there are cases where
acting beyond the call of duty in a suboptimal manner is clearly morally wrong. Hor-
ton (2017) discusses the following case to build a conceptual problem concerning the
central normative notions of permissibility, obligation, rightness, and wrongness:
Collapsing Building: Suppose that there is a collapsing building and that
there are two children about to be crushed. There are three options avail-
able to you:
Option 1: Do nothing.
123
Option 2: Save one child by allowing both of your arms to be
crushed.
Option 3: Save both children by allowing both of your arms to
be crushed.
Provided that a great sacrifice is involved here, it is not required to save any children.
In other words, Option 1 is permissible: it is permissible to not save any children.
There is a further and more interesting verdict here which is that Option 2 is morally
wrong: even though there is a great sacrifice involved in saving one of the children, it
is wrong to save only one child because an equivalent sacrifice would have saved both
children. Option 3 is also permissible and involves the same great sacrifice, but both
children end up being saved, and is not morally wrong.
Given these intuitive verdicts, Horton (2017) argues that there is a deep challenge here.
Here are two reasonable judgments which follow from the case:
Claim 1: It is morally permissible for you to not save both children.
Claim 2: It is morally wrong for you to only save one child.
However, Claim 1 and Claim 2 seem to imply Claim 3:
Claim 3: You ought to save neither child rather than only save one.
Claim 3 seems contentious at the very least. It is strange to think that what you ought
to do is nothing, especially given that the alternative would arguably produce more
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good. As Horton (2017, 94) puts it: ‘Surely the best moral view would not discour-
age you from saving the one child’. At the same time, there is something reasonable
about Claim 3, namely the thought that it is a consequence of the reasonable and
broader idea that you should avoid doing wrong. Nevertheless, the salient under-
standing of this claim seems to imply that doing something good—and beyond the
call of duty—should be avoided. And this seems counterintuitive because saving one
child, although it is not the best option, is better than saving no one, even if this is, in
some sense, wrong.
Horton argues that Claim 3 is due to the following principle:
Principle: If j is morally permissible and y is morally wrong, then we
ought to do j rather than y.
And Principle looks very plausible. Indeed, Horton (2017, 96) says:
This principle is intuitively correct. And there are countless cases that
seem to verify it. Suppose, for example, that it is permissible to say some-
thing nice, permissible to say nothing, and wrong to say something nasty.
[Principle] implies that you ought to say nothing rather than say something
nasty. And that seems the right result.
I am sympathetic to the plausibility of Principle. Although, at the same time, there
does seem to be something fairly counterintuitive here, especially given that it implies
Claim 3. It seems as though the only acceptable options are to do nothing or to do the
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best. And what you ought to do if you are not going to do the best is to do nothing.
The problem here is known as the All or Nothing Problem.70
While Principle appears intuitively plausible, my contention is that we need to care-
fully examine the normative notions involved to properly make sense of this principle.
If Principle is true, then we need a good account of how it is that an act which is better
can also be wrong.
Recent authors responding to the All or Nothing Problem have sought to reject at least
one of the claims or Principle in order to approach the problem. My own approach
will be different. I will be understanding the problem here as having to do with a
challenge about whether the notion of supererogation can be captured on the standard
interpretation of the deontic modal notions. The notion of a supererogatory act is gen-
erally understood as an act which is better than what is morally required. But the All
or Nothing Problem seriously undercuts this way of thinking about supererogation.
As it stands, it does not seem that there is a satisfactory answer—from the perspective
of the standard account of the structure of the normative domain—to the question of
how it can be better to act than to not act, yet also be doing something wrong. At least
part of the issue is that the standard account appears to involve the idea that between
two options, you ought to do what is higher-ranked of the two.
I argue that the standard account requires some further distinctions and refinements,
and that these clarifications not only help provide an answer to the All or Nothing
Problem, they are important for the sake of understanding the main normative no-
70This name of the problem is given by Horton (2017). Antecedent discussion of this kind of problem
can be found in Parfit (1982, 2011) and Tadros (2011). See McMahan (2018), Muñoz (fc), Portmore (2019),
Pummer (2016, 2019), and Sinclair (2018) for recent discussion.
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tions and how they relate to each other. They are also important for approaching the
more general problem of suboptimal supererogation, which is the problem of explain-
ing why some cases of suboptimal supererogation are acceptable while others are not
acceptable.
The core ofmy approach develops an argument to the effect that there are good grounds
to distinguish between two notions of supererogation: one is a scalar notion that is de-
fined in terms of optimality and the other is a binary notion that is defined in terms
of whether an act is good, permissible, and not what is required by morality. Put dif-
ferently, there is one conception of supererogation that is sensitive to the question of
optimality in actual circumstances and another conception of supererogation that is in-
dependent of optimality in this sense and counts any action which, in the appropriate
sense, ‘exceeds’ the requirements of morality as supererogatory.
The sketch of the overall argument in this chapter is as follows. Supererogation natu-
rally fits with the notion of ought. Normative modals can generally be distinguished
in two categories: realistic and idealistic. We will say that realistic deontic modals
are sensitive to actual circumstances whereas idealistic deontic modals are less sensi-
tive to actual circumstances and are more general. This delivers two ways of thinking
about ought: one that tracks the actual facts and another that is not particularly sensi-
tive to the actual facts. These two ways of thinking about ought deliver two notions of
supererogation.
I argue that these two notions give us the resources we need to approach the general
problem of suboptimal supererogation. A suboptimal supererogatory act can be wrong
because such an act is not permissible from the perspective of a realistic ought. An act
127
which is not permissible is forbidden, and if an act is forbidden, it helps deliver the
judgment that an act is wrong. However, suboptimal supererogatory acts are permis-
sible in a broader sense because they are not forbidden by the invariant demands of
morality. This delivers the sense in which an act can go beyond the demands of moral-
ity and not be the very best act but still be regarded as acceptable. Hence, our judg-
ments of rightness and wrongness regarding suboptimality vary because sometimes
they are tracking different senses in which an act is permissible or impermissible.
The rest of the chapter develops this line of argument. I discuss the standard con-
ception of how supererogation might figure into the standard account of the norma-
tive modal notions of permission, recommendation, and requirement. Following this,
I then discuss how it is that this account has issues with accommodating the phe-
nomenon of suboptimal supererogation (Section 4.3).
My next task will be to further investigate the diversity of the deontic domain. I will
introduce two ways of thinking about supererogation based on an underappreciated
distinction we can draw between two kinds of deontic modals: ones that are sensitive
to actual circumstances and ones that are not. I discuss how this relates to the difference
between deontic modals which appear to relate to binary standards and and those
which appear to relate to scalar standards (Section 4.4). Once these distinctions and
refinements are in place, I then discuss how the tools we have at our disposal can
provide a further perspective on the phenomenon of suboptimal supererogation as
well as the All or Nothing Problem (Section 4.5). Finally, I close with some concluding
remarks (Section 4.6).
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4.3 LOCATING SUPEREROGATION
At a minimum, the standard conception of a supererogatory act involves the idea that
such acts are not themselves required but are better than what is required. In order to
make sense of this idea, we need to locate this notion in a broader framework for the
logic and semantics of deontic modality.
The central deonticmodal notions are permission, recommendation, and requirement.
The notion of permission is expressed by modals such asmay and can; the notion of rec-
ommendation is expressed by modals such as ought and should; the notion of require-
ment is expressed by modals such as must and have to.71
The standard account of these core deontic notions is given bywhat is sometimes called
the Optimality Interpretation. It is generally assumed that this account makes room
for supererogation provided an elucidation of what it means to be both not required
and better than required, as well as by the following features: that ought does not
entail must, and that ought is associated with the most optimal actions, or involves
quantification over the most optimal worlds.
I will briefly explain the Optimality Interpretation in order to discuss how it is that
accommodating the notion of supererogation leads to some potential difficulties.
Modals such as ought, should,must, and have to are necessity modals. The central datum
to be accounted for concerns the significant diversity amongst the necessity modals.
71See Ridge (2014) for discussion of the idea, from the perspective of speech-act theory, that should and
ought express recommendations while must and have to express requirements. Also see Björnnson and
Shanklin (2014).
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There are weak deontic necessity modals such as should and ought and strong deontic
necessity modals such as must and have to. There is a difference in strength between
these classes of modals which can be witnessed by observing examples where it is
possible to assert that one ought or should perform some action j while denying that
they have to perform j. Here are some slightly modified examples from Snedegar
(2016):
(140) You ought to donate 10% of your income to charity, but you don’t have to.
(141) You should keep your promise; in fact, you must!
(142) # It’s not as if you ought to donate 10% of your income, but you must.
(143) # You must keep your promise; in fact, you ought to!
The straightforward diagnosis of why (140) and (141) are coherent while (142) and (143)
are not is that must entails ought, but not the other way around. As Snedegar (2016,
159) notes, (140) is coherent since it does not follow that you must do something if it
is true that you ought to do it. The second conjunct of (141) would sound redundant
if should were to entail must, however (141) sounds completely fine. If it is true that
you must donate 10% of your income, then it follows that you should. Hence, (142)
sounds contradictory: this is because it is effectively denying the entailment frommust
to ought. Finally, there is a redundancy involving the second conjunct of (143): the bit
of information that you ought to keep your promise does not add any new information,
provided that it has been asserted that you must keep your promise.
Hence, we get the following general lessons. If one is required to perform some action,
it follows that one also ought to perform that action. If one ought to perform some
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action, then it does not generally follow that one is also required to perform that action.
In addition, it is simple to tie in the concept of permission. If you are permitted to
do something, it follows neither that you are recommended or required to do it. Con-
versely, if you are required to do something, then it follows that you are permitted to
do it. Similar remarks apply for the notion of recommendation. Figure 4.1 summarizes
the relevant entailment relations, represented by the arrows.72
Requirement
Recommendation
Permission
Figure 4.1: Entailment patterns
Snedegar (2016) proposes to explain the Optimality Interpretation in the followingway.
Suppose we have a ranking of actions from worst to best. What one ought to do is
at the top of the ranking, these actions would have to exceed a certain threshold.73
And the impermissible actions are below a different threshold. This is explained using
Figure 4.2 below.74
72The claims about entailment here come with an important proviso: it is important that we read the
modals in question as having the same flavor. Without this proviso, we would get cases where it appears
as though must does not entail ought. See Björnnson and Shanklin (2014) for further discussion.
73Here it is reasonable to assume a reflexive and transitive ranking.
74This diagram is based on Snedegar (2016), and here it is made explicit that this conception involves a
ranking of actions.
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Ought
Permissibility bar
Best actions
Worst actions
Figure 4.2: Optimality interpretation with ranking of actions.
A different articulation of the Optimality Interpretation can be given in terms of pos-
sible worlds semantics, in particular, from the perspective of the unified semantics
for modality in natural language due to Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012). Working
within this framework, von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) propose the following: weak and
strong necessity deontic modals are both operators which universally quantify over a
best set of worlds determined by special contextual parameters—a modal base and a
normative ordering source—but they quantify over the best set of worlds in different
ways.75 Strong necessity modals quantify over the acceptable worlds of the modal base
whereas weak necessity modals quantify over the most optimal worlds of the modal
base.
Consider the optimality interpretation with a ranking of actions. It is easy to see how
we can account for the entailments presented in Figure 4.1. Suppose there are a set of
75See Portner (2009) for further explanation and discussion.
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available actions, with one action above the permissibility bar, and at least one action
below the permissibility bar. In this case, there is only one permissible option, so it is
easy to see that such an option would be required. At the same time, because this is the
highest-ranked option, it follows that this is the action which ought to be performed.
Suppose there are multiple actions above the permissibility bar. In such a case, we
would have a highest ranked action permissible action, this would be what one ought
to do.76 From this, it would not follow that what one ought to do is also required: there
are multiple permissible options which differ in optimality.
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 illustrate how the semantics based on von Fintel and Iatri-
dou (2008) captures the entailments in question.77 In Figure 4.3, we see that whenever
Must(j) is true, so is Ought(j). On this account, Must(j) is true iff j is true in every
deontically acceptable world. SinceOught(j) quantifies over a subset of the acceptable
worlds, we get that Must(j) entails Ought(j). In Figure 4.4, we see that not every ac-
ceptable world is a j-world; hence,Must(j) is false. Ought(j) is satisfied because every
optimal world is a j-world.
Securing the result that Must(j) entails Ought(j) but not the other way around is im-
portant in order to account for the concept of supererogation.78 On the Optimality
Interpretation, we can see how it is that supererogatory acts are understood as those
acts which are not required but are better than those that are required. Work with the
assumption that if supererogatory actions are better than what is required, then it is
reasonable to associated such actions with the notion of what you ought to do. Then
76It is important to note that the area denoting the ought bar is not meant to be gradable: this space is
reserved for only the best action. Thanks to Justin Snedegar for clarifying this aspect of the diagram.
77These diagrams are based on those of Beddor (2017).
78Indeed, note that Snedegar (2016) uses the concept of supererogation to help motivate the distinction
between ought and must.
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j j
Accessible worlds
Acceptable worlds
Optimal worlds
Figure 4.3: Optimality interpretation verifying Must(j) and Ought(j).
speaking in terms of a ranking of actions, a supererogatory act would then have to
exceed the bar for ought and would thus be considered the best action out of a set
of available actions. There would, at least, have to be one other available action.79
From the perspective of possible worlds semantics, we might say that an action j is
supererogatory whenever it is the case that j is verified by every optimal world. Then
we can have that if it is supererogatory that j, then this means that j is true in ev-
ery optimal world but there are also acceptable worlds where  j is true. At the very
least, this understanding secures the idea that supererogation involves the idea that
supererogatory acts are associated with the notion of what we ought to do.
As it stands, however, the All or Nothing Problem poses problems for the account of
supererogation associated with the Optimality Interpretation. There are three issues to
note in particular.
The first issue is that the Optimality Interpretation does not help make sense of how
79The situation is obviously more complicated than this because of phenomena such as suboptimal
supererogation: there are supererogatory actions which do not exceed the bar for ought. However, if
supererogation is associated with ought, then this understanding is more or less what we would get.
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j j
Accessible worlds
Acceptable worlds
Optimal worlds
Figure 4.4: Optimality interpretation verifying Ought(j) but not Must(j).
it is possible for a supererogatory act could be wrong or impermissible. The All or
Nothing Problem pushes us to try to account for the following:
(Wrong) That there is a sense in which suboptimal supererogatory acts can be
wrong even though they are supererogatory.
It would then seem that supererogatory acts can have a variety of deontic statuses
and not necessarily associated with ought. More generally, the problem is that the
Optimality Interpretation does not seem to helpmake sense of the idea that there can be
multiple supererogatory options differing in optimality. The general thought is that a
principle of supererogation says something about what we ought to do. In Collapsing
Building, for instance, the option to save only one child is supererogatory in that it is
better than what is required: it goes beyond the call of duty and involves a significant
sacrifice. Although the act of saving only one child has these paradigmatic features,
this does not mean that saving only one child is something that we ought to do. Hence,
supererogation would appear to have a more complicated relationship with the notion
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of what we ought to do.
The second issue is that, on the Optimality Interpretation, it seems to follow that if an
act j is better or higher-ranked than an act y, then one ought to do j rather than y. This
is a straightforward consequence of the standard semantics for oughtwe have sketched
here. One of the core elements behind the All or Nothing Problem is that it forces us
to reconsider the idea that what we ought to do is to be understood in terms of what
is better relative to other options. The Optimality Interpretation, then, does not deliver
on the sense in which one ought to supererogate suboptimally in Collapsing Building
even though such an option is a better option than not acting at all. The phenomenon
we need to be able to account for is:
(Better) That there is a sense in which suboptimal supererogatory acts are better
than doing nothing.
The third issue is that it is contentious whether the Optimality Interpretation can help
account for the acceptability of some acts of suboptimal supererogation. What is needed,
more generally, is the flexibility to be able to model the fact that some suboptimal acts
are acceptable while others are not. If supererogation is associated with ought, then we
would have trouble vindicating the judgment that it is not morally wrong to donate to
the cause of animal welfare if doing so would be less good than donating toward a
more effective cause.80 I hold that it is a highly reasonable judgment that we ought to
80Justin Snedegar (personal communication) raises the point that perhaps the Optimality Interpretation
can do this, so long as the relevant act is above the permissibility threshold. But then what would be
needed is some explanation of why some suboptimal acts are above the permissibility threshold and why
some suboptimal acts are not. A ranking of better to worse does not seem to settle the question because,
in both kinds of cases, there is the thought that in doing something good but not best, we are still doing
better than doing nothing.
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donate toward the cause of animal welfare, even if doing so means doing less good.
This would have to be in some sense of ought that is not directly related to the notion
of optimality. If supererogation is understood in terms of optimality, then we cannot
deliver on such judgments.
These problems reveal the need for a closer examination of the treatment of the modal
notions at issue here. We need a way of working with the Optimality Interpretation
which acknowledges important distinctions amongst the relevant modal notions and
can help lead to more precise ways of thinking about supererogation in order to ap-
proach the general problem of suboptimal supererogation.
4.4 MODAL VARIEGATION
The Optimality Interpretation, given its associated account of supererogation, has diffi-
culty in accounting for our judgment of the moral status of at least some acts of subop-
timal supererogation. In this section, I show that there are some important refinements
that we need to consider in order to support the Optimality Interpretation in dealing
with the aforementioned problems.
The core of what we need to explain is the puzzling fact that there are cases where
we reasonably judge that suboptimal supererogation is acceptable while there are also
other cases where we reasonably judge that acts of suboptimal supererogation is unac-
ceptable.
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 When we judge an act of suboptimal supererogation to be morally unacceptable,
the idea is that it is because the action in question fails to be at the top of some
scale.
 When we judge an act of suboptimal supererogation to be morally acceptable,
this cannot be because this action sits at the top of some scale, since, by definition,
it is suboptimal.
Instead, there has to be some other sense in which it is true that you ought to act
suboptimally, one that does not define ought in terms of optimality.
When we understand ought in terms of optimality, then it follows that the concept of
supererogation we are working with is one that is implicitly scalar. This is because
the notion of supererogation is understood in terms of ought. When we say that it
is supererogatory for you to donate that money, we are ultimately saying that you
ought to donate that money, and, after all, it would be the best you could do in the
circumstances.
Another way of putting the challenge against the standard account of deontic modality
from the perspective of the general problem of suboptimal supererogation is that an
act cannot even count as properly supererogatory if it is not optimal. This is because
it follows that it is not true that you should do anything which is suboptimal, at least
according to how we have set up the Optimality Interpretation.
But there is an important question here regarding whether we should, after all, be
understanding supererogation in such scalar terms. This is because the Optimality
Interpretation has the limitation that actions such as saving only one child (when there
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are two to be saved) or donating to animal welfare (when there are also malaria nets
in demand) are technically not regarded as supererogatory even though these actions
go beyond the call of duty. Perhaps this could be because we have left out notions
such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness out of our description of the notion of
supererogation. Such notions arguably track the commonsense idea of supererogation
that we are familiar with. However, even if we tie in notions such as praise, blame, or
something related into our notion of supererogation, this would not remove the need
to ask the question of whether we should be understanding supererogation in scalar
terms.
The remainder of this section pursues a closer examination of the diversity of the
normative domain to uncover the further clarifications we need. The first point we
will consider is the difference between binary and scalar standards. This will set us
up to discuss the underappreciated difference between realistic and idealistic deontic
modals. I will then argue, in the following section, that this distinction allows us to
see the difference between two notions of supererogation, and it is distinguishing be-
tween these notions which helps put us in a position to approach to the more general
questions surrounding suboptimal supererogation.
4.4.1 BINARY AND SCALAR STANDARDS
It is useful to distinguish between binary and scalar standards, especially in the con-
text of normativity. One of the recent insights on this matter comes from Björnnson
and Shanklin (2014) who propose that the core difference between weak and strong
necessity modals lies in different grounds or standards for selecting alternatives at the
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exclusion of others. On their proposal, the contribution of Must(j) is that j satisfies a
binary standard among the relevant alternatives and that Ought(j) suggests that j is
selected by a scalar standard among the relevant alternatives.
This characterization of the difference between weak and strong necessity is general
in that it applies to different kinds of modal flavors. For example, an epistemic must
might be interpreted as putting forth a standard on which there is only one alternative
which is compatible with the available evidence whereas with deontic must, there is
the only alternative which satisfies the relevant normative requirement.
The central idea here is very related to the older and influential proposal of Sloman
(1970) on which we can capture weak necessity by emphasizing its connection to the
notion of comparison. We are to interpret what it means for Ought(j) to be the case in
terms of the idea that j is the best of the available alternatives. This proposal gives us
a scalar way of thinking about modality.81
Distinguishing between binary and scalar standards has a number of advantages. It
builds upon existing proposals in interesting ways and opens up further possibilities
for analyzing the central normative modal notions. Consider one potential application.
The difference between binary and scalar standards allows us to distinguish between
various more detailed notions which characterize the concept of obligation. For a brief
illustration, we might consider what is obligatory to be captured by a binary standard
or a scalar standard. Those who hold that moral obligation is a matter of increasing
expected moral value might wish to characterize the morally obligatory in terms of a
scalar standard. In this case, the resources for giving a theory would have to involve
81In general, the idea that modality involves scales is now becoming more familiar. For example, in
recent work, Lassiter (2011, 2014, 2017) has developed a scalar account of modality. This is also applied
to deontic modality in particular.
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considering the semantic contribution of normative weak necessity modals. A more
traditional conception of moral obligation would presumably be given by a binary
standard. Whether or not an action counts as obligatory would be due to its fitting
some standard or not, whether or not it fulfills some optimality requirement. In this
case, an account of obligation would have to involve considering the semantic contri-
bution of strong deontic necessity modals. An alternative option might be to embrace
a conception of moral obligation which is itself binary, but also makes room for an as-
sociated scalar standard. For instance, the demands of morality could be given by a
binary standard, but there could also be an operative scalar standard which provides
a ranking of actions from worst to best, relative to the circumstances.
The proposal to distinguish between different kinds of standards in accounting for
the difference between weak and strong necessity captures something very important
which is missing in the standard formulation of the Optimality Interpretation. How-
ever, the issue I would like to raise at this point is that it is not entirely obvious that
weak necessity is to be associated with a scalar standard. It is very natural to ask
whether there is a sense of weak necessity which involves a binary standard, and, re-
latedly, whether there is a sense of strong necessity which involves a scalar standard.
In what follows, I argue that there is further diversity to be accounted for here, and that
weak and strong deontic necessity have a somewhat different and more complicated
relationship with binary and scalar standards.
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4.4.2 REALISTIC AND IDEALISTIC NORMS
An implicit idea underlying the Optimality Interpretation involves the thought that
whether one ought to j is a matter about whether j is optimal with respect to a par-
ticular set of circumstances. If you are deciding which road to take in order to get to
the airport on time, you might have three available options and the one that would get
you there with the most time to spare, amongst other things, would be the route you
ought to take. The question of whether or not a particular route will get you there in a
good amount of time needs to be considered against a set of facts, for example, what
the current traffic conditions are like.
There are cases, however, in which we also ask whether one ought to act upon some
option j where, in doing so, we make no judgement about optimality with respect to
a particular set of facts. Suppose one were to consider whether, in general, giving to
charity is the sort of thing one ought to do. One can reasonably take this question to be
a question of what might count as good simpliciter. There is a difference between ask-
ing about whether one ought to, in the most general terms, give to worthy causes and
asking about whether one ought to give to some particular cause or some particular
charitable organization. Questions of the latter sort are considered against sets of facts.
It is possible to judge that one ought to give to charity but disagree that one ought to
give to some particular charity, perhaps because it is not well-managed or is ineffective.
The former ought is idealistic because actual facts do not influence its interpretation; the
latter ought is realistic because actual facts do influence its interpretation.
As a preliminary characterization, wemight say that the core of the distinction between
realistic and idealistic norms is that the former are sensitive to empirical circumstances
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in ways that idealistic norms are not. We can make this more precise by drawing this
distinction within the standard framework for deontic modals. In terms of the seman-
tics based on Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012), recall that modals are sensitive to two
contextual parameters: the modal base f pwq and the ordering source gpwq. The modal
base determines a set of worlds relevant for the domain of quantification giving us
X f pwq; the ordering source imposes a reflexive and transitive ranking ¤gpwq on X f pwq
according to how well they satisfy the relevant ideals.
In order to represent certain norms, we need to include restrictions into the modal
base. For example, in order to model the legal regulation that every citizen must pay
their taxes, we need to consider the set of worldsX f pwqwhich include the proposition
that the relevant regulation has been enforced. In order to represent norms which are
not sensitive to circumstantial information, such as necessary moral laws, we do not
restrict f pwq in this manner. Instead, in the idealistic case, the meaning of the modal is
captured by a constant function. We then have the following:
 Realistic norms: for such norms, f pwq includes whatever circumstantial infor-
mation is needed in order to determine a restricted set of worlds X f pwq which is
then ordered by ¤gpwq.
 Idealistic norms: for such norms, f pwq  W, therefore the modal base is the set
of all worlds, and the ordering source ¤gpwq then ranks every world.
At this juncture, there are three remarks to motivate and elaborate upon this distinc-
tion.
First, one of the distinctive features of realistic norms is that they vary considerably.
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Idealistic norms are broadly characterized by their stability. In terms of possible worlds,
we can say that the same idealistic norms hold at every world while this is not the case
for realistic norms. The former are defined by a constant function while the latter are
defined by a variable function. This captures the idea that idealistic norms are nec-
essary, either in a metaphysical, or somewhat more restricted sense and that realistic
norms are contingent.
Second, it might be useful to compare the distinction between realistic and idealistic
norms by considering a distinction made in the common law tradition between acts
that are mala prohibita (wrong because prohibited) and those that are mala in se (wrong
in itself). For example, criminal acts such as murder or robbery are universally re-
garded as wrong and are thus violations of morality itself prior to being offenses of
against the law, so are such acts are mala in se; criminal offenses such as traffic offenses
are wrong in the mala prohibita sense insofar as they are violations of statute. That any
act is mala in se is not due to some contingent feature of the actual world (for instance,
wrong on in virtue of a prohibition). The intended idea is that such acts are wrong in
a more robust sense. Acts that are mala prohibita can be said to be wrong in a realistic
sense whereas acts that are mala in se can be said to be wrong in an idealistic sense.
Third, the distinction between realistic and idealistic norms cross-cuts the distinction
between requirements and recommendations. Building on this latter distinction, the
resulting picture we get of the core normative notions is that requirements and recom-
mendations can be categorized as either realistic or idealistic.
The remainder of this section explores, in more detail, the idea that we can enhance
our understanding of the normative domain using the proposal that realistic modals
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generally relate to scalar standards whereas idealistic modals generally relate to bi-
nary standards. To reiterate, the aim is not only build on the proposal that deontic
modality involves binary and scalar standards, but also to enhance our understand-
ing of supererogation by drawing a difference between binary and scalar notions of
supererogation.
4.4.2.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
There is good reason to hold that recommendations involve scalar standards. Whether
an agent ought to j is largely a matter of whether j is the best in actual circumstances.
However, after considering the difference between realistic and idealistic recommen-
dations, we will see that there is further variation to account for as idealistic recom-
mendations do not seem to involve scalar standards. I will argue that the notion of
optimality involving such recommendations is a binary one: whether one ought to j
in the idealistic sense is not considered against a set of facts and therefore does not
involve optimality in the usual, scalar sense.
The paradigmatic cases of recommendations tend to involve considering what is best
from the perspective of actual circumstances. Consider some examples:
(144) a. Everyone should file their taxes early. [Guidelines from TurboTax]
b. Every student ought to take a logic class. [Advice of philosophy professors]
c. Everyone should wash their hands. [Advice of company management]
d. Everyone should eat a variety of foods. [Government guidelines on nutrition]
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In general, each of these examples involves considering what is the best option at the
exclusion of others. The standards involved here vary depending on their source. The
guideline that one ought to file their taxes early is for the general benefit of taxpayers
because many issues can be avoided by not leaving it to the last minute. While a logic
classmay not be required by all students, philosophy professorsmight recommend this
because they believe it is in the best interests of every student. Anyone who uses the
bathroom should wash their hands because this would help stop the spread of disease,
and company management might explicitly make this requirement of their employees.
Finally, eating a variety of foods might be encouraged by a government body because
this helps ensure good general health.
The understanding of these normative recommendations as involving scalar standards
provides us with a useful way of interpreting these cases. If we understand the under-
lying scale as involving a notion of expected utility, then the examples in (144) can be
interpreted roughly as saying that acting in accordance with the relevant recommen-
dations in the appropriate context maximizes expected utility compared to competing
options.
However, there are other cases of recommendations which do not get interpreted in
a scalar manner. Idealistic recommendations involve standards which are not inter-
preted with respect to actual facts but instead are principles which pertain to the al-
ternatives that exceed the expectations of the general normative requirements which
govern and guide our actions. General supererogatory principles are the paradigm
examples of such recommendations: supererogatory principles of the moral domain
make for examples as well as supererogatory principles of other normative domains.82
82See McElwee (2017) for arguments that the notion of supererogation is a more general normative
phenomenon and not only limited to the moral domain: there is good reason to believe that there the
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The principles of beneficence which state that it is morally good to act beyond our
moral obligations for the benefit of others are not to be understood of whether some
particular action or other yields the maximization of utility with respect to a particular
circumstance; instead, we think of such principles as sufficiently general so as to apply
to all circumstances and all agents.
The claim that one ought to engage in supererogatory acts of beneficence is one that is
indifferent to the scalar notion of whether are actually optimal. The sort of notion at
stake here is a binary one: in order for an act j to count as supererogatory according
to such a general principle is a matter of whether j meets the standard of exceeding
the demands of what is required. Some additional care is of course needed here with
respect to what it would mean for an act to ’exceed’ or ’go beyond’ the requirements
of morality when speaking in the idealistic sense. If these notions are understood in
terms of something along the lines of expected moral value, then we would not have a
truly binary notion of recommendation. Hence, we would need to spell things out in a
way that does not use notions related to optimality.83
4.4.2.2 REQUIREMENTS
The distinction between realistic and idealistic norms also affects our understanding of
requirements. While it is reasonable to generally understand requirements as relating
to binary standards, I argue that it turns out that it is only the idealistic requirements
notion of supererogation can be found in other normative domains. I think that these arguments also gives
reason to believe that a careful investigation of supererogation is beneficial for our general understanding
of normative modality.
83Perhaps a simple proposal would be that, in the idealistic case, the notion of ought is simply defined
as permissible and not required, where these latter notions are interpreted idealistically. This would more
or less involve a very standard understanding of the relationship between these deontic categories.
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which are straightforwardly and paradigmatically binary. Some option or alternative
j is idealistically required so long as, roughly, j is selected by a standard which is in
force in all circumstances. However, when we restrict ourselves to requirements which
are relative to some set of actual circumstances, there is a question about whether there
are genuinely binary standards involved in such requirements.
One point which supports this idea is that there is an interesting sense in which realistic
requirements involve gradation. Consider the following realistic requirements:
(145) a. You must pay your library fines.
b. You must pay your taxes by the IRS deadline.
One of the intuitive differences between the requirement to pay your taxes by the dead-
line and the requirement to pay your library fines is that there is a sense in which the
former requirement carries more weight than the latter.84 Some precedent for under-
standing strong necessity in this way comes from Portner and Rubinstein (2016) who
propose to understand deontic modality in terms of a scalar structure. They put forth
the idea that the degrees involved are ‘the weight of requirements which favor a par-
ticular proposition’.85
And there is good reason to understand strong necessity in terms of scale structure.
84There are indeed big differences in the failure to comply with these requirements: the failure to pay
taxes on time results in penalties and accrued interest whereas the failure to pay library fines comes with
no such repercussions.
85Portner and Rubinstein (2016, 272). Themain objective in Portner and Rubinstein (2016) is to argue for
the view that strong necessity modals are like extreme adjectives such as huge and brilliant and that weak
necessity modals are like non-extreme adjectives such as big and smart and use the empirical tests given by
Morzycki (2012) which distinguish between these two classes of adjectives. Just as non-extreme adjectives
have extreme counterparts, the idea is that we should expect gradable modals to come in extreme and
non-extreme pairs.
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This is because we want to make sense of examples where degrees of must are being
compared. For instance, Portner and Rubinstein (2016, 271-2) point out that while
strong necessity modals resist the comparative (146), they are able to feature alongside
even (147):
(146) a. Susan ?must/should call her mother more than she ?must/should call her
father.
b. It is more ?crucial/important for Mary to call her mother than her father.
c. It is more ?certain/likely that Mary will call her mother than her father.
(147) a. Susan must call her mother even more than she must call her father.
b. It is even more crucial for Mary to call her mother than her father.
c. It is even more certain that Mary will call her mother than her father.
We should read the relevant comparisons here as having to do with degrees of obliga-
tion: the examples in (147) express the idea that there is a greater degree of obligation
for Susan to call her mother rather than her father.
While the question of whether must is gradable has previously been considered in the
literature, it is generally noted that it is difficult to find direct examples of gradation
and comparison.86 However, provided that we can conceive of the diversity of require-
ments in terms of degrees and comparisons, a likely result is that those requirements
which do not vary according to circumstance, such as the requirements of morality
86For instance, see Barker (2009), Klecha (2014), and Lassiter (2011). Though must does not seem grad-
able in the traditional sense, the arguments by Portner and Rubinstein (2016) suggest that the limited
gradability of must can be attributed to the limited gradability of extreme adjectives, since they argue the
two categories are empirically analogous.
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or the requirements on the psychologies of ideal agents, are associated with a greater
weight or degree. If it is reasonable to think of such requirements as requirements
which exceed a certain threshold of necessity, then the question of whether or not a
requirement is an idealistic one is a binary matter as opposed to a scalar matter. Real-
istic requirements, such as those in (145), are not governed or defined by a threshold;
such requirements instead involve varying degrees of necessity and it makes more
sense to understand these as gradable instead of binary. Hence, although the data is
not perfect, a potential and very tentative conclusion we might draw here is that re-
alistic requirements involve some internal scalar structure in at least some ways that
idealistic requirements do not. At the very least, we can see that there is a legitimate
question about whether talk of thresholds of necessity can vary depending on whether
a requirement is realistic or idealistic.
4.5 THE STATUS OF SUBOPTIMAL SUPEREROGATION
I have argued that the normative domain has a diversity of notions and that the realistic-
idealistic distinction is useful in capturing this diversity, especially the difference be-
tween binary and scalar standards. A consequence of mapping out this diversity is
that it helps us characterize our core intuitions regarding the notion of supererogation.
Provided that we have the distinction between realistic and idealistic interpretations
of ought, this naturally allows us to characterize two notions of supererogation.
We can describe the resulting notions as follows:
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 A realistic sense of supererogation which tracks whether or not an act is the most
optimal with respect to a given circumstance.
 An idealistic sense of supererogation which tracks whether or not an action
counts as being beyond what is required.
This is a consequence of the idea that supererogatory principles are recommendations
and not requirements. Since we can draw a difference between two notions of recom-
mendation, we can distinguish two notions of supererogation, which, I argue, are both
at stake in the All or Nothing Problem.
The core of the overall argument in this section is based on the idea that acknowl-
edging the difference between these two notions of supererogation gives us what we
need in order to account for how it is that there can be suboptimal supererogatory acts
which are better yet also wrong. This allows us to maintain that the phenomenon of
suboptimal supererogation can be modelled using the Optimality Interpretation.
In what follows, I will argue for the following two claims in turn:
(Wrong) That there is a sense in which suboptimal supererogatory acts can be
wrong even though they are supererogatory.
(Better) That there is a sense in which suboptimal supererogatory acts are better
than doing nothing.
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4.5.1 ARGUMENT FOR WRONG
The first point is that the realistic notion of supererogation helps deliver the sense
in which saving only one child is wrong. According to the preliminary gloss of su-
pererogation in the setting of the Optimality Interpretation, an act j is supererogatory
just in case j is better than what is required. The implicit idea associated with this
preliminary gloss is that saving only one child should be a permissible option since it
is a better option than what is required.
However, there is an important argument to the effect that saving only one child is
impermissible—at least in a more restricted and refined sense of permission. Then
the general line of reasoning is that if there is a significant sense in which an act is
impermissible, then this helps explain why such an act could be regarded as wrong.
The standard interpretation of May(j) is that it is the dual of Must(j). But we can
consider a more restricted notion of permission which can be defined as the dual of
Ought(j). This idea has been recently explored by Beddor (2017). There is an interest-
ing question about whether weak necessity modals have duals, especially since it does
not seem like there are any natural language expressions (at least in English) which
have a word that would naturally correspond to whatever the dual of the weak neces-
sity modal would be.
The notion of permissibility which is the dual of Ought(j) would correspond to the
idea that an option is optimally permitted. We can define this notion as follows:
(148) Optimally-Permissible j :  Ought j
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Hence, an action j is optimally permissible iff j is the case in some optimal world.
Figure 4.5 depicts a situation where it is permitted that j but not optimally permitted
that j. Figure 4.6 depicts a situation where j is optimally permitted but Ought(j) is
false. Hence, it is easy to see that Ought(j) entails that j is optimally permissible, but
not the other way around.
j
 j
Accessible worlds
Acceptable worlds
Optimal worlds
Figure 4.5: Optimality interpretation where j is permissible but not optimally permissible
j
 j
Accessible worlds
Acceptable worlds
Optimal worlds
Figure 4.6: Optimality interpretation verifying optimal permissibility
If there are multiple options which are on a par from the perspective of optimality,
then each one is optimally permitted. If there is one most optimal option, then it is
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the only option which is optimally permitted. There is a big difference in optimality
between saving only one child and saving both children. Hence, the only optimally
permissible option is saving both children. Saving only one child is not permissible
from the perspective of optimal permissibility. If an action is not permissible, then it is
forbidden. Therefore, we have an argument that there is a sense in which the option of
saving only one child is forbidden, and this is the feature that allows us to model the
judgment that this option is morally wrong.87
4.5.2 ARGUMENT FOR BETTER
The second point is that the idealistic notion of supererogation helps deliver the sense
in which saving only one child is a better action. While saving one child is not per-
missible from the perspective of realistic supererogation, this action is permissible in a
broader sense, one that does not concern the particular facts about the circumstances in
question. Hence, when we judge that a suboptimal action is, in some sense, better than
the alternative of not acting, the binary standard of whether such an action is beyond
what duty demands is what is relevant here.
In this way, saving only one child is permissible by the lights of morality, here under-
stood as involving a set of idealistic requirements. Morality does not demand that we
sacrifice our arms to save the lives of others. But it is morally permissible to save oth-
87There is precedent in the literature for something like this understanding of wrongness in terms of
the notion of being forbidden, or something along these lines. For instance, Scanlon (1998, 153), working
from the perspective of Contractualism writes that:
an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set
of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a
basis for informed, unforced general agreement.
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ers. Therefore, the notion of ‘better’ at stake here can be interpreted as one that does
not involve optimality in the usual sense.
We can also give an explanation by appealing to a realistic notion of supererogation
because if we understand our two main options as saving one child or saving no child,
then saving one child is clearly the better option. Part of the background information
informing the judgment that you ought to save one child rather than save only one
involves the fact that you are not going to save both.88
4.5.3 DEFENSE OF PRINCIPLE
To summarize both of these arguments, for Better andWrong, we have seen that there
is a sense in which the option to save only one child is a permissible moral option in
a broader sense whereas this option is not optimally permissible. Then, if there is a
sense in which an act is not permissible, it follows that there is a sense in which an
act is forbidden. And if an action is forbidden, this supports the judgment that it is
morally wrong.
The next stage of the overall argument is to develop these claims into an answer to the
All or Nothing Problem. There are two points which establish this, namely that we can
vindicate the central judgments in Collapsing Building as well as provide a defense
of Principle.
Vindication of judgments. The main judgments concerning Collapsing Building are
vindicated on this approach. I will outline the reasoning behind each of the core judg-
88In this way, we can see that the style of explanation by appealing to conditional obligations or similar
would be compatible with this way of thinking about supererogation.
155
ments in turn.
 Claim 1 says that it is morally permissible to not save both children. There is
nothing in the case which blocks the claim that it is not obligatory that you not
save both children.
 Claim 2 says that it is morally wrong for you to save only one child. This judg-
ment is delivered by the fact that saving only one child is not optimally permissi-
ble and hence, in an important sense, forbidden. It is reasonable to conclude that
if an action is forbidden, then it is wrong.
 Claim 3 says that you ought to save neither child rather than only save one.
Based on what we have so far, an available strategy is to say the following. If
there is a general principle to the effect that one ought to avoid doing what is
wrong, then it would seem reasonable to interpret this ought as being idealistic
in the sense that what is in question is not which acts are higher-ranked or lower-
ranked with respect to a set of circumstances, but rather the moral properties
that are under consideration. Here, the idea is that saving one child is wrong in
an important sense. So, there is a more general ought which would recommend
against this action and in favor of not acting at all. Of course, the salient judg-
ment that there is something wrong with the judgement that you ought to save
neither child which is arguably more important to account for. But the claim is
that if we interpret this judgment in the way I have suggested, then we do not
need to think that Principle is forcing an unreasonable judgment.
Defense of Principle. The second point is that from the perspective articulated here,
there is no deep fault with Principle. We just need to be careful about howwe interpret
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it. We can accept that there is a sense in which we ought to do j rather than y provided
that j is morally permissible and y is wrong. At the same time, the pressing issue is
that we need to be careful in keeping track of whether we are working with a realistic
ought or an idealistic ought. My sense is that there is a general tendency to interpret the
oughts here as exclusively related either to optimality, the notion of what is better, or
something contrastive.89
If Principle is interpreted with respect to a realistic ought, it would not seem to make
much sense of the judgment we want because we normally understand what we ought
to do in terms of what is better or best, and given a choice between two options, we
ought to go with the more optimal of the two. Given this, there is reason to conclude
that Principle is defensible if its associated notion of ought is interpreted as a more
general ought, one with a more binary, idealistic flavor.
To briefly sum up, there are a variety of notions at play here and perhaps the overar-
ching point is that in dealing with supererogation and related notions of ought and
permissibility, we need to keep track of various different senses of these notions that
might be at stake here. Although the All or Nothing Problem seems to show that su-
pererogation cannot be easily understood in terms of ought, we can allow for different
notions of supererogation which allow us to make different judgments, sometimes con-
cerning optimality, and sometimes not.
89See Cariani (2013, 2016) and Snedegar (2012, 2014, 2015) for background and discussion.
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4.5.4 OTHER RECENT SOLUTIONS
I will now briefly discuss some recent proposals by Horton (2017) and Pummer (2019)
to deal with the All or Nothing Problem. These alternative solutions involve, inter alia,
rejecting at least one of the core claims (Horton) or Principle (Pummer).
4.5.4.1 CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION AND PERMISSION
Horton (2017) argues for a solution to the All or Nothing Problem which involves a
rejection of Claim 1, which is that it is morally permissible for you to not save both
children. The upshot of this move is that this would allow us to reject Claim 3 and
preserve Principle.
The alternative to Claim 1 is the following:
Claim 1*: If you were not willing to save either child, it would be permissi-
ble for you not to save either, but because you are willing to save one, you
ought to save both.90
The justification for interpreting Claim 1 in this way is based on the following line of
thought. Suppose we are working with the following criterion for an action counting
as wrong: ’if our acts are not justifiable to the people whom they affect, then these
acts are wrong’.91 If one is not willing to save both children, a reasonable justification
90Horton (2017, 97).
91Horton (2017, 97). Regarding the justification for this claim, Horton notes that this view is defended
by Scanlon (1998) and Parfit (2003).
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would involve appealing to the fact that losing one’s arms is a major sacrifice; however,
if one is only willing to save one child, then such a justification is no longer available.
From this, Horton argues, it follows that we should accept the conditional claim that:
‘because you are willing to save one child, you ought to save both.’92 This leads us to
the core of Horton’s solution, which is stated as follows:
Because you are willing to save one child, you ought to save both, but if you
are not going to save both, you ought to do the next best thing, which is to
save one. That is, you ought to save one child rather than save neither.93
The idea is that we working with Claim 1* instead of Claim 1, together with Claim 2,
would not lead us to the consequence that you ought to save neither child rather than
save one child (Claim 3). In this way, we are able to instead accept that you ought to
save one child rather than save neither.
It is important to note that Horton (2017, 97) interprets Claim 3 as the following condi-
tional ought:
Claim 3*: If you are not willing to save either child, you ought to save
neither rather than only save one.94
Understood the claim is understood this way, the implication fromClaim 1* andClaim
92Horton (2017, 97).
93Horton (2017, 97).
94Stated earlier in the chapter as: ’If you are not going to save both children, you ought to save neither’
(Horton, 2017, 94).
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2 via Principle looks more transparent. Hence, supposing you are only willing to save
one child, we would get the following, which needs to be held alongside Claim 3*:
(149) If you are only willing to save one child, then you ought to save one rather than
save neither.
Pummer (2019) notes that one problem with Claim 3* is that it discourages you from
performing a supererogatory act if you are not going to go all the way: if you are
not going to save both children, then the conditional ought claim thereby discourages
you from saving one child instead. It should be straightforward to see why this is an
undesirable consequence.
Furthermore, in general, it seems strange to allow that what you ought to do in these
matters should depend on your willingness. This would make for an odd explanation
of why sometimes suboptimal supererogation appears acceptable. Such acts would
presumably be acceptable because you were not willing to do what was optimal. But
this kind of strategy would not have the resources to help draw a line between the
suboptimal acts that are morally acceptable and those that are morally wrong. The
conditional obligation strategy only tells us that what we ought to do is dependent on
what we are willing to do.
4.5.4.2 REJECTION OF PRINCIPLE
Pummer (2019) argues that we should reject Principle.95 Pummer defends the follow-
ing conditional permission claim:
95Recently, there appears to be some growing opposition to Principle. For instance, see Portmore (2019).
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(150) If you are not going to save both children, it is permissible to save only one.
Pummer argues that the conditional permission in (150) does not follow from the con-
junction of Claim 1 and Claim 2. The conditional obligation claim follows from Prin-
ciple. But Principle, Pummer argues, leads to undesirable consequences. To use his
example, suppose you are faced with a choice to do nothing, or save one hundred chil-
dren by pressing a button, or press a different button to save these hundred children
and prevent an additional child from losing a foot. Stipulate that the cost of pressing
the button is your death. According to Principle, wewould get that if you are not going
to perform the third option, namely pressing the button to save one hundred children
and the foot of some additional child, then you ought to do nothing. But then you
would be required not to save the hundred children because you have opted to not go
just a bit further and save the foot of some additional child. This case helps makes it
more transparent that Principle is what is yielding these unintuitive conditional ought
claims. If we reject Principle, then we do not need to accept the problematic condi-
tional oughts which arise.
Once these claims are rejected, the proposed alternative is based on an appeal to con-
ditional permissions such as (150). The general idea behind the strategy is that if one
is not going to do the best option, then it is permissible to do the next best option.96
Pummer (2019) writes:
Now suppose your alternatives are (i) do nothing, (ii) save one child by sac-
rificing your arms, (iii) save this very child and another by sacrificing your
96Importantly, as Pummer notes, we should not have the relevant permission claim imply something
to the effect of: ‘If it is permissible not to save both children, then it is permissible to save only one child’.
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arms, or (iv) save both these very same children and a third by sacrificing
your arms. On a plausible extension of what I have argued here, you ought
to save all three or save none, but if you are not going to save all three,
you ought to save two or save none, and so on. It would be implausible
to claim that, because you have excluded saving all three, you are condi-
tionally permitted to do any of these non- excluded alternatives. Of these
non-excluded alternatives that are wrong, you are conditionally permitted
to do only the least wrong one. At the same time, you are permitted to save
none.
I agree that this strategy based on conditional permissions is preferable to the previ-
ous strategy based on conditional obligation. The notion of permission is something
I appeal to as well, especially in explaining the wrongness of at least some cases of
suboptimal supererogation. One notable advantage over the approach defended by
Horton is that characterizing the relevant judgments in terms of conditional permis-
sions provides us with a notion that does not discourage one from saving a child if
they are not going to go all the way and save both.
My main point of contention with the overall strategy defended here mainly lies in the
fact that my view is that Principle can be defended, but only a specific version of it,
one that is understood in an idealistic manner. While I am potentially sympathetic to
rejecting Principle, I think that there is also reason to believe that it is important to pre-
serve what is good and reasonable about it in the first place. In my view, what should
be preferred is an account which helps preserve Principle in at least some cases while
rejecting it in others, in hopefully some principled way. A virtue of distinguishing be-
tween realistic and idealistic senses of ought is that this has the potential to preserve
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Principle by reserving it for an idealistic interpretation.
For these reasons, I am inclined against a wholesale rejection of Principle. After all,
the notions invoked in this principle are each very complicated and subject to further
variability. This point applies especially to the notion of ought. If I am right that we
can distinguish between scalar and binary senses of ought, then this should have some
implications for how we understand Principle and its applications.
4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The general problem of suboptimal supererogation demands that we consider a closer
examination of the core normative modal notions of permission, recommendation, and
requirement. This reveals the need to carefully distinguish and emphasize the under-
appreciated distinction between deontic modals which receive a realistic interpretation
and deontic modals which receive an idealistic interpretation. This, in turn, leads us to
recognize a difference between realistic supererogation and idealistic supererogation.
The judgment that an act of suboptimal supererogation can be wrong is due to a realis-
tic notion of supererogation, one on which what we ought to do are the highest-ranked
option or set of options. While such acts are not supererogatory in the realistic sense,
they are still supererogatory in the idealistic sense, which does not involve the ought of
optimality. These claims raise significant questions about the notions of rightness and
wrongness, and more work needs to be done to analyze how it is that these notions are
related to or fit into the a framework for understanding the central modal notions in
the philosophy of normativity.
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In the concluding chapter to this dissertation (Chapter 5), I return to the issue of right-
ness and wrongness, and elaborate on some of the complexities, along with a discus-
sion of some other issues.
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Conclusion
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CLOSING REMARKS
There are several arguments and proposals in this thesis, and the main theses defended
are:
 That because the variability of generics resembles the variability of weak neces-
sity modals, generics therefore involve covert weak necessity modals.
 That moral principles are best understood as generic generalizations and that this
supports a particularist model of moral reasoning.
 That the diversity of the central deontic notions reveals further avenues for un-
derstanding and interpreting the notion of supererogation.
Because these points raise several significant further questions for research, in this clos-
ing chapter, I would like to take the opportunity to highlight and discuss a couple of
additional philosophical issues pertaining to the following topics:
 Issue 1: RIGHTNESS AND WRONGNESS
 Issue 2: MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY
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5.1 ISSUE 1: RIGHTNESS AND WRONGNESS
One of the issues left unresolved in Chapter 4 was on characterizing the general rela-
tionship between notions such as moral rightness and moral wrongness with respect
to the modal notions we have discussed and defined such as permission, recommen-
dation, and requirement. At least one such general problem is the remainder of the is-
sue of suboptimal supererogation which concerns the acceptability of suboptimal acts.
When are such acts acceptable, if at all?
If a donation toward the cause of animal welfare is less optimal compared to the option
of donating toward the purchase of malaria nets, then it follows that donating toward
animal welfare is not optimally permissible and therefore, in one sense, wrong. How-
ever, there is the fairly robust judgment that there is nothing wrong in donating to the
cause of animal welfare. Hence, what is needed is not only an account of how exactly
rightness and wrongness relate to the varied notions of permission, recommendation,
and requirement, but also an account which matches up with our intuitive judgments.
For our purposes, the focus will continue to be on cases of suboptimality because these
cases are interesting and controversial. One extreme way to resolve the controversial
fact that some suboptimal acts seem acceptable whereas others seem unacceptable is
to deny that our judgments are tracking the facts and explain away these judgments.
Such a view is highly implausible. The defender of such a strategy would be in a highly
undesirable argumentative position having to posit, perhaps even for unprincipled
reasons, that our judgments are unreliable. The starting position I accept is that there
really are situations where acting suboptimally is permissible and perfectly morally
acceptable. While I will not be in the business of giving a general account of when
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and how suboptimality can be morally acceptable, I will, however, be interested in the
different possibilities for modeling suboptimality and its relationship to notions such
as rightness or wrongness.
An interesting theoretical possibility is to consider falls out of the idea that we should
be careful to understand these core normativemodal notions in context. Then rightness
and wrongness, too, are subject to similar sorts of variability, perhaps even underap-
preciated forms of variability.
It is important to note here we should question whether moral features such as right-
ness and wrongness are to be uniquely understood in terms of optimality.97 Giving
money to an animal welfare charity is undoubtedly supererogatory, even if only in the
idealistic sense. I will discuss two ways we can approach the matter of how it is we
can account for the overriding judgments of rightness and wrongness that we appear
to have in response to different examples of suboptimal supererogation.
One approach would interpret rightness and wrongness in terms of optimality. We
can optimality not in terms of the top-ranked option but rather a set of options which
exceed a certain context-sensitive threshold. Then such a threshold could allow that
donating to an animal welfare charity is optimally permissible and, hence, not wrong.
In a related fashion, the optimality standard can be tweaked using a context-sensitive
threshold in the following way. For example, we might suggest that any action which
is greater than half as optimal as the top-ranked action counts as optimally permissible.
Saving only one child is only half as optimal as saving both children, so this does not
pass the bar of optimal permissibility. Donating to an animal welfare charity is close to
97It is also worth noting that it is a matter of significant controversy whether notions such as rightness
and wrongness are binary or scalar. See Sinhababu (2018) for recent discussion, as well as arguments for
the scalar view.
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optimality as a malaria net charity, so this action is reasonably optimally permissible.
This approach unfortunately leaves us with big questions about how such thresholds
are determined.
Another approach would involve accepting that there are different notions of rightness
and wrongness corresponding to the different senses of permissibility we have consid-
ered. While donating to the cause of animal welfare is not permissible in the optimal
sense associated with the realistic notion of supererogation, it is permissible from the
perspective of the idealistic sense of supererogation. The overall judgment cannot be
that donating to the cause of animal welfare is both wrong and not wrong. One of these
judgments is overriding, and there is a big question about which notions of rightness
andwrongness take salience for a givenmoral judgment. Or perhaps theremight be no
overriding rightness or wrongness, but rather a plurality of such notions. At the same
time, one of the benefits here would be that it is theoretically interesting and perhaps
even enlightening to entertain different notions of rightness and wrongness.
My interest here is not to adjudicate between these approaches or to argue for some
particular one, but to put them forward because of their more general philosophical
interest. There are definitely further questions to consider regarding the kind of vari-
ability associated with our notions of rightness and wrongness, and also whether they
are at all closely related with the notions at stake in our background framework of the
core modal notions.
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5.2 ISSUE 2: MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY
I have argued in this thesis that we should understand moral principles as generic
generalizations. If this is true, then we have good reason to accept a form of partic-
ularism on which moral principles do not appropriately support reasoning about the
moral status of particular cases. The arguments which pursue this claim emphasize
the centrality of moral philosophy in the dispute over generalism and particularism.
These issues raise several further questions for research in moral epistemology:
 Question 1: Epistemology of Moral Generalizations The account of our justi-
fication in general moral principles should be sensitive to whatever account of
moral principles we are working with. If we should be working with the generic
view, then it would be natural to think that some considerations in the episte-
mology of generics should be relevant in constructing such a theory. What is the
relationship between the epistemology of generics and our justification in moral
principles?
 Question 2: Epistemology of Particular Cases The arguments in Chapter 3 pur-
port to show that our knowledge of whether an action has a givenmoral property
is not supported by general principles. These arguments are supported by the in-
termediary claim that generic generalizations on their own are not apt to support
our knowledge in reasoning about particular instances.
 Question 3: Questions of Priority Once we have separated out some differences
in the epistemology of the general and the epistemology of the particular, one
way to map out the terrain of possible positions in moral epistemology is to think
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about whether some particular approach to moral epistemology, perhaps by fo-
cus on general principles or particular cases, takes priority in an account of moral
knowledge.
Question 1 One question not directly considered in this thesis was on our knowledge
of the general principles linking together actions with moral properties. Arguing that
generic moral principles are not suited for reasoning about particular cases does not
entail that we should reject such principles. Nor does it entail that we cannot have
knowledge of such principles. The justification of general moral principles is an en-
tirely different matter, one that should be guided by the overall view we accept about
the nature of moral principles.
This means that if we accept the generic view of moral principles, we should expect
that there is further work to be done in delivering a positive theory of the role of moral
principles in morality. This is something that moral particularists want to be able to do.
But in order to take on this task, someone who accepts arguments that are friendly to
particularism need to start with a clear conception of moral principles that is suitably
non-central with respect to action guidance and moral reasoning.
If we accept the generic view, it is then natural to consider the general workings of a
theory of justification related to other more paradigmatic generic generalizations. Such
a theory would likely benefit from recent empirical work on the sorts of judgments
people are prone to make involving generics. As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3,
there are a range of defects associated with generics and their role in reasoning. Such
considerations would likely play a role in a general account of justification for moral
principles.
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Question 2 It is generally to fair to characterize the argument from Non-Numerity in
Chapter 3 as a negative argument in the sense that it does not tell us anything about
how it is that we do happen to acquire justification in our particular moral judgments.
The positive work that needs to be done here takes us well beyond the scope of that
chapter. Amongst the possible ways forward, we can separate out at least two of them
for now. It is possible to tie an account of the epistemology of particular moral judg-
ments to something to do with generics, or the account can be entirely separate from
considerations having to do with generics.
I am skeptical about the possibility of relying on the generic nature of moral principles
to inform us about anything about particular cases. And I think that the arguments in
Chapter 3 allow us to conclude this, and thus provide direction for a positive way for-
ward. For these reasons, as well as some independent ones, my sympathies are instead
with an account which does not appeal to generalities in how we should discern the
moral properties of particular actions.
Question 3 The final point I wanted to discuss here concerns questions of priority. I
have claimed that it is important to separate questions in the epistemology of morality
in the way I have described by distinguishing the epistemology of the general and of
the particular. An overall account of moral epistemology ought to account for how it is
that we have knowledge of particular moral facts as well as how we have knowledge
of general moral principles.
There are two possible directions that I wish to discuss here: one direction consists
in giving priority to particular moral facts and the other direction consists in giving
priority to general moral principles.
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Call the view that particular moral knowledge has priority Particularist-First Moral Epis-
temology. The main task for the Particularist-First moral epistemologist is to give an ac-
count of how it is that we come to know or have justified beliefs in in particular moral
facts. The Particularist-First approach need not endorse any commitment to general
moral principles. Without such a commitment, the Particularist-First philosopher can
instead be committed to the idea that knowledge of particular moral facts is all there is
to moral epistemology.
Call the view which gives priority to general moral principles Generalist-First Moral
Epistemology. This view is roughly opposed to Particularist-First Moral Epistemology.
Themain task for a Generalist-First moral epistemologist is to give an account of how it
is we come to know or have justified beliefs in general moral principles. One approach
such a moral epistemologist could take is that our knowledge of general moral princi-
ples determines the moral status of particular actions. In this way, the epistemology of
particular moral facts is more or less a matter of knowing the general moral principles.
In distinguishing between these positions and theoretical options, we can see which of
these conflict with my arguments about the nature of moral reasoning, and which of
these would be open for future consideration if these arguments are accepted.
The well-known debates on the status of moral principles, that is, the debates between
generalists and particularists, can also be described as disputes about whether we
should endorse a Particularist-First approach or a Generalist-First approach regard-
ing questions of the epistemology of particular moral facts. On the particularist view
of moral reasoning I have argued for, we get reason to endorse a Particularist-First
approach regarding the epistemology of particular moral facts.
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These usual debates on the status of moral principles, however, tend to leave out ques-
tions of the epistemology of the general moral principles themselves. On a certain
brand of a Particularist-First view, the epistemology of general moral principles is noth-
ing more than just the epistemology of particular moral facts. But this is not the only
option for an account of our knowledge of general moral principles.
And although I have argued for the insignificance of moral principles with respect
to questions of particular moral knowledge, it is still the case that moral principles
are significant in understanding questions pertaining to our beliefs and justification
in general moral knowledge. Treating moral principles in terms of generic generaliza-
tions could therefore potentially open up theoretical possibilities for accounting for the
epistemology of general moral principles.
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